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Abstract 
This thesis presents a comparative study of cultural policy in Britain and 
Italy. It provides a historical reconstruction of the cultural, legal and 
administrative contexts for cultural policy-making in the two countries, 
with a view of highlighting how cultural policy priorities have changed 
over time. The discussion of the growing popularity, in Italy, of notions of 
the cultural heritage as an engine for local economic development and as 
a resource that can allow the government to find the resources it needs 
to finance infrastructural works is given particular emphasis. Indeed, this 
probably represents the most original contribution made to the field of 
cultural policy research, in that Italy is a much under-researched country, 
and extant literature in English is almost non-existent. The main 
argument that the discussion aims to substantiate is that, despite being 
rooted in very different cultural and administrative traditions, both the 
British and Italian cultural policy debates seem to display a growing 
popularity of an instrumentalist rhetoric, which justifies public subsidy of 
the cultural sector on the grounds of the alleged beneficial impacts of the 
sector in the social and economic spheres. The main contribution of the 
thesis to the current understanding of instrumental cultural policy is 
therefore to offer plausible explanations for this recent trend. The thesis 
argues that the current situation, both in Italy and the UK, can be best 
understood in the light of the global phenomenon of neo-liberal 
globalisation, and the tendency for policy-transfer between countries that 
it tends to promote. 
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Introduction 
As it is probably the case for most research projects, the questions that 
this thesis attempts to answer have changed remarkably as I got 
progressively more involved in the research process. The main spur for 
my interest in conducting a comparative research of cultural policy in 
Britain and Italy, however, has remained unchanged. As an Italian 
student having completed a postgraduate course in cultural policy studies 
in the UK, I was quite aware of the extent to which issues of 
instrumentality and relevance to social and economic policy were crucial 
aspects of cultural policy-making and administration in the UK. I was 
aware of how such developments had been traced back, by scholars and 
commentators, to the Thatcherite era and the profound transformations 
that it had operated in the British system of public administration. As I 
began to read about contemporary developments in Italian cultural policy, 
however, it soon became evident that the rhetoric of instrumentalism, and 
the emphasis on the potential for local economic development of the 
cultural heritage (especially in the struggling South, where I am from) had 
equally become current in the Italian debate. Instinctively, I felt that the 
exploitation of the rhetoric of the 'useful arts' (Cheit 1975) to justify the 
expenditure of public resources to the advantage of the cultural sector 
was, to a significant extent, in contradiction (if not openly incompatible) 
with what I perceived to be the prevailing understanding of the role of 
culture in the life of the nation among Italians. I was also very curious to 
grasp by what route such concepts, apparently extraneous to indigenous 
debates over cultural policy, had entered the Italian borders, and where 
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they came from. The equivalence and the borrowing of terms seemed to 
point towards the Anglo-Saxon world as the main 'exporter' of the 
instrumental arguments. This thesis is the result of my attempt to 
understand the roots and the contemporary evolution of national cultural 
policy in my native and adopted countries, and to provide possible and 
plausible explanations for what initially seemed to me to be puzzling 
phenomena. I believe that one way to solve the mystery is to look beyond 
both the British and Italian borders at trends and developments of a 
global nature, whose effects are currently been felt, though in different 
degrees and intensities, in both the countries under analysis here. 
As my research progressed, I soon discovered that, not only are 
conceptions of culture and cultural policy different across borders, but 
that no rigorous methodology for cross-national comparisons exists as 
yet. In fact, the very concept of what a 'cultural policy' actually is (or 
ought to be) is far from being uncomplicated or uncontroversial. The 
understanding of 'cultural policy' that the present study relies upon has 
been clearly spelled out by Hugues Simonin (2003,116-7): 
... a cultural policy cannot be described only from a 
formal point of 
view as a neutral public intervention in the field of culture. We know 
that a "culture" corresponds to a set of rules, the content of which is 
contingent. So, it appears that cultural policies pursued in a society 
show us how "culture" is interpreted, in the particular case of this 
given society. Cultural policies have a hermeneutic dimension in 
that they disclose what a society holds to be "cultural", and 
henceforth disclose the being of a society. 
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Simonin (Ibid., 117) further explains that cultural policies are both "a way 
of moulding values into formal shapes, and formal shapes into values"; in 
other words, "the objects dealt with by cultural policies are intrinsically 
linked to the way they are dealt with: the content and the container have 
to be considered altogether to express the essence of the social being". 
As will become obvious as the methodology followed for the present 
analysis is expounded in the first section of this thesis, this is indeed the 
main guiding principle that I have followed in the course of my research. 
Because of the very nature of cultural policy studies, in order to write this 
thesis, I have made use of very diverse bodies of literature that belong to 
different disciplinary fields and that have been written under the aegis of 
different theoretical positions. Despite an inclusive and eclectic approach 
to the consultation of the extant literature, my own theoretical standpoint 
is based on the belief that, in order to be fully understood, cultural 
phenomena need to be placed in their historical and political context. 
Cultural manifestations can be fully understood only when placed in the 
context of the material development of a certain civilization, the forms 
that state power assumes at that particular historical time, and the power 
struggles that characterize class-relations within a certain social context. 
The centrality of the 'context' ostensibly becomes even more crucial 
when researching politically and historically sensitive issues such as the 
politics of culture and cultural policy. This type of approach many would 
label "Marxist" (Eagleton 1990.5). The dangers of such position Eagleton 
(Ibid., 4) - who certainly knows about Marxist criticism - summarises as 
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"the 'left-functionalism' which reduces the internal complexity of the 
aesthetic to a direct set of ideological functions". I hope to have avoided 
such risks of reductionism, and to have made justice to the 'relative 
autonomy' of the artistic sphere'. However, I do believe that, especially in 
the present cultural climate, it is important to stress how cultural 
production and consumption, and - consequently - cultural policy have 
become enmeshed with economic preoccupations and other, apparently 
extraneous, political agendas. Hence the importance of understanding 
cultural phenomena 'in context'. Terry Eagleton (1990,5-6) has 
described the present situation in a compelling passage, worth quoting at 
length: 
The truth is that a combination of factors has contributed in many 
areas of contemporary left-wing thought to the open or 
surreptitious denigration of such questions as social class, 
historical modes of production and forms of state power, in the 
name of a commitment to more 'topical' modes of political 
struggle. Paramount among these factors has been the newly 
aggressive turn to the political right of several Western bourgeois 
regimes, under pressure of global capitalist crisis -a dramatic 
shift in the political spectrum and ideological climate which has 
succeeded in muting and demoralizing many of those whose 
earlier spoke up more combatively and confidently for a 
revolutionary politics. There has been in this respect what one 
can only characterize as a pervasive failure of political nerve, and 
in some cases an accelerating, sometimes squalid process of 
accommodation by sectors of the left to the priorities of a 
capitalist politics. 
The concept of 'relative autonomy' was introduced by Althusser with the intent to 
sidestep the potentially simplistic view of culture and art as a 'superstructure' completely 
determined by the characteristics of the economic base. In this respect, Althusser 
claimed that despite the undeniable connections between culture and economics, the 
sphere of art still maintains a certain autonomy and independence from the economic 
forces at work in society (Barry 1995,163). 
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There is no doubt that a strongly 'militant' tone characterises Eagleton's 
indictment of the current acquiescence to the values of the market (even 
when these appear in contradiction with previously held values and 
policy priorities). Such 'accommodation', rather than being limited to 
certain sectors of left-wing academia, is in fact a prevalent attitude that 
can be detected in the workings of governments and public institutions 
throughout the Western world and beyond. Indeed, this thesis concerns 
itself precisely with the consequences, in the sphere of cultural policy- 
making, of such processes of compliancy with the values of neo-liberal 
globalisation and the transformations that, as a result, have taken place 
within public administration (and cultural administration in particular) in 
Britain and Italy. 
This thesis, however, is not a 'militant' argument in the way that the 
passage quoted from Eagleton is. For the guiding ideal that has steered 
the present research is rather consistent with the principle of 'critical and 
reflexive cultural policy analysis' as it has been defined, recently, by Jim 
McGuigan (2004,19): 
Critical and reflexive cultural policy analysis is permitted to ask 
awkward questions about the conditions of culture and society in 
the world at large that go beyond the self-imposed limitations of 
management consultancy and policy-wonking. 
This thesis represents, indeed, my attempt to provide plausible answers 
to some 'awkward questions' indeed. In particular, the present research 
aims to tackle the following main questions: 
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" Are 'instrumental' notions of the arts and culture significant 
aspects of current cultural policy making in the UK? If this is 
indeed the case, can we convincingly argue that such 
instrumental notions are slowly taking root in Italy too? 
" How can we account for recent developments in cultural policies 
in the two countries? And how do they fit in the historical evolution 
of the British and Italian cultural policy model? 
" Can we suggest possible paradigms of explanation for these new 
developments in British and - more recently - Italian cultural 
policy (in a similar way in which - for instance - Clive Gray (2000) 
has interpreted the evolution of British arts administration over the 
past sixty years as a result of processes of commodification of 
culture)? 
The thesis deals with these questions in three different sections. The 
first, which includes the first three chapters, tackles methodological 
problems arising from a cross-national study of culture and cultural 
policy, and offers an analysis of the legislative, political and linguistic 
'contexts' of cultural policy making in Britain and Italy. The second 
section (chapter 4 to 6) attempts to trace the historical roots of the British 
and Italian national models of cultural policy and administration by 
discussing the intellectual traditions of the two countries. This part also 
traces the more recent developments of their cultural policies with a 
particular focus on the apparent convergence of policy priorities in the 
two nations, and the common rhetoric of instrumentalism that seems to 
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dominate the public debate over cultural spending. Finally, the last 
section of the thesis seeks to find, in the spread of neo-liberal 
globalisation and related phenomena, a possible explanation for the 
afore-mentioned developments in cultural policy, suggesting that the 
theory of 'policy transfer' might offer a useful paradigm to make sense of 
the current common trends displayed by British and Italian cultural 
policies. 
An important note needs to be made with regards to the scope of the 
analysis presented in the thesis. Although a number of the broader 
conclusions put forward for the case study of England (especially with 
regards to the spread of managerialism in the public sector and 
instrumental cultural policy) might be extended to the whole of Britain 
(with the exception, possibly, of Scotland, where post-devolution cultural 
policy appears to be developing in increasingly autonomous ways), this 
thesis focuses mainly on a study of policies for the arts sector in 
England. Thus, issues of devolution, though undoubtedly relevant to a 
discussion of British cultural policy, are not included in the present 
analysis due to limitations of space. 
With regards to the Italian case, the discussion of the Italian cultural 
policy model and its evolution focuses mainly on heritage policy, and on 
the national level. It was my original intention to also cover regional and 
municipal heritage policy-making in Italy. However, within the extant 
literature, the analysis of contemporary cultural policy-making in the 
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English language is extremely paltry. As a consequence, introducing the 
very basis of policy-making in the cultural sector in Italy to an English- 
speaker readership entailed the need for a more detailed discussion of 
policy rationales and their historical evolution that was required for the 
British case. It soon became obvious that limitations of space meant that 
a decision needed to be made on whether to opt for scope or depth in 
the chapter devoted to Italy. In this instance, depth seemed the most 
crucial aspect, and the decision was made to limit the scope of the 
discussion mainly to policy-making at the national level, with a view to 
being thus able to deal appropriately with the complexity of the Italian 
legal and administrative systems. 
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Chapter 1 
Comparing cultural policy in Britain and Italy: Towards a 
methodological framework 
Today we live in an increasingly "globalised" world, in which the local, 
national and international dimensions are more and more interwoven, 
and this is true whether we are discussing the production of commodities, 
the characteristics of the knowledge economy, the birth of social or 
political movements, or the spread of new ideas and values. It is 
therefore inevitable for most countries to feel the need to look at each 
other's experiences when making important political and administrative 
decisions. In this context of increasing interdependence between nations, 
it is easy to understand the reason for the growing interest in comparative 
research. These are indeed the circumstances in which comparative 
cultural policy studies have developed. This chapter will therefore attempt 
to analyse some methodological problems arising from the comparative 
study of public policies for the cultural sector, focussing in particular on 
those that appear to be especially relevant to the research on hand. The 
discussion will thus attempt to highlight the limitations of much of the 
currently available comparative cultural policy research. The conclusive 
section of the chapter will finally propose some ideas for further research 
and for a broader, multi-dimensional and multidisciplinary approach to the 
cross-national study of cultural policies. For only such an approach can 
succeed in accounting for the different cultural, administrative, political 
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and legal traditions between the countries observed, thus providing a 
better understanding of the mechanisms of cultural policy-making within 
the countries at the centre of the present study. 
THE USE AND ABUSE OF CULTURAL STATISTICS IN CROSS-NATIONAL 
RESEARCH 
Comparative cultural policy is a very young discipline which is 
increasingly acquiring a growing degree of popularity among scholars 
interested in the study of cultural studies, public policy, cultural 
economics, and, more broadly, the economic and legal conditions for 
cultural production and distribution. The earliest examples of comparative 
studies of this nature date back to about 30 years, when a small group of 
experts began conducting research and compiling reports and papers, 
mainly on behalf of international organizations such as UNESCO 
(Wiesand 2002). In Europe - on which the analysis in this chapter 
focuses - this phenomenon can be clearly detected in the tendency 
shown by European Governments, around the early 70s, to look beyond 
their national borders for inspiration and solutions to their policy 
problems. Observing one's own national policies in comparison to other 
countries' is indeed a very good way to get a fuller understanding of the 
policy-making processes and their effectiveness in the homeland. This 
observation is especially valid for EU countries, where the attempts on 
the part of international and transnational organizations (first and 
foremost the European Community itself) to establish common standards 
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in several public policy areas have represented a strong incentive for 
researching the ways in which other EU countries have faced common 
problems (Antal et al 1996,10). 
As a result of this growing interest for cross-national comparisons of 
public policies, the first European intergovernmental conferences on 
cultural policies took place in Venice in 1970, and in Helsinki in 1972, 
with the aim of looking at their objectives and their financial and 
administrative aspects (Wiesand, 2002). Furthermore, the interest in this 
topic has not ceased to be a stimulus for the setting up of ambitious 
cross-national research projects, especially on the part of European and 
international bodies such as the Council of Europe or UNESCO. And we 
cannot avoid mentioning in this regard, the programme of national 
cultural policy reviews that was set up in 1985 by the Council for Cultural 
Co-operation within the Council of Europe. The reviews involved two 
types of report for each country that took part in the programme: a 
'national' report was produced by the relevant authorities (i. e. Ministries 
of Culture, of Foreign Affairs, etc. ); a second was compiled by a team of 
experts appointed by the Council of Europe (D'Angelo and Vesperini 
1998,12-13). 
This was certainly a very important step forward in the developing of an 
international interest for the exercise of cross-national, comparative 
cultural policy analysis. However, from the point of view of methodology, 
which is the issue with which this chapter concerns itself, there are 
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problems with this type of research that do not allow us to consider this 
project as a genuinely comparative study on various national cultural 
policies. The UNESCO series of publications Studies and documents on 
cultural policies presents similar problems: each of the volumes offers a 
description of the cultural policy of each state; however, the data 
presented in each booklet have been collected in different ways in each 
country, and at different points in time. The data are thus not harmonized 
because they reflect the very particular political, institutional and 
administrative realities of each country, as well as different practices in 
data collection. The data are, thus, impossible to compare (Schuster 
1996,30). Unfortunately, the harmonization of data collection, and 
therefore the comparability across states of national cultural statistics, is - 
even among EU countries - still not an achievement as much as a target, 
albeit a target that seems to be getting closer. At the European level, 
good results have been achieved, and a 'common statistical language' 
has been developed that allows for the collection of consistent statistics 
(and consequently for sound international comparisons) in the field of 
economics. Currently, work is being done towards a more focused 
development of harmonized EU cultural statistics via the involvement of 
Eurostat, the Statistical office of the European Communities and the 
institution, in 1997, of a cultural statistics LEG (Leadership Group) with a 
mandate to start producing statistics on cultural expenditure, employment 
in the cultural sector, comparable across the EU (Allin, 2000). Another 
factor worth mentioning here is the recent trend in the rise of the 
phenomenon of the international "cultural observatories", whose work is 
20 
often of a cross-national nature and whose number and importance in 
the context of the diffusion and production of cultural data have been 
consistently growing in the last decade. Schuster (2002,29-39) in his 
recently published work on the cultural policy information infrastructure, 
has contributed a detailed discussion of the rise of organizations such as 
cultural observatories and networks and the ways in which their activities 
of data-gathering, monitoring and dissemination of information - as well 
as their particular modus operandi - has increasingly impacted (in ways 
that are both good and bad) on cultural policy research. 
However crucial the development of comparable international cultural 
statistics is for the development of cross-national cultural policy analysis, 
it is important not to reduce methodological issues in comparative 
cultural policy to a mere discussion of harmonization of statistical data. In 
fact, too often comparative cultural policy is limited to a discussion over 
comparability of national public arts expenditure data, and to the 'league 
table' approach that tends to come with it. The problem with the latter is 
that it seems to reduce the comparative study of policies for culture to the 
production - more or less rigorous - of tables that claim to compare 
government support for the arts in different countries (normally by 
charting the proportion of per capita state expenditure on the arts and 
culture)2. Indeed, to borrow the words of J. Mark Schuster, who has 
written widely on the problems concerning the scarce availability, 
2 The Research Report International data on public spending on the arts in eleven 
countries published by the Arts Council of England (edited by Feist et al. ) in 1998 and 
discussed later on in the chapter is one of the most recent and ambitious examples of 
this type of publication. 
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reliability and comparability of cultural statistics in comparative cultural 
policy research, "the league table has become a sine qua non of much 
comparative research on arts funding" (Schuster 1996,24). He goes on 
to argue that often these tables, while giving the impression of providing 
answers to fundamental questions about state support for the arts in 
various countries, actually raise more questions that they answer 
(Schuster 1996,23-26). An interesting case in point is one of the latest 
statistics-based comparative studies of public funding of the arts carried 
out in the UK, and commissioned by the Arts Council of England in 1998. 
According to the data presented in the published report, the cultural 
sector allegedly occupies less than two per cent of the total public 
expenditure in many European countries. The proportion of public 
resources devoted to culture seems to be, in fact, less than one per cent 
in the two countries at the centre of this study, Italy and the UK (Feist et 
aL, 1998). Undoubtedly, there are a number of reasons that call for a 
cautious approach to such data. For instance, subsidies to public 
libraries are not included in the calculation of public expenditure on 
culture in the UK. However, in the section devoted to Italy, archives and 
libraries are included in the tables charting government's expenditures on 
culture. Therefore, data presented in the report offer a distorted picture of 
the financial commitment of the British state to culture. As a result, 
comparing the data presented in different sections of the same report 
turns out to be a rather pointless, if not even misleading, exercise. This 
can be explained with the fact that the report is based on the analysis of 
existing published and unpublished data available in each country. Such 
22 
data has been collected according to differing criteria across different 
countries, and some of the extant statistical data might be impossible to 
disaggregate. This is indeed a problem common to much cross-national 
work that relies heavily on quantitative material. 
Therefore, the 'league table' approach and, more generally, a study of 
cultural policy that relies exclusively or mainly on quantitative data 
(usually the comparison of national expenditure data to explain 
differences between cultural policies across nations) can be misleading 
and, indeed, has been criticized as such within the academic literature in 
the field (Schuster, 1988 and 1996; Kawashima, 1995; Feist and 
Hutchison, 1990). It is not in the intention of this chapter to provide a 
detailed criticism of this type of research, however, in the present context 
it might be useful to refer to Schuster's (1996,34) mention of an article, 
now famous within the American public policy literature, written in 1971 
by Max Singer. The article was entitled - rather eloquently - The vitality 
of mythical numbers. Its content is very simple, yet meaningful: once a 
statistic is produced (no matter how incorrectly) and starts being quoted, 
it takes on a life of its own. As a result, the imaginary statistics might 
enter the official debate on cultural policy, being quoted for years without 
their original source and its reliability ever being verified. 
An explanation for this state of affairs can be the fact that much of the 
comparative research that has so far been carried out in the sphere of 
cultural policy is very political in its intent, and thus often confuses 
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research and advocacy. As a result, the desire for increased 
understanding often gives in to the political desirability of certain 
outcomes over others. In fact, it is not rare for the policy-makers that 
commission research to have a more or less explicit political purpose. 
(Schuster, 1988 and 1996; Kawashima 1995 and 1999). Consequently, 
too many of the available studies are the product of a time-limited 
commission from arts agencies or funding bodies whose genuine 
objective is not to further knowledge and understanding through research 
(Schuster, 1988,2). Moreover, nowadays in most countries, arts 
organizations work on very tight budgets that do not always include 
resource allocations especially devoted to funding research. This means 
that more often than not, resources for research are detracted from 
resources that would have otherwise been spent on cultural activities. 
Hence the sometime considerable internal pressure, within arts 
organizations, against funding research (Schuster 1996,34). In such a 
context, it is important to underline the important contribution that the 
academic world could make to the development of more 
methodologically sound and unbiased research in the field of cultural 
policy studies. 3 
CULTURAL POLICY ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: THE "MODELS OF 
CULTURAL POLICY" APPROACH 
3 Nevertheless, it seems still true what Kawashima wrote in 1999, that "... there has 
been a gap between practical, policy-oriented research and academic, theoretical 
research" (Kawashima, 1999,2) 
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Although a significant proportion of cross-national studies in the 
disciplinary area of cultural policy studies are based on the presentation 
and the discussion of quantitative data, it would be wrong to assume that 
this is the only type of comparative research currently available. In fact, 
another important strand of cross-national research has been developing 
in parallel to the 'league table' type described above. This alternative 
form of cross-national analysis is represented by what could be labelled 
as the 'cultural policy models" literature. By this expression, I refer to the 
body of work that discusses the different administrative frameworks for 
cultural policy in different countries in the attempt to derive, from such 
observation, a number of "archetypical" models of cultural policy to which 
all others could be more or less be ascribed. This type of work, whose 
most influential examples were published in the mid-80s, quite often 
attempted to establish and observe the links between national cultural 
policies and the cultural, intellectual and historical contexts of the 
countries in which they had developed. In many ways the contribution of 
such works is still valuable, in so far as they bring to the attention of the 
reader how different styles of cultural policy-making are a result of a 
number of complex variables and historical developments. One of the 
most illustrious representatives of this approach to cross-national 
research is the influential collection of essays edited by Cumming and 
Katz (1 987a) with the title The Patron State: Government and the Arts in 
Europe, North America and Japan. 
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In their introductory chapter, Cumming and Katz acknowledge the 
diversity among different countries' cultural policies and the institutions 
that are in charge to define and implement them. More importantly, they 
explicitly link such diversity to each county's particular context: "... this 
variety reflects not only differing national traditions in the organization of 
public functions, but differing philosophies and objectives regarding the 
whole area of culture and the arts" (Cumming and Katz 1987b, 4). The 
chapters that make up the book all share the ambition to shed light upon 
such differing philosophies of policy making for the cultural sector, as 
well as the varying definitions - adopted among different countries - of 
what cultural forms the state should take upon itself to finance and 
promote. On the basis of their historical roots, Cumming and Katz (Ibid., 
5) identify two main patterns of political development on which 
contemporary national cultural policy models have been moulded. The 
first is that of the royal absolutist states such as France and Austria, and 
the other is represented by more limited monarchies that developed in 
highly mercantile countries, such as the Netherlands and England. 
Countries like Germany and Italy - which were united in a single state 
only in the second part of the nineteenth century - display, according to 
this paradigm, a mixture of the characteristics of either group. From 
these diverging historical factors derived the various models of 
contemporary cultural policy presented in The Patron State. 
According to Cummings and Katz (1987b, 12) there are indeed various 
different organisational forms that governments can choose in order to 
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pursue their goals with regards to cultural policies: one is the quasi-public 
institution at arm's length from the government which tends to prevail in 
the Anglo-Saxon world, having been pioneered by the UK. The 
alternative approach is based on the notion that cultural provision and 
support are simply examples of the many functions of the state, and as 
such, they are to be run according to the normal rules and procedures 
that regulate the public administration. One variant of this approach is 
represented by the so-called "French Ministry of Culture Model", whereby 
responsibilities for policy-making, funding and advocacy for the cultural 
sector are all reunited under the roof of a single ministry, headed by a 
cabinet minister. In Cummings and Katz's paradigm, Italy represents a 
second variant of the normal public administration approach, since 
responsibility of cultural programmes is - in this case - divided amongst 
several ministries. In both the Italian and French models, however, 
resources for culture are allocated following the same budgetary 
procedures as for any other form of public spending, and the same 
control mechanisms are in place as for any other government's 
departments and ministries (Ibid. ). However, following the creation in Italy 
- in 1998 - of the first unified Ministry for Culture since the Fascist era, it 
might be argued that the difference identified in the late 1980s by 
Cumming and Katz between the French and Italian variants of the public 
administration-based model of cultural policy has lost much of its 
relevance today. Indeed, the Italian Ministry for Heritage and Cultural 
Activities has, according to Carla Bodo (2002,3) "finally achieved the full 
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status of a ministry of culture comparable to the ones existing in most 
European countries"4. 
Besides the obvious and inevitable obsolescence of the information it 
presents, from a methodological point of view, there are further limitations 
in this collection of essays. Arguably, The Patron State belongs to that 
category of work that Schuster (1996,30) has wittily labelled as the 'ten 
countries, ten chapters and a staple' literature. This is because the 
discussion offered by each chapter is in fact developed independently 
from the other chapters in the book. No common framework has been 
adopted and shared by the many authors whose papers are brought 
together in the volume. No particular disciplinary perspective or 
methodological approach has been consistently endorsed by all the 
authors. So, on the one hand, the chapter on Italy consists of a detailed 
and rather technical discussion of the legislation relevant to the 
administration of the cultural sector in force at the time in the country and 
how it originated in the Fascist era (Palma and Clemente di San Luca 
1987). On the other hand, the chapter on the UK adopts a more 
discursive tone and - after an attempt to link prevalent notions of culture 
in Britain to the country's Protestant tradition and to the political 
dominance of capitalism - presents a historical review of the historical 
development of the main institutions responsible for the distribution of 
public resources to the British arts sector. As the following sections of this 
thesis aim to show, there is a well founded reason why a legal focus is 
" The competencies of the unified Italian ministry now include the performing arts, 
cinema and copyright; only responsibilities for information and arts education are still 
beyond its remit (Bodo 2002). 
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more appropriate to understand the logic of cultural policy-making in Italy 
- and therefore preferable to an approach based solely on historical 
reconstruction such as the one chosen by F. F. Ridley (1987) for his 
chapter Tradition, Change, and Crisis in Great Britain. However, no 
explanation or justification for the adoption of such different approaches 
within the same collection of work is offered, since each chapter 
represents, in fact, a self-contained and independent unit which the 
authors have developed from a number of different disciplinary 
perspectives, emphasising different aspects of the process of cultural 
policy-making. 
A second influential work of the "cultural policy models" type is 
represented by the collection of essays edited by Cummings and 
Schuster and published by the American Council for the Arts in 1989. 
The contribution by Hilman-Chartrand and McCaughey to the volume is 
the most relevant to the present discussion. Their paper looks at the 
ways in which different governments articulate and implement their 
cultural policies, and on this basis, they identify four different models of 
the state's involvement in the financial support of the cultural sector. 
Hilman-Chartrand and McCaughey's chapter begins with a discussion of 
the centrality of the so-called "arm's length principle" in Western public 
policy and in the promotion of the arts and culture on the part of the state. 
However, there are other alternative modes of public support that need to 
be taken into consideration. In the authors own words: 
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The arm's length principle [... ] is not the only possible mode of 
public support to the fine arts. There are four alternative roles for 
the State: Facilitator, Patron, Architect and Engineer. 
Furthermore, the State can have two different objectives - to 
support the process of creativity or to support production of 
specific types of art such as socialist realism (Hilman-Chartrand 
and McCaughey 1989,48). 
The chapter goes on to provide examples of each of the four models of 
state support for the arts just described (Ibid. 48-53). So, the United 
States with its generous policy of promoting the arts through incentives to 
private donations in the form of foregone taxes, represent the Facilitator 
state. Great Britain, embodies the type of the Patron State, which is 
characterised by the reliance on bodies at "arm's length" from the 
government for the distribution of public resources to the cultural sector. 
France is the archetypical Architect state, where culture is highly 
bureaucratised and crucial decisions are made centrally by a Ministry for 
Culture. The fourth model of state intervention is the most appealing to 
governments with totalitarian tendencies, since it features the subjection 
of cultural policies and strategies to the obtainment of political goals, and 
artistic decisions are made and modified according to changes in the 
government's political priorities. Interestingly, after describing at great 
lengths the various models of state support of the arts, Hilman-Chartrand 
and McCaughey (Ibid., 53) admit that "[a]lthough these roles are mutually 
exclusive in theory, in practice, most nations combine some or all of 
them". Furthermore, the final section of the chapter, sets out to 
demonstrate how these ideal roles of the state vis ä vis the arts have 
been progressively converging, so that "[m]ost countries have, to varying 
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degrees, adopted all four modes of public support" (Ibid., 72) . In the 
fifteen years that have intervened since the publication of Hilman- 
Chartrand and McCaughey's work, with the process of globalisation now 
well underway, this trend towards convergence has become even more 
marked, and the role of the state in the promotion of the cultural sector 
has become so complex - if not even, occasionally, contradictory (as 
chapter 5 and 6 will show) - that the four ideal types described above are 
not as useful a tool in understanding how cultural policy develops 
differently in different countries as they probably were when they were 
first conceptualised. 
BEYOND A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 
In the light of the preceding observations, it cannot be denied that still a 
lot has to be done to conceptualise comparative cultural policy, so that 
we are able go beyond a purely quantitative methodology based on 
international comparison of cultural statistical data. Cultural expenditure 
is certainly an important aspect in so far as it represents an expression of 
a government's priorities in cultural funding and, consequently, in the 
broader sphere of cultural policy. Thus - as Clive Gray (1996,218-219) 
warns us - what is spent, how it is spent and the effects of what is spent 
are important issues in understanding cultural policies. This is especially 
significant when public expenditure is observed over the longer term, in 
order to register changes in governments' priorities and preoccupations 
vis 6 vis cultural policies. However, this chapter aims to suggest that a 
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quantitative approach cannot alone suffice to understand the workings of 
the cultural sector and of policies for it across nations. To this end, a 
methodological approach is needed that allows and requires a more in- 
depth study of the cultural, social and political history and the cultural 
debates within the countries being compared, as well as an 
understanding of their legal and administrative systems as a precondition 
for discussing cultural policy mechanisms cross-nationally. The 
importance of such an approach is indeed eloquently exemplified by the 
case study of the comparative analysis of the cultural policy of Britain 
and Italy. 
TOWARDS AN APPROPRIATE COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY: THE CONCEPT 
OF CONTEXTUALIZATION 
In the light of the preceding arguments, we are forced to conclude that 
the methodologies that currently guide comparative cultural policy 
research are largely inappropriate, and do not meet the specific 
requirements of cross-national research. The final section of this paper 
will thus attempt to offer some suggestions towards the development of a 
more appropriate methodology for comparative, cross-national analysis 
within the cultural policy field. To this end, inspiration can be drawn from 
research and debates that have taken place in the context of other 
academic disciplines. In particular, comparative social research and 
comparative policy studies seem to be the areas that can provide the 
richest wealth of implications for the field of cultural policy studies. In 
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particular, the notion of contextualization elaborated by social 
researchers will be shown to be especially significant and useful. The 
reason why it seems convenient to look at these disciplines for a way out 
of the methodological impasse in which comparative cultural policy 
research seems to have been trapped, is that the theorization and 
discussion of methodological concerns in cross-national research are 
more developed within these academic fields. Moreover, a review of the 
available literature in cross-national social research and policy analysis 
reveals that the problems that scholars within these fields have had to 
face, when developing suitable research methodologies, are substantially 
similar to those facing the cultural policy researcher. Significantly, 
Hantrais and Mangen (1999,91), who have written extensively on the 
topic, consider some of the crucial issues inherent in a comparative 
approach to social research as a consequence of the fact that "[m]uch of 
the officially sponsored research is primarily dictated by pressures to 
extract 'lessons from the homeland"'. They report that the sector has only 
recently witnessed the establishment of a more robust research agenda 
aiming at the definition of well-constructed models and the testing of 
theories. However, they conclude that much of the extant literature on the 
comparative research process tends to focus on 'thematic content and 
findings' rather than on theorizations and explorations of the theory and 
methodology of the research process. They maintain that: 
[T]he growing interest in cross-national comparisons within the 
social sciences since the 1970s has not therefore, been matched 
by commensurate advances at the theoretical and practical level. 
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As a result, the material collected in international projects is often 
not directly comparable, and the findings reported to sponsors may 
be biased or misleading" (Hantrais and Mangen 1999,91). 
These observations indeed reflect the objections moved against current 
practices in cross-national research in the cultural policy field earlier in 
this chapter. These methodological difficulties, thus, are not exclusive to 
this field of study, but seem rather intrinsic to international comparisons 
of cultures and policies. However, the existence of these problems has 
been acknowledged and thus appropriately confronted in the social 
sciences. A number of ways have hence been suggested in order to be 
able to compare cultures and policies across nations in a more rigorous 
and meaningful way. 
In particular, the most interesting contribution that comes from the 
sociological field is the development of contextualization as an approach 
to cross-national comparative research that can successfully circumvent 
some of the difficulties inherent in this type of research (Hantrais and 
Mangen 1999; Hantrais 1999). Linda Hantrais (1999) maintains that 
contextualization is central to all the possible approaches to comparative 
social research. Currently, social scientists are indeed showing an 
increasing interest in issues surrounding contextualization, which is now 
considered a fundamental component in cross-national comparative 
studies. Hantrais (1999,94) writes that "... an in-depth understanding of 
the socio-cultural, economic and political context in which social 
phenomena develop is a precondition for successful cross-national 
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comparative research". In the same paper, she also delineates the 
development of the discipline over time, and the changing attitudes 
toward the importance of context in cross-national research. She 
identifies three possible approaches to comparative social research: the 
universalist, culturalist and societal approach. 
According to Hantrais's schematisation, the belief of the early sociologists 
in the possibility of deriving general laws from sociological observation (in 
order to explain social phenomena across different cultures) deeply 
affected the international comparative research that was carried out in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Cross-national social research at this stage "... was 
grounded in the assumption that universal characteristics could be 
identified in social phenomena, independently from a specific context... 
This is because universalist theory was culture or context free" (Hantrais 
1999,94). The problem with the universalist approach is that it results in 
a research process which places its emphasis on the search for 
similarities and points of convergence among nations and cultures. It thus 
ignores the specificity of the social, political and cultural contexts of the 
social phenomena studied, since it is based on the assumption that 
"there are shared, universally identifiable, pressures and trends working 
across all industrialized societies" (O'Reilly quoted in May 1997,181) 
Alongside this school of thought, a rather different approach was 
elaborated by the Chicago School in the 1920s and 1930s, on the basis 
of a number of studies that were undertaken on cultural diversity in urban 
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settings. Whereas the universalists' body of research aimed at seeking 
uniformity and commonalities among countries (in order to draw 
generalizations and infer theories from observations), the Chicago School 
chose to concentrate their attention rather on particularism and national 
uniqueness. They aimed at trying to underline differences among 
countries and cultures through comparative research. If the universalist 
approach is regardless of context, the culturalist one is based on 
relativism and culture-boundedness. Accordingly, the very possibility of 
generalizing from field observations was rejected on the basis of the 
denial of the existence of universal concepts that could be meaningful 
across national boundaries. Indeed, this approach "placed such great 
emphasis on social contexts and their specificity, distinctiveness or 
uniqueness, that meaningful comparisons and generalization were made 
very difficult, if not impossible" (Hantrais 1999,95). 
In between these two extremes, Hantrais (1999,96-97) places an 
intermediate position which she defines as the 'societal approach'. This is 
based on the view that it is possible to generalise from observation, and 
hence derive theories, provided that the national specificity of the social, 
cultural and political contexts in which social phenomena manifest 
themselves is properly accounted for. This last, societal, approach to 
comparative research is indeed at the basis of the methodological model 
that this chapter strives to advocate for the achievement of a meaningful 
cross-national cultural policy research. This is also the methodological 
framework within which the comparative case study research presented 
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in this thesis is inscribed. Such an approach might indeed successfully 
contribute to overcome some of the limitations, and prevent some of the 
abuses, of current comparative research in this area. The problems that 
the comparative researcher might incur are made clearer by the 
distinction made in 1990 by Else Oyen (1990b, 5-6) between four 
archetypes of comparative researchers: the purists, the ignorants, the 
totalists, and finally, the genuine comparativists. 
The 'purists' are those who firmly believe that comparative work is no 
different from any other type of sociological research. They would 
therefore not feel the need to accompany their comparative studies with 
any particular methodological discussion relative to the specific problems 
of cross-national comparisons. The second group is represented by the 
'ignorants', who are clearly ethnocentric in their approach. They indeed 
recognize the special nature of cross-national work, but they tend to 
'import' uncritically in their research theories and principles developed in 
other countries, irrespectively of social contexts and historical and 
cultural differences. In ! yen's words, they "pursue their ideas and data 
across national boundaries without ever giving a thought to the possibility 
that such comparisons may add to the complexity in interpreting the 
results of the study" (1990b, 5). This is unfortunately a very common 
tendency in the sociological tradition. The third group are the 'totalists' 
who are - at least in theory - aware of the complications and the 
methodological issues involved in comparative research. However, 
"[t]hey consciously ignore the many stumbling blocks of the non- 
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equivalence of concepts, a multitude of unknown variables interacting in 
an unknown context and influencing the research in question in unknown 
ways. And they deliberately ignore the scientific requirements regarding 
the testing of hypotheses in settings which do not and cannot meet the 
conditions for such testing" (Oyen 1990b, 5). Finally, the 'comparativists', 
believe that comparative social research is a type of research that poses 
very specific methodological problems that need to be addressed, and 
they tackle their research questions accordingly. 
Oyen's categorization is obviously based upon ideal types, and it is thus 
somewhat artificial and schematic. However, it has the distinct advantage 
of facilitating the task of qualifying the most common type of comparative 
research that has so far been undertaken within the field of cultural policy 
research. It seems possible at this stage of the discussion, to suggest 
that extant cross-national cultural policy analysis is markedly 'totalist' in 
nature - though 'ignorant' or even 'purist' examples of comparative 
cultural policy research could also probably be found. Indeed, the intent 
of this chapter is precisely to argue in favour of the need for comparative 
cultural policy research to shift towards a more genuinely and 
consistently 'comparativist' position. 
RESEARCH VS. ADVOCACY 
This chapter has attempted to argue against a purely quantitative 
methodology, and against using public expenditure as the main cultural 
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policy output measure, whilst at the same time alerting the reader to the 
incapacity of the already mentioned 'ten countries, ten chapters and a 
staple' literature to generate a true understanding of cultural policy issues 
across countries (Schuster 1996,30). As noted earlier, changing patterns 
of public funding throw light on a government's changing priorities, which 
are of great importance in cultural policy. However, our argument is that 
comparisons of data on public expenditure on cultural policy alone do not 
suffice to offer explanations of developments within national cultural 
policies. Indeed, we have seen that one of the main problems with the 
currently available literature is its descriptive nature, and the fact that it 
does not always aim at providing an interpretation of the phenomena 
under observation. The descriptive moment is the necessary first step of 
any comparative research, but it will only produce information, not 
understanding. This is why there is a great need for a more theory- 
building approach to the study of cultural policy (Kawashima 1995; 
Schuster 1988,6)5. 
Equally important in defining an appropriate comparative methodology is 
the need to distinguish policy analysis from policy advocacy6. In 
Understanding Public Policy, Thomas R. Dye maintains unequivocally 
that "[l]earning why governments do what they do and what the 
consequences of their actions are is not the same as saying what 
governments ought to do, or bringing about changes in what they do. 
5 Indeed, as Rose (1991 a, 447) points out, "concepts are necessary as common points 
of reference for grouping phenomena that are differentiated geographically and often 
linguistically". 
s For a discussion of the often-blurred divide between advocacy and research see 
Schuster (2002,27-29) and Bennett (2004). 
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Policy advocacy requires the skills of rhetoric, persuasion, organisation, 
and activism. Policy analysis encourages scholars and students to attack 
critical policy issues with the tools of systematic enquiry" (Dye 1975,5). 
Unfortunately, as Dye himself recognises (1975,14), this is often easier 
said than done, since the people who are actually undertaking policy 
research are often programme administrators, who have a vested interest 
in proving the success of their programmes. It is thus essentially 
important to separate as much as possible research from policy 
implementation and advocacy for funding. This is very difficult to achieve 
in practice, though, in view of the way the cultural sector is structured and 
the way it works. More recently, Radin (2000,92) has explicitly 
acknowledged that "[a]nalysts cannot insulate themselves from the 
dynamics of politics, interest groups, and deadlines"'. 
Although public policy experts agree that there has been a shift away 
from the belief that policy research can be fully apolitical (Radin 2000, 
104), Oliver Bennett (2004) in a recent article warns about the 
consequences that are unavoidable whenever the researcher succumbs 
to the temptation of blurring of the boundaries between research and 
advocacy: 
7 At the end of a detailed discussion of the many pressures that policy analysts have to 
operate under, Radin (Ibid., 105) concludes: "... the tensions between the imperatives of 
the two cultures - the cultures of analysis and politics - are not easy to avoid. They are 
a part of the day-to-day life of the policy analyst, playing out in different ways in different 
environments, and the stress that emanates from them is part of the lifeblood of the 
policy analysis profession and should be expected in a democratic system. Analysts are 
rarely in the controlling role in this relationship, and most have acknowledged that their 
legitimacy is derived from elected or appointed political officials". 
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Advocacy-inspired research [... ) does, of course, impose severe limits on 
the kind of research that will be conducted. Research questions will be 
designed to produce answers that are in the organisation's interests; 
research that might produce uncomfortable findings will, as far as 
possible, be avoided. 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
The present discussion has attempted to show how the stated effort to 
conceptualise and theorize about cultural policies cross-nationally needs 
to be founded on an extensive knowledge of the circumstances of the 
countries chosen as case studies, in respect of the principle of 
contextualization. In particular, those factors that might affect the cultural 
sphere need to be taken into account when assessing and investigating 
cultural policies. This is tantamount to advocating a strongly 
interdisciplinary approach to methodological issues in comparative 
studies. This is a well-accepted notion in comparative social sciences. 
The sociologist Rokkan in 1978 wrote that cross-national research entails 
a "built-in transition from internationality to interdisciplinarity: it is simply 
difficult to establish acceptable comparisons between countries and 
cultures without bringing a broader ranges of variables than those of only 
one discipline" (quoted in Qyen 1990b, 11). More specifically, the most 
obvious requirement for the comparative research model here proposed, 
would be a clear and complete picture of the mechanisms of cultural 
policy and their functioning within the nations studied as a necessary 
precursor of any rigorous comparative study. In particular, what is 
excluded or included by governments within their domain of action is very 
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significant in shaping national cultural policies and should thus be a prime 
object of analysis. Moreover, the reconstruction of the historical 
development of cultural policies in the context of the political, cultural and 
intellectual history of the countries is unavoidable if we want to 
convincingly account for differences and particular national 
developments. Furthermore, because cultural policy does not operate in 
isolation from other spheres of public policy, the approach that we are 
here proposing would require that we investigate and compare the legal, 
administrative and political frameworks in which cultural policy decisions 
are made. This would allow the researcher to understand how policy- 
making in the cultural arena fits into the broader patterns of state 
intervention. Indeed, understanding to what extent cultural policies 
develop and operate independently of other policy areas, and the extent 
to which they feel the effects of external pressures can clarify the 
changing circumstances of cultural policy within different states. 
These are all very ambitious aims, and indeed the research model that 
this chapter advocates calls for a strong methodological stance. I refer 
here to the need to acknowledge that, in order to achieve a comparative 
research that is able to go beyond the mere description (as 
recommended above), it is preferable to limit the number of countries 
being compared. This would enable the researcher to examine a larger 
number of variables and aspects than it would be feasible in a larger- 
scale comparison (Hantrais 1999,99). The currently popular format of 
comparative study exemplified by the report published in 1998 by the Arts 
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Council of England (Feist et al., 1998) which compares data on public 
spending on the arts in eleven countries, does not lend itself to the type 
of in-depth study that we are proposing. Limiting the number of countries 
observed would also allow one to concentrate on the question of 
equivalence of concepts in different contexts - or even, as shown by the 
case study of Italy and the UK, the lack of equivalence in different 
contexts, a crucial issue in cross-national research (see chapter 2). This 
is indeed an accepted principle within the social sciences. In Linda 
Hantrais' words, "[t]he smaller the number of countries included in 
'narrow-gauge' studies... the greater the contextual detail and the 
chances of approaching a more holistic comparison, and the easier it is 
to be consistent in specifying and applying concepts and in using 
qualitative evidence" (Hantrais, 1999,101). This is certainly a necessary 
requirement to achieve a broader, multi-dimensional and multidisciplinary 
approach for cross-national cultural policy comparison, which is precisely 
what this chapter has attempted to advocate. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodological considerations in practice: Researching 
policy in Britain and Italy 
The preceding chapter has examined, in general terms, a number of 
methodological issues arising from the engagement in the cross-national 
analysis of cultural policies. This chapter will build on the methodological 
observations already made, by focussing in particular on their adaptation 
to the comparative study of Italy and Britain, the two countries on which 
this research focuses. Differences in their cultural, administrative and 
legal frameworks will therefore represent crucial aspects of the 
discussion presented in following chapters. In particular, the second part 
of the thesis will be devoted to the exploration of the two different 
traditional cultural traditions of Britain and Italy, and the different 
evolution of national cultural policies that flourished within those 
traditions. Before turning to the detailed analysis of public policy making 
with specific regards to the arts and culture, however, it is necessary to 
consider the frame in which public policy is made and studied in the two 
countries, and examine whether the contrasting understanding of the 
very notion of policy might affect decisions that are made in the 
administration of the public cultural sector. 
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PUBLIC POLICY AS A FIELD OF STUDY 
As Peter John explains, "research on policy seeks to understand how the 
machinery of the state and political actors interact to produce public 
actions" (John 1998,1). Its main focus of analysis is therefore the 
ensemble of decisions that determine the output of a political system (in 
the case presently under scrutiny, cultural policies) as well as changes 
that such decisions produce outside of the political system itself, which 
are normally referred to as 'policy outcomes' (for example, increased 
levels of participation in cultural activities, or changes in the age or social 
composition of arts audiences) (Ibid. ). The ultimate raison d'etre of the 
discipline of public policy research, thus, lies in the ambition to explore 
and explain the complexities of the policy-making process. As John 
(1998,1-2) further explains: 
Public policy seeks to explain the operation of the political system 
as a whole. This is its main contribution to political science. The 
policy-orientated approach looks at public decision-making from 
the viewpoint of what comes out of the political process. Each 
element of policy-making is considered to cause a particular 
output and outcome. 
Despite the discipline's focus on policy outcomes, policy researchers are 
well aware that policy-making remains nevertheless a highly political 
exercise. Indeed, each policy sector contains within itself all the elements 
that make up a political system: elected politicians, civil servants, 
pressure-groups, bureaucrats and so on, as well as the complex fabric of 
institutional relationships, law and regulations that govern any modern 
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political structure. It thus logically follows that one of the principal goals of 
the policy-oriented research in the politics sphere should be "to sharpen 
up the analysis of politics by examining the links between decision- 
makers as they negotiate and seek influence in the governmental 
system" (John 1998,2). 
As a sub-sector of public policy, cultural policy can therefore be 
described as the variegated forms of institutional structures that have 
been set in place by national and local government to support, as well as 
regulate, the heritage and the diverse creative and artistic endeavours 
that make up the cultural sector. However, as Bennett (1995,201) points 
out, cultural policy is not limited to governmental activities, since also the 
measures adopted by organisations within the cultural sector itself are an 
equally important aspect of cultural policy. As Miller and Yüdice (2002,1) 
explain, "organizations solicit, train, distribute, finance, describe and 
reject actors and activities that go under the signs of artist or artwork, 
through the implementation of policies". In this sense, cultural policy, 
despite being concerned with the arts and what might appear - to the 
naive observer - the aloft and timeless preoccupations of aesthetics8 is 
in fact a rather political terrain, no less than other aspects of policy, such 
as health or social policy where the political element might seem more 
obvious. In fact, as Jim McGuigan (1996,5) argues, the political element 
has been, until very recently, what has been most attractive to 
8 It can be assumed, however, that such naive observers are today on their way to 
extinction and soon to become just a figure of speech, since postmodern theory has 
made a point of negating the existence of any non-politically charged notion of what 
represents art or aesthetically valuable endeavours. 
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researchers working in the disciplinary fields that are grouped under the 
umbrella term of cultural studies. Consequently, while 'cultural politics' - 
intended as aesthetic practices that aim to challenge the mainstream and 
the cultural establishment - have received great attention, the more 
pragmatic 'politics of culture' - which include not only policy analysis but 
also policy formulation - have been somewhat neglected. McGuigan 
suggests that an explanation for this lack of interest might reside in an 
exaggerated form of critical purity on the part of researchers working 
within cultural studies, as well as in their reluctance to get involved in the 
state's regulatory processes (Ibid. ). This might contribute to explain the 
relatively recent development of the academic interest in cultural policy 
research (Kawashima 1999). 
It is important, however, to put the slow development of cultural policy 
studies as a discrete field of research into an appropriate context. It is 
significant to note how, in fact, the systematic study of public policy (of 
which cultural policy can be seen as a sub-discipline with a stronger 
humanistic connotation) is itself a rather young field of enquiry within 
political science. Beryl A. Radin (2000,1), in trying to describe what it 
means to be a policy analyst, goes as far as claiming that "[d]espite the 
growth of the field over the past several decades, this is not a profession 
that the general public understands. It is obvious that policy analysis has 
not gained a place in the world of professions equal to that of law, 
medicine or engineering". This might seem a rather surprising 
statement, especially to the British reader, in consideration of the 
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escalating reliance of UK government and policy-makers on consultants, 
analysts and the ever-increasingly powerful 'think-tanks'. However, if we 
turn to Italy, we would have to conclude that the state of affairs there is 
rather different, and an Italian reader would certainly be more 
sympathetic towards Radin's statement. 
Indeed, if research into public policy has had a slow development in the 
Anglophone world, this has been even slower in Italy, where public 
policies and policy-making have not received a degree of attention and 
scrutiny parallel to that of other Western European countries. In his 
research guide to contemporary Italy, Bull (1996,34) attributes this to the 
fact that, in the early 1960s, when the question of state intervention and 
public policy-making became a crucial issue, Italian political science was 
so underdeveloped that it was just incapable of properly analysing the 
changing circumstances. In other countries, around that same time - 
following the establishment of welfare states - the interest in the 
understanding and evaluation of public policies constituted a crucial 
encouragement for the development of public policy research (John 
1998,4). The above-mentioned shortcomings of Italian political science 
meant that, there, public policy became the preserve of academics with a 
legal, economic and sociological background. A more systematic 
approach to the study of public policy was eventually prompted by the 
reform of the Italian welfare state in 1978 (Bull 1996,35), although policy 
analysis first entered the world of academia only in the mid-eighties, 
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when the first courses on public policy were established in a limited 
number of universities. 
As with many other Western countries, public policy still represents only 
a minority interest within the broader field of Italian political science - 
which is itself reputed to be lagging behind and struggling in catching up 
with international developments (Bull 1996,34-35; Regonini 2001,46). 
Regonini (2001,46) further laments the fact that even as late as 1990 
'public policy' was not to be found in the subject index of the Rivista 
Italiana di Scienza Politica (the main political science journal in the 
country), nor have Italian publishing houses shown much interest for 
foreign publications in the field, with the result that a number of works by 
'classic authors' of the public policy tradition, such as Lowi, Schön, 
Allison, Wildavsky and Kingdon, are not available in translation (though - 
admittedly, this might also be the case in other non-English speaking 
countries other than Italy). 
The following section of this chapter will explore a possible explanation 
for such a late development in the interest for public policy and its study 
in Italy. 
"NOMINA SUNT SUBSTANTIA RERUM"? A QUESTION OF VOCABULARY 
Regonini (2001,12) suggests that one of the causes for such a lack of 
interest in policy research on the part of the Italian academia might be 
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linked to the fact that a very large proportion of the extant literature in this 
area has been produced in the United States. Consequently, a certain 
appreciation of the administrative and political structures in place there - 
which the Italian policy researcher might not necessarily be acquainted 
with - is a required background knowledge for the full understanding of 
the available public policy literature. More importantly, work produced in 
the American cultural context refers to concepts and values that are not 
equally diffused - or even acceptable - when transposed into the Italian 
system of beliefs and values. This concept is effectively clarified by the 
reception, in Italy, of what is universally seen to be now a 'classic' text of 
policy analysis: Lindbloom's 1959 article entitled The science of 
"muddling through". This otherwise influential article, as well as its very 
title, could not solicit but the uttermost suspicion in a culture such as the 
Italian one, characterised by a deep-rooted sense of reverence for the 
written law as a guide to public administration. This reverential attitude to 
the law is indeed reflected in disputes over conflicting interpretations of 
single words of the legislative text that can engage law experts and high 
courts alike for whole decades. It is therefore common for the educated 
Italian reader to feel that, while policy studies might provide useful 
guidance towards an improved public administration, they do not display 
an adequate standard of scientific solidity on the theoretical and 
methodological levels to command academic credibility (Regonini 2001, 
12)9. The lack of a unitary corpus of literature in the disciplinary field of 
public policy to be shared by all those involved in it and commonly 
9 As the opinion by Beryl A. Radin (2000) referred to above confirms, this is hardly a 
sentiment limited to Italian academics, though it is arguable that it might 
be more 
intense amongst them for the reasons suggested by Regonini (2001). 
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referred to, further enhances the difficulty of seeing public policy as a 
fully legitimate ambit for academic research (Regonini 2001,13). 
Such scepticism is without any doubt accentuated by the fact that the 
word policy, in fact, does not exist in the Italian language. As a result, in 
Italian (as well as in most other main continental European languages) it 
becomes much harder to make explicit the distinction between politics 
and policy that is immediately obvious to the English speaker. This has 
implications that go well beyond the impossibility of translating in an 
elegant way expressions such as, for example, "the politics of cultural 
policy". For it is significant to point out how the words 'policy' and 'politics' 
have, in the Anglophone linguistic context, a strong autonomy not only of 
a lexical nature, but also at the level of meaning. As Regonini (2001,19) 
shows, in the American political and cultural frames of reference, such 
distinction often shifts into an open contraposition, whereby the notion of 
policy is felt to be freer from connotations of partisanship and corruption 
than politics. 
Arnold J. Heidenheimer (1986) has contributed an interesting review of 
the historical foundations and the principal consequences of the 
divergence between the concepts of 'politics' and 'policy' in English and 
other Continental European languages. He bases much of his 
conclusions on examples derived from German and French, although the 
paper's central argument is also valid for other European languages. 
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Heidenheimer (Ibid., 3) maintains that the fact that many languages in 
Europe do not possess a term for policy that is distinct from that for 
politics is a terminological problem that is primarily responsible for the 
difficulties in establishing a genuinely cross-national literature on political 
science. His paper represents an important attempt to study in a 
systematic way what he (Ibid., 4) refers to as the "polls-family of words" 
(in so far as the terms under analysis in his paper are all derived from the 
Greek terms polis and politeia). His aim is to achieve a better 
understanding of the development of terminologies over time and across 
language areas, with a view to reconstruct the series of events that 
brought the English language to develop a notion of 'policy' 
complementary to that of politics, while in the other Continental 
languages both meanings came together in the sole term of politics. 
The importance of Heidenheimer's work lies in the fact that, as observed 
by the German political scientist Sternberger, there is "no comprehensive 
philological study existing so far which would inform us about the curious 
migration or migrations of these words through the ages, or about the 
striking changes of meaning they underwent in the course of time" 
(quoted in Heidenheimer 1986,4). Although over two decades have 
passed since Sternberger wrote these words in the early 1980s, the 
underdevelopment of research in this area seems to be still 
unchallenged. Accordingly, today there still is no established analytical 
framework that deals specifically with the variation of meanings of similar 
words across languages as well as changes in the meaning of those 
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words over time. This means that quite often both 'policy' and 'politics' 
are translated as 'politics' without much awareness, on the part of 
professional translators, of the need to make explicit the actual difference 
in meaning conveyed by the two English words10. 
Unfortunately, limitations of space do not allow me to discuss here in 
great detail the historical reconstruction of the evolution of the words 
policy and politics offered by Heidenheimer. Suffice it to say that he 
establishes a correlation between the decline of feudalism and the rise of 
an urban merchant class in England and the diffusion of the term policy 
(with its already mentioned more positive connotation with respects to 
politics). His main argument is that: 
The English policy became generalised in a socially downward 
direction in ways that the Continental term Policey could not. 
That is, terms that were initially attributed to royalty and higher 
strata came to be applied also to the actions of ordinary 
citizens. [... ] In the Continental systems with higher 
stateness", the terms Policey and Politik became, over roughly 
the same period, semantically further removed from the private 
word of the burgher and citizen. Both concepts were becoming 
associated with actions at higher levels of the evolving nation- 
states (Heidenheimer 1986,14). 
10 It is very telling that Regonini, writing in Italian in 2001, in order to represent faithfully 
the thought of foreign theorists whose work she refers to in her book, has felt the need 
of going back to the original texts and offer her own translation of crucial passages, in 
view of the shortcomings of the available published translations of those same classic 
texts (Regonini 2001, chapter 1). 
" Heidenheimer (1986,9) maintains that nations can be distinguished on the basis of 
their different levels of 'stateness'. Quoting Ernest Baker, he writes: " State societies' like 
France and Germany developed historical and intellectual traditions of the state 
embodying the "public power". "Stateless societies' fall short of perceiving "the state as 
an institution which acts". Englishmen tended rather to see in the executive, "just a 
bundle of officials, united only by a mysterious Crown which serves chiefly as a bracket 
to unite an infinite series of integers". 
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In summary, Heidenheimer believes that the shifts in meaning among the 
various terms belonging to the "polis-family of words" in different 
European languages are ascribable to the different political 
circumstances of the various countries, and are the reflection of their 
political traditions (e. g. higher or lower degree of 'stateness') and of 
different priorities in governmental concerns within the arenas of both 
domestic and foreign policy (Heidenheimer 1986,7-15). 
Far from being a dispute of purely linguistic relevance, Heidenheimer's 
arguments have very important repercussions on the ways in which 
speakers of different languages think and write of politics and policy. 
Heidenheimer himself proffers very telling examples. He recounts of his 
attempt to prove wrong, with a simple empirical test, the belief beheld by 
many Continental political scientists that - despite the limitations of their 
native languages - when reading foreign texts in translation, they are 
able to gather from the context whether the English writer refers to 
'policy' or 'politics' in his or her arguments. However, when asked to 
translate the heading of a press release that read "Industrial Policy = 
Industrial Politics" the press staff of European embassies in Washington 
offered very different translations. More significantly, even countries 
sharing the same language came up with rather different renderings of 
the heading. So, if the French embassy translated the given sentence as 
"Le politique industrielle = les politiques de l'industrie", the Belgian 
Embassy's version was the substantially different "Politique industrielle = 
politique politicienne de l'industrie". While the Spanish Embassy's 
-- 54 
interpretation is the yet different: "Una politica industrial = Politica 
industrial global", the Germans had to render the obviously troublesome 
second part of the heading with an incredibly long circumlocution: 
"Industriepolitik = parteipolitische Auffassung von der 
Foederungswuerdigkeit bestimmter Industriezweige" (Heidenheimen 
1986,20-21). 
What are the consequences of the linguistic impasse the preceding 
examples so sharply point out? According to the Italian political scientist 
Giovanni Sartori (1984 and 1973) - who has conducted extensive 
research into the theory of political and social concepts, their historical 
development and their links to language - such consequences are, as a 
matter of fact, extremely significant. He insists (1984,15) that whatever 
we know is mediated by language and that since "language is the sine 
qua non instrument of knowing, the knowledge-seeker had better be in 
control of the instrument". At the centre of Sartori's argument is the claim 
that rather than simply expressing thought, language is in fact a 'thought- 
moulding instrument': words 'interpret' things. Sartori therefore holds that 
the language user thinks through a vocabulary that embodies and 
reflects a general way of perceiving and conceiving things (Ibid., 18). To 
make this concept clearer, he refers to the notions of semantic projection 
and semantic import (Ibid., 16-17). This is how he explains their 
meaning: 
the semantic import of words entails that (1) what is not named 
largely remains unnoticed or, in any event, impervious to 
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cognitive development; and that, (2) the naming choice 
(selecting a given word within a given semantic field) involves a 
far-reaching interpretive projection. All told, then, projective 
semantics brings to the fore both the constraints and the 
pathways that any given natural language imposes upon and 
affords to our perceiving, thinking and knowing. 
Sartori clearly shares Heidenheimer's scepticism of the researcher's 
capacity to go beyond the-conceptual limits of his or her natural language 
in order to grasp notions and concepts (as well as the full meaning of the 
words that express them) elaborated in other languages. Drawing on a 
biblical paraphrase, Sartori (Ibid., 17) explains that In the beginning is 
the word, that is, naming". When we express what we have in mind, we 
select, among the number of possible choices offered by our natural 
language, those words that can best represent our thoughts. Conversely, 
we would struggle to express effectively what we mean unless we are 
able to find the words for it, and, by the same token, we cannot form a 
sentence unless we already know the meaning of the words contained in 
it. Sartori therefore agrees with Taylor, who wrote that "language is 
constitutive of the reality, is essential to its being the kind of reality it is" 
(quoted in Sartori 1984,17). 
It should be clear at this stage that these arguments have very serious 
implications for the question of the consequences of the lack of the word 
'policy' in many Continental languages (including Italian) that has been 
discussed so far. These, have been spelt out very powerfully by Whorf 
(quoted in Sartori 1984,17-18), who writes: "We dissect nature along 
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lines laid down by our native languages ... we cut nature up, organise it 
into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we 
are parties to ... our speech community". It follows thus, that "facts are 
unlike to speakers whose language background provides for unlike 
formulation of them". In conclusion, Whorf argues that thinking "is in a 
language - in English, in Sanskrit, in Chinese. And every language is a 
vast pattern-system ... by which the personality not only communicates, 
but also analyses nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and 
phenomena, channels his reasoning"12. 
Sartori warns of the possible extreme interpretation of Whorl's relativism 
as a principle of 'untranslatability', which he thinks would be an 
exaggerated reaction. However, he reinforces the point that whenever 
people think about something at any point in time, they do so in relation 
to a particular linguistic system which is taken to be a 'given'. This is the 
meaning of Sartori's insistence upon the role of language in moulding 
thought which was referred to above. He exemplifies this point with a 
number of convincing examples (Sartori 1984 19-22). He begins with the 
preference displayed by the English language for the word 'government' 
over the word 'state', which has resulted in the systematic translation of 
the French etat, the German Staat and the Italian stato as 'government'. 
Conversely, other European languages consider 'government' merely as 
one of the partitions of the state, which they still consider as a broader, 
12 According to Sartori, the fact that translators have somehow managed, for millennia, 
to translate written works from one language into another does not question the validity 
of the point made, since the polyglot in fact 'rethinks' in each of the languages he or she 
is proficient in, rather than actually translating as such (Sartori 1984,65). 
-- 57 
general entity. The practical consequence of this different linguistic 
reference is that whoever decides to write on the topic of the state in 
English is handicapped, according to Sartori, in two different respects. 
First of all, the writer is exposed to the ambiguity of the relationship 
between the words and concepts of state and government. On the other 
hand, he or she would also tend to limit the scope of the research, in so 
far as the more pragmatic approach (implicit in the reduction of the 
concept of state to that of government) misses out on what has been 
written in other languages and within cultures attached to the more 
theoretical notion of state. These are indeed more likely to have 
elaborated a more abstract, juridical as well as philosophical theory of 
the state. As the discussion presented by this thesis will unfold in this 
and the following chapters, it will become evident that this is indeed a 
point of extreme relevance to the comparative analysis of policy-making 
in Britain and Italy. 
Sartori (1984,21) further suggests that even the different ways in which 
different peoples see themselves as part of a national community might 
be affected by linguistic differences. To stick with the Italian and English 
languages, 'people' is, in English, a plural noun, whereas its Italian 
equivalent popolo (as well as the German Volk and the French peuple) is 
singular. This linguistic difference is paralleled by the difficulty on the part 
of English-speaking political writers to see the people as "an oversoul, or 
as an organic indivisible entity", while such notion is at the very basis of 
the Italian, French and German speech communities. Sartori thinks that 
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this might not be a simple coincidence, rather, his hypothesis is that 
"when we say 'people are' we are semantically prompted to perceive and 
conceive a multiplicity, a sum total of 'each body', while those who say 
'people is' are predisposed and encouraged to conceive an 'allbody', a 
whole that subsumes its parts" (Sartori 1984,21). 
What implications do the considerations presented so far have on the 
specific case in point for this research? 
THE PREVALENCE OF'ABSOLUTE POLITICS' IN ITALY 
If one were to accept Sartori's theory of language as a thought-moulding 
instrument, then it would consequentially follow that the fact that the 
Italian language does not possess a distinctive word to express the 
meaning conveyed, in English, by the word policy should be a prime 
reason behind the slower development of public policy studies in Italy. 
This seems confirmed by the observation made by the renowned social 
scientist Alessandro Pizzorno that the Italian public sphere is dominated 
by what he calls 'absolute politics' (la politica assoluta). Implicit in the 
notion of absolute politics is the belief that political action is the only form 
of activity that can significantly transform society. According to this view, 
political action is the only means by which the life of the nation, and in 
fact, the life of humanity as a whole can be improved according to an 
ideal of perfection (Pizzorno quoted in Regonini 2001,18). In Pizzorno's 
view, then, at the heart of absolute politics is the conviction that collective 
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quality of life can only be enhanced through forms of political action that 
aim to radically change the structure and distribution of political power 
within society: party activism, political mobilization, voting at political 
elections and even the choice to fight the current political system 
(Regonini 2001,18). In this perspective, 'relative politics' (le politiche 
relative) - that is specific policies targeted at the solution of a number of 
issues arising from the life of the community (transport, education, health 
and so on and so forth) - are clearly seen as subaltern, amounting to 
merely dependent variables. Policies are indeed conceived, at best, as 
either obstacles to be removed or as useful tools to gain consensus, and 
therefore advantage, in the rather more significant game of politics. 
Regonini (2001,18) further elucidates Pizzorno's theory by explaining 
that deep-rooted in Italian political perceptions is the idea that politica 
intended as 'politics' (that is, the ensemble of the intricate relationships 
between government, party leaders and voters that are founded on the 
striving for ever stronger consensus and power) and politica as 'policy' 
(intended as the strategies put in place to tackle a collective problem or 
issue), rather than being two distinct concepts expressed by a single 
word are, in fact, just two aspects of the same phenomenon. In this case 
then, the first acceptation of the word politica expresses its most crucial 
and essential traits, while politica as policy depicts what are clearly only 
derivative or secondary aspects13. 
13 Regonini (2001,20) gives a number of examples, taken from the Italian press, of 
public declarations of Italian ministers and politicians which clearly reveal that such 
60 
This internal differentiation in the meaning of the Italian word politics 
clearly causes the ambiguity in practical usage lamented by 
Heidenheimer, but also seems to prove right Sartori's claim about the 
neglect that befalls the concepts that a language does not explicitly 
express by naming them. Following Sartori's line of reasoning, the slow 
development of the discipline of policy analysis and, more generally, the 
scarce interest in public policy in Italy could be accounted for by the very 
lack of a word for policy. This linguistic situation creates a pathway of 
thought that directs attention to the more comprehensive notion of 
politics rather than to the more specific notion of policy which is 
adumbrated within it. Moreover, in the Italian case, the linguistic 
ambiguity is even more marked than for other continental European 
languages. As noted by McGuigan (1996,7), the French language - like 
the Italian - does not possess a specific term for policy, however, it has 
managed to create a distinction between the masculine form le politique, 
which refers to institutionalised politics, and the feminine la politique 
which refers more directly to the science of politics and policy. The Italian 
language, as we have just seen, can only rely on the feminine noun 
politica which thus embodies both meanings, although the word is often 
used in the plural - le politiche - to refer to 'policies'. 
To complicate things even further, in the phrase public policy, it is not 
only the noun which is difficult to translate in Italian, for so is also the 
subordination of policy to politics, far from being limited to the perceptions of the general 
public, is in fact shared by politicians themselves. Very telling is the case of Francesco 
De Lorenzo, once Minister for Health, who - when asked by a journalist whether he 
would like to repeat his ministerial experience - answered that rather than being 
involved in government (that is, policy-making) he would much prefer to go back to 
being involved in 'politics with a capital P. 
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adjective 'public'. This, in Italy, is generally interpreted as having the 
more restrictive meaning of 'belonging or pertaining to the state' rather 
than the broader acceptation 'of or concerning the people as a whole' 
received in the English language (according to the OED). 
Resulting from the complexity of the Italian situation is the already 
mentioned central role acquired by jurists, who, stretching the boundaries 
of their discipline, have turned public policy (and, consequently, cultural 
policy too) into one of their specific competences. If, on the one hand, 
this has had the positive effect of filling the already discussed research 
gap in this field, on the other hand, it confirms the unchallenged 
prominence that law holds on the understanding and research of the 
Italian public sphere14. The major consequence of this state of affairs is 
that, in Italy, the bridge between scientific research and active 
involvement in the solution of issues of collective significance has been 
developed to a significant extent around the contribution of the legal 
disciplines. As a result, the framework in which it has become customary 
to discuss public issues in Italy is that elaborated by the legal disciplines 
- though the boundaries of their competences tend to be so flexible that 
they often come to include also economic, sociological and 
organisational considerations15. Hence, policy difficulties and failures 
14 Interestingly, during the 1960s, Italian jurists positively resisted the development of 
political sciences as an autonomous discipline in order to maintain their intellectual 
dominance over the academic study of public policy-making. (Regonini 2001,47). 
15 Regonini (2001,47) argues that while the legal discipline has displayed a clear 
tendency to absorb other fields of enquiry, other academic areas have generally 
developed in accordance to a strict and limiting interpretation of their scope for 
research. So, she argues, economists have limited themselves to the analysis of 
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have been narrowly interpreted in terms of the inadequacy of the norms 
and laws that regulate the public sector, or their violation on the part of 
the main actors in public-policy making (Regonini 2001,47). 
However, as Regonini (2001,26) firmly points out, although there are 
significant overlaps between the sphere of law-making and policy- 
making, they by no means coincide, neither practically nor conceptually. 
The difference between these two domains is somewhat harder to grasp 
in the Italian context, in view of the fact that laws often appear to be the 
only tool Italian institutions can use to direct public resources towards 
16 specific objectives. Yet, the effectiveness of public policies should be 
rather evaluated on the basis of their success in tackling issues that 
concern a large section of the community. In this perspective, it might 
actually be a sign of a very successful strategy when policy makers 
manage to obtain good results just by improving institutional co- 
ordination and putting the available technologies to the best use, rather 
than resorting to the creation of new legislation. In short, as Regonini 
explains (2001,27), there is no direct link between the scope and 
precision of the law and the scope and precision of the actual policies. 
economic issues, while pedagogic experts have stuck with educational issues, 
architects with city planning ones, and so on and so forth. However, in response to 
Regonini, one could also point out to the strongly interdisciplinary nature that 
characterises the work of a growing number of Italian economists, city planning experts 
and architects. 
16 Regonini (2001,26) offers a corroborating example of this typically Italian attitude to 
law-making by referring to a newspaper article published in Italy in 1999 in which a 
senior Italian magistrate lamented the sorry conditions in which his profession has to 
carry out its functions (e. g. lack of computers, adequate furniture and office supplies) 
and attributed it to the deplorable fact that no new laws had been promulgated for the 
sector since 1990. And yet, Regonini sarcastically observes, it is dubitable that a new 
law could result in the sudden, miraculous apparition of the much needed and desired 
computers, desks, etcetera. 
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Public policy-making entails the conscious resort to a wider range of 
resources and technologies than those allowed for by the extant laws. 
Indeed, policies in Italy tend to be based more on what the laws does not 
forbid than on what the law requires to do. Consequently, mediation, 
persuasion campaigns and the promotion of incentives to action (which 
are all strategies allowed but not recommended by the law) are the most 
influential elements in the policy-making process and might have in fact a 
greater impact on the end results than the legislative act alone (Regonini 
2001,28). 
If we take as an example the Italian cultural sector, if we were to judge 
Italian cultural policy-making purely on the basis of the legislation 
produced to regulate the sector, we would have to conclude that Italy 
does not have access policies comparable to those that have been 
developed in the UK. However, if we look, rather, at the number of 
people working in the public cultural sector, at the number of court 
decisions that have relevance for the field, at the level of public 
resources spent on keeping prices for the live performance arts and 
museums low (much lower, in fact, than they are in the UK), then we 
might reach a very different conclusion. The systematic study of public 
policy-making should not limit itself to the consideration of the relevant 
legislation, but should also include the analysis of all the actions and 
strategies adopted by the key players in public policy-making that can 
produce consequences that affect the community, as well as the decision 
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not to take action at all (Regonini 2001,65). Effective policy-making thus 
cannot be limited to acting in conformity to the law. 
We can therefore conclude the present review of the different attitude 
towards the notion and the study of public policy in the Italian and 
Anglophone context with the observation made by Regonini (2001,48) 
that, in the case of 'policy' - as for any other concept that is extraneous to 
the lexicon of a culture - the problem is not so much the filling of a gap 
but, rather, the creation of a new space. This entails the necessity to 
challenge that culture's current systems of interpretation which join 
together to form a solid and shared self-sufficient structure of thought 
that is so strong as to be capable of making any new approach seem 
irrelevant. In Italy, one of the most significant elements in the current 
system of thought is represented by the dual concept of political parties 
and power. In Italy, the conviction that public policy-making is so 
enmeshed with and conditioned by political power-games (and so 
affected by the ever-changing allegiances among different parties and so 
functional to their political strategies) is so strong that it is felt that it 
would make no sense at all to make it into the object of a distinct and 
autonomous area of academic research (Regonini 2001,48). 
Unsurprisingly then, one of the central concerns of political science 
research in Italy is the study of power. Conversely, the American cultural 
context, which provides the background for much of the available public 
policy literature, does not give the sphere of politics the importance nor 
the deference the European (and Italian in particular) context does 
(Regonini 2001,66). Therefore, if we compare the approach prevalent in 
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political science in Italy and in the Anglophone context, we have to 
conclude that the relative lack of interest in public policy that Italy 
displays has not resulted merely in the setting aside of a large portion of 
the discipline (in favour of the study of the more 'political' aspects of 
policy making). It rather resulted in the adoption of a totally different 
approach to the understanding of policy altogether, an approach so 
different, in fact, as to make common terms such as, for instance, 
'politics', 'power' and 'institutions' not completely corresponding in 
meaning (Regonini 2001,66 and 52). 
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Chapter 3 
The British and Italian models of cultural policy-making: 
the `arm's length principle' versus the law-making 
approach 
There is a general consensus, among scholars of British politics, that one 
of the most striking and distinguishing features of the British political 
system is the fact that a significant proportion of what is understood as 
the 'public sector' is in fact not accounted for by what is conventionally 
taken to be the public institution par excellence: a London-based, central 
department headed by a Cabinet minister (Jones et al. 2001,585). As a 
matter of fact, a large number of people who work in the public sector do 
not formally belong to the category of 'civil servants', while most of the 
work done within the public sector is done by institutions whose official 
status is not that of civil service departments. Conventionally, such 
institutions are referred to as 'quangos' and they represent the kernel of 
that typical British invention: 'quasi-government'. The present chapter will 
look at the shape that 'quasi-government' has assumed in England, 
which is the country on which the analysis of the British case is based. 
The term `quangos' (which stands for 'quasi-non-governmental- 
organisations') is a loose definition for the broad variety of bodies that 
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have been created over time by British governments (both Tory and 
Labour) to provide a public service using public funds, while also 
maintaining a certain degree of distance from politics and ministerial 
influence (Flinders and McConnel 1999,17). This is however, a definition 
deduced empirically, for, in fact, there is no agreed or official definition of 
what a quango actually is"; moreover, the word represents an umbrella 
beneath which a wide range of different organizations finds shelter 
(Wilson 1995,4; Flinders 1999a, 4). Consequently, counting the existing 
quango organisations is an almost impossible task18. Commentators 
generally agree that - despite various claims made over the years by 
successive governments to be "culling the quangos" (Holland 1980) - 
their number remains a four-figure one. According to Kavanagh (2000, 
222) they are about 1500 and varied in terms of size, composition, 
function, and powers. Indeed, the variations among them are so marked, 
that government itself soon grew very uncomfortable with the label of 
'quango'. In the 1980s, the Conservative government introduced the 
alternative label non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) whereby, an 
NDPB was defined as "a body which has a role in the process of national 
government, but is not a government department or part of one, and 
accordingly operates to a greater or lesser extent at arm's length from 
17 Hogwood (1995,32) maintains that "[w]e may have to accept that an agreed, 
workable, inclusive and exclusive definition of this type of body may not be possible to 
achieve and that we should be concerned primarily with the extent to which a range of 
bodies exhibit varying combinations of characteristics with which we may be concerned, 
and what the implications of these are for policy delivery and accountability". 
18 Flinders argues that the lack of an agreed definition of quangos has seriously 
undermined the development of academic research in the field, while also generating a 
heated debate, since to different definitions correspond radically different indicators of 
quango numbers and activities (Flinders 1999a, 5). 
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the Ministers" (Wright 2000,277)19. This definition is fundamentally 
consistent with that of quango and equally controversial20, but had, for 
the government, the distinct advantage of being a much more restrictive 
term, which therefore succeeded in limiting the number of quangos the 
government had to acknowledge (Ibid. ). 
Whether we choose to call them 'quangos' or 'NDPBs', and despite 
government's declarations of their reduced numbers, the fact remains 
that 'quasi-government' is a feature of British politics that is here to stay. 
Moreover, it directly affects cultural policy making, since one of the most 
influential policy-makers and funders of the arts and culture in the UK is 
the Arts Council, which is indeed a quango/NDPB. To quote Matthew V. 
Flinders (1999a, 11), "[q]uasi-government is fundamental to any analysis 
of British politics, as it is now a critical layer of governance which, despite 
rhetoric to the contrary, is unlikely to be dismantled under any 
government". Thus, in order to decide if, or to what extent, the quango 
nature of the Arts Council affects the policy-making process and the 
distribution of resources to the sector, it becomes indispensable to gain a 
deeper understanding of the workings, the advantages and the 
disadvantages of 'quasi-government' in general, and of the Arts Council 
as a quasi-government organisation in particular. 
19 According to the definition here proposed, NDPBs include selected executive bodies, 
advisory committees and tribunals (Hogwood 1995,30). 
20 Hogwood (1995,30) laments that "[t]here is no operational definition of an NDPB; it is 
a pragmatic labelling, focusing mainly on a set of bodies to which government makes 
appointments, and applied inconsistently". 
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Historically, quangos are not a new phenomenon, for semi-independent 
bodies have been a component of British governance for over two 
hundreds years. The Board of Trade, just to make an example, belongs 
to that group of boards that were set up in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries to carry out activities that were felt to be beyond the 
domain of the government proper. But it was with the advent of post-war 
social democracy and the establishment of the welfare state that the 
growth of quasi-autonomous public bodies increased dramatically 
(Flinders 1999b, 27-28). Despite being fiercely criticised by opposition 
parties, quangos have in reality been created by both Labour and 
Conservative governments. However, 1979 was an especially crucial 
year, marking a definite move from the traditional form of government - 
based on bureaucracy - to new forms of 'quasi-government' (Flinders 
1999b, 29). But what does the formula 'quasi-government' really mean? 
Defining an institution as 'quasi-governmental' means that it retains many 
of the characteristics of public bodies, such as having the task of carrying 
out activities prescribed by law; receiving a portion of (if not all) their 
financial resources from the state; having their leading officers appointed 
by a minister and under his or her control. However, this kind of body 
also enjoys a certain degree of independence of ministers and their 
departments in their day-to-day activities, and they traditionally appeared 
to be less subject to parliamentary scrutiny than civil service departments 
(though this is slowly but steadily changing) (Jones et al. 2001,585). The 
most important quangos are those of an executive nature, which usually 
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employ staff and have their own budget (quite often a substantial one). 
The Arts Council belongs to this category of public bodies (Wilson 1995, 
9), which means that, in the UK, approximately half of the public 
resources for culture are distributed by quangos21. Bodies with executive 
powers have often been created in order to establish an arm's length 
relationship between government and the delivery of a particular service 
or the solution of a particular issue (Norton 1994,198). As will become 
clearer as the discussion unfolds, the so-called 'arm's length principle' is 
a crucial element in the modus operandi of the Arts Councils in Britain, 
and one of the main differences between the British and the Italian 
models of cultural policy. 
Although Norman St. John-Stevas, when nominated arts minister in 
1979, proclaimed the arm's length principle as "one of the happiest 
constitutional inventions of the century" (quoted in Shaw and Shaw 1992, 
28), this is by no means a commonly shared view. As was previously 
mentioned, far from being an uncontroversial matter, the use and abuse 
of 'quasi-government' in British politics and the pros and contra of 
quango bodies have all been issues at the centre of a heated debate 
which culminated in the mid-to late seventies but is certainly not 
extinguished yet. 
21 The rest of public resources for the cultural sector are distributed, at the national level, 
by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport to directly funded organizations (mainly 
museums and galleries) and, locally, by local government. Both forms of arts funding 
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5. 
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QUASI-GOVERNMENT AND THE BRITISH TRADITION 
To summarise what has been demonstrated above, 'quasi-government' 
has increasingly become an important and distinctive aspect of political 
life in Britain; quangos have indeed been created by both Labour and 
Conservative governments (despite furious criticism against them by the 
party in opposition at any given time). It was also observed that, although 
quangos and NDPBs of the current type are a post-war creation, semi- 
independent public bodies have existed in this country for centuries. 
What are the reasons for the enduring popularity of this form of 
management of the public sector? Flinders (1999a, 8) advances this 
explanation: 
In many ways the quango state mirrors the British constitution 
itself. It is flexible, executive-centric and ill-defined, has evolved 
in a piecemeal and incremental fashion and, for the most part, 
relies on the 'good chaps' form of governance, which has, until 
recently, lacked formal rules and regulations. 
As Flinders (1999b, 27) further explains, this means that subsequent 
British governments have enjoyed a degree of freedom in creating new 
public bodies and introducing bureaucratic reforms that would have been 
simply unthinkable in other European countries (Italy among them). This 
state of affairs was made possible by the fact that Britain does not have a 
written constitution, nor a system of constitutional law of a superior order 
with respects to ordinary law. As a consequence, in the UK, the 
executive has an influence over the legislature which is unparalleled 
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anywhere else in Europe. These considerations move Flinders (1999b, 
27) to conclude that: 
Indeed British bureaucratic reform has been conducted under Crown 
prerogative rather than through legislation. Elsewhere similar reforms 
would have necessitated major legislation. [... ] Therefore, the 
creation of quasi-government has been a much easier option for 
successive British governments than it has been in other countries as 
there was very little law needed and no strong tier of local or regional 
government to battle against. 
As we will see in the final sections of this chapter, things are very 
different in Italy, where the public sector is managed on the basis of a 
very complex system of regulation and a very rich, if incoherent, corpus 
of administrative law. 
Flinders (1999b, 31) maintains that the growth of quangos is linked to the 
fundamental shift that has been taking place in the last two decades from 
'government to governance'. As a result of such shift, as the formula 
goes, ministers "steered but did not row themselves", thus reflecting an 
ambition to unburden the ever-more complex political process. Another 
important factor in the growth of 'quasi-government' is the increasingly 
withering divide between the public and private realms (this trend will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 5). According to Flinders (1999a, 
3), it is precisely such "demise of the classic public/private dichotomy" 
that has actively contributed, in Britain, to the phenomenon of 'quasi- 
government'. As we have seen, this new tier of governance is constituted 
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by a large group of bodies that are neither public nor private: they are, in 
fact of a hybrid nature. In Flinders' words (1999a, 3-4): 
[t]hey are organisations that utilize private sector methods to 
achieve public aims in the most efficient manner possible. They 
are 'quasi' in every respect: quasi-independent, quasi-public, 
quasi-private, quasi-legitimate and quasi-accountable. We are no 
longer governed by politicians alone but by a 'new magistracy' of 
unknowable, and often untouchable, individuals. 
Interestingly, quasi-autonomous bodies have been explicitly linked to the 
public administration reforms that go under the umbrella term of New 
Public Management (NPM), which will be analysed extensively in chapter 
5. According to David Wilson (1995,3), from the central government's 
point of view, quangos and NDPBs represent a useful vehicle for the 
incorporation of NPM principles in the British public sector. The most 
remarkable consequence of this trend is the progressive affirmation of a 
new concept of accountability proposed by the NPM model alternative to 
the traditional one based on the accountability of the elected 
representative. Accountability is, as a matter of fact, one of the major 
issues raised by the spread of quasi-government and the main focus of 
discontents for the critics of the so-called 'quangocracy'. 
ASSESSING THE QUANGOS: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF'QUASI- 
GOVERNMENT' 
The discussion so far has referred primarily to the many criticisms moved 
against the institutions of 'quasi-government' rather than to the 
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advantages they provide. The government-commissioned report on 
quangos produced in 1980 and known as the Pliatzky report, identifies 
four principal reasons for the creation of these bodies: 
Because the work is of an executive character which does not 
require ministers to take responsibility for its day to day 
management; because the work is more effectively carried out 
by a single purpose organisation rather than by a government 
department with a wide range of functions; in order to involve 
people from outside of government in the direction of the 
organisation; in order to place the performance of a function 
outside the party political arena (quoted in Flinders 1999b, 29). 
As Flinders (Ibid. ) notes, though, these explanations only provide half the 
truth, for they do not acknowledge the fact that the true motives for the 
creation of new quangos are, in reality, more complex and are affected 
by exquisitely political considerations. One of the principal 'real' reasons 
for the growth of quangos lies in the remarkable growth of the state and 
its responsibilities in the post-war years. As the size of the state grew, so 
did the feeling that it was increasingly becoming overloaded to the 
degree that many commentators felt the public sector was progressively 
reaching a worrying level of ungovernability. Traditional political 
institutions were simply not adequate to oversee and manage a public 
sector that was much larger and complex a structure than the one they 
had originally been designed for. In these circumstances, the creation of 
quangos appeared as an effective and practical means to reduce both 
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the size and the scope of the state, with the result of bringing the public 
realm more easily under control (Flinders 1999b, 29)22. 
Obviously, the 'arm's length principle' is another of the crucial 
strongholds of the quango-supporters. The 'quasi-government' system 
would appear to offer the decisions-making process some protection 
against control by politicians in general, and ministers in particular. In 
principle at least, it should certainly be more difficult for a minister to 
scrutinise and impose his or her will on a semi-independent body than it 
would be if he or she were dealing with a civil service department headed 
by him or herself (Jones et al. 2001,585). With respects to the arts and 
culture the importance of the autonomy from immediate political 
concerns was spelt out forcefully by Raymond Williams (1979,158-159) 
who wrote that "while public finance, from the general revenue, is 
essential, it is undesirable that any governmental body, subject to 
changes of political emphasis, should have direct control over artistic 
policies and practices". Whether such independence of the public 
support of the arts from politics belongs to the sphere of reality or rather 
to that of myth, will be a question that this chapter will tackle in the 
following section. For the moment, it is important to observe that the 
arm's length principle, once distanced from the righteous rhetoric that 
22 In answer to the question 'why do governments love quangos? ' Flinders (1999b, 30) 
suggests that '[g]overnments liked quangos because they recognised that government 
could not carry out all functions well". The creation of quasi-autonomous bodies thus 
entails the acknowledgement that central government departments simply do not have 
the resources and the specific knowledge that are required for the fulfilment of all the 
tasks demanded for the smooth running of the public sector. 
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accompanies it, might also seem the perfect tool for the government to 
delegate 'hot potatoes' to specific and semi-autonomous bodies, so as to 
decline responsibilities for any potentially controversial decision made on 
the matter. In the case of the arts, making the Arts Council fully 
responsible for its artistic policy (which is, according to 'quango-theory' 
defined independently from the government's preferences) automatically 
frees the Arts minister from having to take any personal responsibility for 
any decision that might prove contentious (thus avoiding the need for the 
minister to get personally involved in any polemic that might arise from 
contested funding decisions). 
Another problem arises from the very existence of bodies that, despite 
distributing tax-payers' money, do so outside of direct ministerial or 
parliamentary control. Clearly these bodies and their activities raise 
issues of accountability. Understandably then, democratic accountability 
is central to current debates about quangos (Wilson 1995,5). As Flinders 
(1999b 30-31) points out, it is ironical that precisely the attempt at de- 
politicisation through independence - which gave quangos their 
legitimacy to begin with - is what is currently at the centre of debates and 
preoccupations over transparency and control23. 
23 The essence of the criticism moved against the institutions of 'quasi-government' with 
regards to accountability have been powerfully voiced by Sir Norman Chester who, in 
an article entitled "Fringe bodies, Quangos and all that" wrote that the growth of semi- 
autonomous organisations represented "a retreat from the simple democratic principle 
evolved in the nineteenth century that those who perform a public duty should be fully 
responsible to an electorate - by way either of a minister responsible to Parliament or of 
a locally elected council. The essence of the fringe body is that it is not so responsible 
for some or all of its actions" (quoted in Wilson 1995,5). 
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Consistently with the values promoted by NPM, central government 
activities have for quite some time now, focused on the citizen as 
consumer (see chapter 5). In this new perspective, contract or market 
accountability tend to substitute themselves to the more traditional form 
of electoral accountability referred to in the quote above. The 
government, on its part, claims that the growth of 'quasi-government' has 
resulted in a 'democratic gain' rather than the 'democratic deficit' 
lamented by the 'quango-detractors' (Wilson 1995,6). Indeed, David 
Wilson explains that, in order to assess the accountability levels of quasi- 
governmental organisations, "the 'accountability' associated with elected 
local government needs to be set against the 'accountability' associated 
with the publication of accounts/scrutiny by press, public, etc., which 
often characterises the 'quango' sector" (Wilson 1995,7). However we 
decide to interpret the notion of accountability within the quango debate, 
it remains undeniable that this is the area where many concerns about 
quasi-government still tend to coalesce24. 
ISSUES OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
A first issue open to questions is represented by the appointment of 
senior staff within quangos, for how do quasi-independent regulators and 
policy-makers fit into ministerial accountability? From a democratic 
24 The importance of the accountability issue becomes clearer in view of the fact that, 
amongst advanced democracies, the concept of accountability is often used as a 
benchmark against which systems of government can be judged: accountable 
governments are reputed to be good governments (Flinders and McConnel 1999,21). 
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perspective, what right do these individuals (who are not elected by the 
public) have to fill such crucial posts in the public sector and make 
decisions over how to best spend public finances? Since the boards of 
quangos are unelected and independent from ministers, how can 
quangos be held responsible for their activities and decisions? In 1994, 
quangos were responsible for nearly a third of all central government 
spending, and 10 years on their influence is far from diminished, to the 
extent that quangos are said to represent a new 'magistracy' (Kavanagh 
2000,111). The heart of the problem lies in the minimal parliamentary 
influence over appointments of the chairs or the boards of quangos. 
These are, in fact, chosen by ministers, and the criteria vary. As 
Kavanagh (2000,111) explains, some individuals are appointed in so far 
as they are 'independent' persons; others, instead, 'stand for' and give 
voice to specific interests. In either case, the appointees belong to the 
vague category of 'The Great and the Good', which - in reality - tend to 
be drawn from the upper strata of British society and in particular from 
the business world. Under the Thatcher and Major governments, for 
instance, the relative proportion of businessmen and accountants among 
appöintees grew compared to pre-1979 levels (Kavanagh 2000,111). 
Doubts rightfully arise then, on the extent to which the appointees are 
actually representative of English society at large. Moreover, the practice 
of ministerial appointments also originates suspicions that, in reality, 
political affiliations rather than merit often are the true criteria for the 
selection of the appointees. The partisan background of many of the 
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'Great and the Good' has been indeed lamented, giving rise to what 
Wilson calls the 'quangowatch' industry (Wilson 1995,10). 
In the mid-nineties, following a government-commissioned review of 
quangos' appointment procedures, a recommendation was made to 
establish the position of Commissioner for Public Appointments. The 
Commissioner's first annual report, published in July 1997 presented 
detailed statistics of the 1753 appointments made in the nine-month 
period covered by the report (July 1996 to March 1997). On the whole, 
the statistical data seem to confirm many of the worries over 
appointments cited above. The report showed a clear gender imbalance, 
especially for the more senior positions, as well as an age bias in favour 
of the older generations (with young people almost totally absent). It also 
emerged that a significant number of appointees (mainly Chairs) held 
more than one appointment. Finally, the evidence on the appointees' 
past political activities and sympathies clearly revealed a strong political 
bias of the appointment decisions, especially with regards to appointment 
to the position of Chairs (Wright 1999,193-195). The problem of the 
political affiliations of appointees is indeed a vexed question (whatever 
the colour of the current government) and one of the hotspots in the 
quango debate. As Wright (1999,195) explains: "[m]inisters will properly 
want to ensure that public bodies are headed by people who are broadly 
sympathetic to their purposes, or at least not positively unsympathetic, 
and this is perfectly consistent with the Code [of Practice] requirements 
of appointment on merit and procedural integrity". 
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Wright's statement is corroborated by a study conducted in 2002 by the 
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) on the gender, social and 
educational characteristics of the government appointed regulators of 
TV, the press, telecommunications services and advertising - that is 
bodies that "make decisions on quality and taste and decency in their 
respective areas" (IPPR 2002). The research report, entitled All Change 
at the Top? Government Appointed Regulators under New Labour (2002) 
concludes that "UK communications regulators are deeply 
unrepresentative of the general public on whose behalf they have been 
appointed. [... ] few things have improved since 1995 when IPPR last 
surveyed appointments under Conservative leadershipn25 
We have noted already in the course of this discussion, that the 
government's main argument in favour of quangos' accountability for 
their power and their use of public resources consists in the claim that 
quangos, in fact, increase accountability by making services directly 
accountable to their customers (formerly referred to as citizens) through 
Citizen's Charters and a number of other mechanisms of control 
borrowed from the private sector and increasingly popular since the 
advent of NPM. However, as Wilson (1995,12) observes, "[m]arket 
25 The data presented in the report show that 65% of members are male (in 1995 the 
male majority was of 57%) and more than a quarter have been educated at either 
Oxford or Cambridge. On the age front, the situation is not any better: the average age 
for board members is 56 and rises to 63 for chairs (IPPR 2002). According to the IPPRs 
report, only ethnic diversity has increased under New Labour, although the number of 
non-white ethnic background presences in boards are still remarkably low, having risen 
from 4 members out of 90 in 1995 to a mere 7 out of a total of 91 members in 2002. 
Finally, the IPPR's report draws attention to the fact that not only are the regulatory 
bodies under examination unrepresentative of the general population, but this fact is 
also kept outside of public knowledge. Indeed, as the report denounces, "[t]he 
regulators operate in relative secrecy and most lack clear transparency obligations". 
Suffice it to say that the British Board of Film Classification, one of the bodies included 
in the IPPR study, refused to release any information at all on its members (Ibid. ). 
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accountability and contractual accountability are clearly very different 
from public accountability"26. This argument, however, has been 
unsuccessful in silencing the critics of 'quangocracy'. In the words of one 
of their most fierce representatives, Sir Philip Holland - who has devoted 
many years to the study and criticism of quangos - °[t]he whole 
argument of bringing power closer to the people is bogus. Quangos are 
always in the interests of ministers and civil servants. They are not 
elected and are not answerable to the people" (quoted in Wilson 1995, 
12). On the other hand, the use of executive quangos/NDPBs means that 
while ministers are not accountable for individual spending decisions, 
they can still, through directives and guidelines, have a marked influence 
on the policy and the strategies behind those very funding allocations 
(Hogwood 1995,44). 
In the light of the discussion presented so far, what are we to make of 
quangos? Are they a useful tool of government? Do they represent 
power without responsibility? The heated debate on quasi-government is 
far from being quelled. The true kernel of the problem, according to 
Flinders and McConnel (1999,24), is that Britain is a parliamentary state 
characterised by a strong executive that has remarkable powers of 
controlling the legislature in the context of a lack of a coherent framework 
of administrative law. Hence the seemingly unsolvable paradoxical 
26 On the other hand, Wilson raises the issue of the need to question the adequacy of 
more traditional notions of public accountability, namely elections. He argues that the 
stress on the periodic election "tends to assume a passive public, content to pass 
judgement only at limited intervals. [... ] Given the levels of turnout for local elections, 
this has something of a hollow ring to it" (Wilson 1995,11-12). 
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situation embodied by the institutions of quasi-government summarised 
by Flinders (1999b 21) as such: 
The bodies we are considering [quangos] lie at the heart of a 
paradox: public administration needs to be insulated from the 
cut and thrust of party politics, yet the exercise of independent 
powers by unelected bodies is contrary to the basic principles 
of representative democracy. For example, the Arts Council 
exists to ensure that arts grants are not used as electoral 
sweeteners, but how then is the Council accountable? 
How indeed is the Arts Council accountable for its funding allocations 
and its policy-making? And has the 'arm's length principle' any relevance 
to British cultural policy besides the mere sphere of rhetoric? What about 
politically biased appointments of the Council's board and Chair? These 
are some of the questions that the following section of this chapter will 
tackle. 
THE 'ARM'S LENGTH PRINCIPLE' APPLIED TO THE WORKINGS OF THE ARTS 
COUNCIL: MYTH OR REALITY? 
All the problems concerning appointments, accountability and the 
ambiguities of the 'arm's length' relationship with party politics discussed 
so far with regards to quangos in general are extremely relevant to any 
discussion of the Arts Council and its role in British cultural policy- 
making. They indeed represent consistently popular themes in the extant 
literature on the topic. The arm's length principle is traditionally seen as 
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the very basis of cultural governance in Britain (Taylor 1995,185). 
However, whether it is a reality or merely a myth is open to question, and 
expressions of scepticism towards the actual independence from political 
power on the part of the Arts Council in its decision-making have been 
made for decades now. Andrew Taylor (1995,193), who has studied 
extensively the political connotations of the Arts' Council's activities, has 
came to the conclusion that "the basic element in the Council's 
relationship with ministers (the arm's length principle) no longer 
commands general confidence, or even credibility, among participants in 
the arts sector". The reasons for such lack of confidence will be 
scrutinised in this section of the chapter. 
It was Lord Redcliffe-Maud who popularised the expression 'arms' length 
principle' with relation to the modus operandi of the Arts Council. He was 
commissioned to report on the funding of the arts in Britain by the 
Gulbenkian Foundation in 1976. In his report he wrote that: 
By self-denying ordinance the politicians leave the Council free 
to spend as it thinks fit. No minister needs to reply to questions 
in Parliament about the beneficiaries - or about unsuccessful 
applicants for an Arts Council grant. A convention has been 
established over the years that in arts patronage neither the 
politicians nor the bureaucrat knows best (quoted in Hewison 
1995,32). 
Lord Redcliffe-Maud's 'definition' of the arm's length principle is 
interesting in so far as it contains all of the themes that have become the 
object of a heated debate in British cultural policy discourse. Indeed, as 
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this discussion will attempt to show, the separation of the Arts Council's 
decision-making from political concerns is, today, far from being a 
generally accepted or straightforward notion. On the contrary, as chapter 
5 will demonstrate, nowadays, governmental influence on cultural policy - 
and therefore on the Arts Council's funding strategies - has been steadily 
increasing, to the point of bringing Andrew Brighton (1999) to define the 
current British cultural climate as a 'command culture', and to compare 
many aspects of New Labour's cultural policy to the policies that gave 
rise to Soviet Social Realism. 
Secondly, the quote above refers to the Arts Council's independence of 
judgement in aesthetic matters. This is generally taken to be the very 
essence of the arm's length principle and a guarantee for the arts 
(allegedly) to be allowed to flourish without any of the restraints that 
direct political control might cause. However, this aspect of the British 
cultural policy model has also been subjected to criticism. For it might be 
argued - as indeed Anthony Beck (1992) does - that the agreement on 
the part of the government to refrain from influencing the arts might in 
fact be less noble and generous than might seem at a first glance. Beck 
(1992,140) observes that all governments are very sensitive to any form 
of disapproval from the public (who periodically become voters), so they 
consistently attempt to avoid any circumstance that could potentially 
damage their image in front of the electorate. The arm's length principle, 
in this perspective, becomes a very useful tool to deflect any possible 
criticism over how tax-payers' money are spent on fostering the arts, in 
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particular when avant-garde, experimental or generally controversial and 
unpopular forms of arts are concerned. Beck (Ibid. ) concludes that: 
When controversy arises the arts minister can claim that 
government does not and must not interfere with arts; that the 
arm's length principle of the separation of the two is an inviolable 
principle; will say that he does not intend to participate in the 
controversy and will leave it to the Arts Council to cope and take 
the flack. 
The convenience of this arrangement of things for the arts minister in 
particular and the government in general, is glaringly obvious. 
Finally, Lord Redcliffe-Maud's words make it clear that supporting the 
arm's length principle is just tradition rather than a well-defined set of 
regulations. The arm's length principle as applied in cultural policy started 
to be codified only after criticism started being made on its workings and 
doubts were raised on its effectiveness in guaranteeing protection 
against political influences. The arm's length principle is in fact politically 
ambiguous since - as has been discussed in the preceding section - 
there is no ministerial definition for it. But this, according to Taylor is 
deliberately so (Taylor 1995,191)27. Taylor (1995,195) insists that the 
arm's length principle which has been for so long the basis and the 
distinctive characteristic of the model of cultural policy developed in the 
UK, has become "one of the quaint conventions of British public life", and 
27 On this ambiguity of status, Flinders (1999a, 12) comments: "It is this confusion over 
respective roles and responsibilities [the government's and the quango's] which gives 
the quangos flexibility, but it is also at the root of many of the problems over 
accountability and independence". 
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as such deprived of any actual validity in real life28. Significantly, none 
other than Raymond Williams, writing after his three years at the Arts 
Council29, had reached a similar conclusion. In an article published in 
1979 he contested the efficacy, in practice, of the arm's length principle 
on the basis of the observation that "it is customary for the body to direct 
its arm" (Williams 1979,159). Therefore, "[t]he true social process of 
such bodies as the Arts Council is one of administered consensus by co- 
option" (Williams 1979,160). 
Why has the arm's length principle as applied to the distribution of public 
finances to the cultural sector given rise to such enduring scepticism and 
concern among cultural and political commentators as well as on 
significant proportions of the policy-makers themselves? The following 
discussion will attempt to provide an answer to this question by focusing 
on the two areas that the preceding discussion of 'quasi-government' has 
identified as the hotbeds of concern: 
- Appointments to crucial positions 
- Accountability 
28 Similarly, Pick writes, with regards to the arm's length principle: "It was not a principle 
in any of the normally accepted senses. It was certainly not a legal principle. The Arts 
Council's Charter does not legally guarantee it any kind of immunity, any more than 
parliamentary law says that the British Arts Council has to be given money each year. 
Nor is it a scientific principle. If anything, it is a principle of etiquette, a convention that 
has roots in earlier systems" (quoted in Quinn 1998,89). 
29 Raymond Williams served on the Arts Council of Great Britain - as it was called then - 
from 1975 to 1978. 
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ARTS COUNCIL APPOINTMENTS: 'THE GREAT AND THE GOOD' VS THE WELL 
CONNECTED 
As we have seen, appointments represent a controversial aspect of 
'quangocracy'. This is certainly true for the Arts Council. Quasi- 
government institutions were a result of post-war reconstruction of the 
public realm. As with many other bodies created at that time, their 
creators did not feel the need to give a formal articulation of their 
relationship with the state. Taylor (1995,188) believes that an 
explanation for this lies in the fact that the individuals who worked in 
these semi-autonomous organisations and the state apparatus shared 
similar social and cultural backgrounds. Consequently, their conceptions 
of how policy should be made and implemented were very similar. In this 
respect, the arm's length principle as it has been developed in cultural 
administration is broadly consistent with the more general pattern of what 
Taylor (Ibid. ) calls the "government-organisation relations" that emerged 
in Britain around the 1940s. 
Taylor's argument builds on Raymond Williams' famous indictment of the 
political character of the appointments at the Arts Council published in his 
1979 article entitled The Arts Council. Williams' conclusion is that the Arts 
Council "is politically and administratively appointed, and its members are 
not drawn from arts practice and administration but from that vaguer 
category of "persons of experience and goodwill" which is the State's 
euphemism for its informal ruling class" (Williams 1979,166). 
Interestingly, the aforementioned IPPR (2002) report on the social and 
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cultural background of the most important UK regulators (who routinely 
make decision of taste and morality that affect directly British media) 
seems to point to a fundamentally unchanged situation vis ä vis the type 
of individuals appointed to senior position within quasi-government in the 
broader cultural sector. Williams makes it very clear that understanding 
the homogenous social composition of such 'informal ruling class' is 
indeed crucially important in order to really understand the functioning of 
quasi-government in general and the Arts Council in particular30. Hence 
Williams' denunciation of the activities of bodies such as the Arts Council 
as "processes of out-work and administered co-option" (Ibid. ). 
Significantly, the possibility for the government to influence and direct the 
Arts Council through the appointment of individuals sharing the same 
cultural attitudes as the political establishment was allowed by the very 
Charter, which, in 1946, instituted the Arts Council. The Charter does not 
formally distance the Council from the government, since it provides no 
criteria for prospective Council members to satisfy, nor does it set precise 
criteria for the funding allocations, which therefore became subjective, 
and dependent on the taste of the deciding panels (Quinn 1997,129- 
131). One further consequence of this lack of formal procedures is that all 
decisions on the distribution of funding happens in camera and cannot be 
30 In Williams' (1979,165) own words: "It would be naive to discuss the principles and 
problems of intermediate bodies without paying some attention to the character of the 
British State and its ruling class. Indeed, it can be argued that intermediate bodies of 
the kind we have known were made possible by this character. The British State has 
been able to delegate some of its official functions to a whole complex of semi-official or 
nominally independent bodies because it has been able to rely on an unusually 
compact and organic ruling class. Thus it can give Lord X or Lady Y both public money 
and apparent freedom of decision in some confidence, subject to normal procedures of 
report and accounting, that they will act as if they were indeed State officials". 
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appealed against, since the Charter did not allow the possibility for the 
arts community to appeal against funding allocation decisions. In view of 
the lack of formal allocations criteria, funding decisions seemed often 
mysterious and it was not uncommon for unsuccessful applicants to be 
left without any clues as to why their application had failed (Quinn 1997, 
134). On these grounds, Quinn (1997,132) concludes that: 
From outside the Arts Council walls, it seemed that the Council 
was composed of political representatives representing the 
interests of government, directing funds towards flagship 
companies which could project a positive image of Sate 
involvement in the arts to the public and arts representatives 
dividing Arts Council funds amongst themselves and their 
associates, leaving crumbs for those who had no seat at the 
table. 
This quote shows how the Arts Council has been able, in the course of 
time, to use the ambiguities intrinsic to the 'arm's length principle' to its 
own advantage. In this predicament, what had been introduced as a 
means to limit the influence of political concerns over arts funding 
allocations became in many ways a tool for what Pick refers to as 
"another kind of political domination of them" (quoted in Quinn 1998,91). 
It is obvious from the description painted so far that the functioning of the 
Arts Council and the problems inherent in the arm's length principle and 
its implementation have given rise to the question of public accountability 
for the Council's activities and its decisions on grant allocation. From the 
quotes presented so far it is possible to evince that scepticism and 
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concern are the prevailing feelings among commentators. It seems fair to 
conclude that the arm's length principle, rather than guaranteeing the 
autonomy of the support for the cultural sector and the nurturing of the 
arts safely from political influence has, in fact, resulted in a source of 
instability and has been undermined on many accounts. According to 
Taylor (1995,191) "[a]ll the major participants in the arts sector have 
made ritual genuflections to the arm's length principle while agreeing that 
the relationship is under great strain and operating unsatisfactorily". 
At this stage of the discussion it is important to try and understand when 
this relationship became strained and the politicisation of the Arts Council 
appointments become more marked. Andrew Taylor (1994,133) argues 
that the arts become politicised after 1963, when the Arts Council's 
budget for the first time in its history passed the £2m mark. This was 
indeed an important moment in British cultural policy. Labour has won the 
1964 general elections, albeit with a small majority, and the new Prime 
Minister, Harold Wilson, decided to transfer responsibilities for the arts 
from the Treasury to the Department of Education and Science and to 
assign them, for the first time, a devoted Minister, Jennie Lee31. 
Despite an increasing in funding following Labour's election, the 
resources directed to the arts were not huge in public spending terms, 
but, compared to the meagre sums previously devoted to the arts and 
" In February 1965, Jennie Lee published the first ever government White Paper on 
cultural policy, entitled A Policy for the Arts. It was in this document that the increase in 
funding was announced (Hewison 1995,121). 
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culture, it indicates a change of climate and a more centre-stage role for 
the arts in public policy. This less marginal role brought with it an 
increased scrutiny on the part of the Treasury, which was reluctant to 
allow such increasingly significant sums of money to be spent without 
any governmental control. This was certainly a significant moment in 
British cultural policy; however, the majority of commentators tend to date 
the increased politicisation of the Arts Council and its appointments at a 
much later point in time, precisely in the 1980s, when the government 
begun to expect to be able to have a say on how the money was spent32. 
It was widely felt that, by the mid-80s - when the Tory government, after 
six years in power, had its mission of 'rolling back the frontier of the state' 
well underway - the Arts Council had become, as a matter of fact, 'a 
creature of the government' to the extent that the arm's length principle 
was denounced as 'a fraud' (Shaw and Shaw 1992,28). By the early 
1990s, as Taylor (1997) so effectively demonstrates, a dramatic shift had 
occurred. Broader changes occurred, during the 1980s, in the structure of 
British government, following which the executive would become the first 
responsible for formulating policy and overseeing its implementation by 
quangos and other autonomous agencies. In this changed context, the 
Department for National Heritage (DNH) assumed a much more 
proactive role than it traditionally had. The DNH's remit was now to 
formulate clear policy objectives, and Taylor (1997,445 and 461) 
interprets this new activism as a departure, if not even a rejection, of the 
tradition of laissez faire that had for so long characterised cultural policy- 
32 For a detailed discussion of the politicisation of arts funding in Britain in the 1980s, 
see Taylor 1997,1995 and 1994; Hewison 1995; Quinn 1997 and 1998; Shaw and 
Shaw 1992. 
-- 92 
making the British way33. The following extract from a document 
published by the DHN in 1992 seems to corroborate Taylor's argument: 
We need to be clearer about what our objectives in each policy 
field are and how we expect our sponsored bodies to help us 
achieve them. That does not mean abandoning the long- 
established 'arm's length principle, particularly with the arts". 
[... However] it is reasonable to expect the bodies we support 
to conduct their day-to-day operations, and to exercise their 
very proper independent judgement in dealing with particular 
clients, within an overall framework of priorities and public 
policies determined by Government" (quoted in Taylor 1997, 
445). 
Is it not at all surprising, in the light of this re-positioning that Taylor 
(1997) summarises as "arm's length but hands on", that the following 
year Lord Rix resigned from the Arts Council and launched against the 
DHN the accusation of 'defecating on' the Council from a great ministerial 
height (Taylor 1995,190). Taylor (Ibid. ) also reports that about two-thirds 
of the fourteen Council members were interiore homine very sympathetic 
to Lord Rix's complaints and shared his conviction that, over the course 
of the decades, the arm's length principle had been fatally 
compromised3a 
33 During a debate in the House of Commons, Virginia Bottomley declared: "[w]hilst 
respecting the arm's length principle, I think it is reasonable for ministers to say what 
they want to achieve and there are a number of levers for achieving these objectives" 
quoted in Taylor 1997,461). 
4 If any doubt about the true governmental attitudes and expectations persisted in the 
reader, it would be certainly dispelled by the re-interpretation of the arm's length 
principle as provided by David Mellor: "[... ] what they want is someone who gets them 
the money but does not have a view about how it is spent. [... ] If you have a minister of 
some significance, you expect him to have a view, he is not like something out of a 
Hammer horror film which comes alive at PES time and goes back to bed again while 
they spend the money" (quoted in Taylor 1997,452). 
-- 93 
At the end of this necessarily brief overview of the developments over 
time of the arm's length principle and the issues relating to it, it seems 
inevitable to agree with Taylor's diagnosis of the state of things as they 
appeared in the mid-1990s as a result of the increasingly politicised 
nature of policy-making: 
The pressure on the Arts Council was that it should transform 
itself from a 'buffer' between the arts world and government 
into a 'transmission belt' for government policy into the arts 
sector (Taylor 1994,134). 
The consequences of this pressure on the functioning of the Arts Council 
and, more generally, on British cultural policy will be analysed in greater 
detail in chapter 5 and will be put in the wider context of global economic 
and societal changes. 
ITALY AND THE 'LEGALISTIC' APPROACH TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
Having examined some of the more salient features of the public policy- 
making process in the UK, it is time to turn our analytical gaze to Italy, 
where the administration of the public sector has developed in very 
different ways. According to the historian Paul Ginsborg, who has 
devoted many a year to the study of the complexities of Italian history 
and politics, one of the principal blight on the development of the Italian 
public administration was the absence of a clear demarcation between 
the traditional culture of the Italian society and the workings of a modern 
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state (Ginsborg 2003,215)35. In other words, in Italy - as well as in many 
other Mediterranean countries - the personal and the particular elements 
that characterised public life in earlier times have persisted, to the point 
of threatening to overshadow the impersonal (in a non-clientelistic sense) 
and impartial aspects of the modern state36. Consequently, Ginsborg 
(Ibid. ) claims that when the Republican system was introduced in Italy in 
the aftermath of WWII, it was already possible to recognise a chasm 
between the formal regulations that were supposed to guide the public 
administration and its actual style of functioning. 
This chasm resulted in what Della Rocca (2000) calls "the public 
administration paradox". The paradoxical element lies in the ambivalence 
of the Italian public administration which is, on the one hand, an 
institution representing the collective interest, and on the other hand, one 
that is blighted by the presence of organisational practices in which 
35 It is generally accepted that what distinguished the practices of the ancien regime 
from the modern state is represented by the growth of the 'formal rationality' embodied 
by the bureaucracy. While the old ordainment of society was characterised by the 
prevalence of asymmetrical relations of power (based on values such as loyalty, 
reverence, submission, obedience and so on), the new conception of state was founded 
on the supremacy of impersonal over personal relations (Ginsborg, 2003,215). 
According to Max Weber's theory, at the very heart of the modern state is precisely the 
institution of clearly understood and universally accepted norms and rules as the guide 
for the state's action; the rightful application of such rules would be ensured by the 
smooth running of the bureaucratic apparatus. From such premise, it logically follows 
that the working principle of the public administration, in a modern state, should be 
equality of treatment for all citizens and the uttermost transparency of all its actions 
(Calandra 2002,87). The essence of the modern state, Weber believed, is constituted 
by the characteristics of precision, continuity, discipline, strictness, reliability and equity 
(Ginsborg, 2003,215). It is important to be aware of the fact that there is widespread 
agreement, among historians, that no modern bureaucracy developed in full 
consistency to Weber's ideal model (Ginsborg 2003 215). This is because, as Paul 
Ginsborg (Ibid. ) observes, "all modern administrations function not only on the basis of 
law and regulation but also on personal contact and informal relations". 
36 It could be argued, however, that State bureaucracy is indeed rather impersonal in 
Italy too - more so, in fact, that in the UK. One could argue that such impersonality 
might result from the apparent impenetrability of the mechanism of the bureaucratic 
machine, especially for those who have no 'connections' with people within the 
administrative system. See my discussion of clientelism on page 97. 
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selective and personal interests often prevail (Della Rocca 2000,376). It 
would be interesting to analyse in great detail the origin and the 
development, over time, of such a gulf between public and private 
interest in order to identify its historical causes. A question as 
complicated as this, however, cannot be addressed adequately here. It 
will suffice to say that historians agree in identifying the main cause of 
the Italian 'anomaly' with the "weak sense of the state" that seems to 
characterise the Italian people (Eve 1996,44 ff.; see also: Filippucci 
1996; Ginsborg 2003, Chapter 7). 
The Italian 'anomaly' translates itself in what is, according to Paul 
Ginsborg (2003,216), "a profoundly deformed relationship between 
citizen and state" (emphasis in the original). This is how the historian 
defines this contradiction, deep-rooted in Italian public life (Ginsborg 
2003,215-216. ): 
In formal terms, the actions of the civil service were minutely 
regulated by administrative law, whose principal objective was to 
safeguard the citizen against the arbitrary power of the 
bureaucracy. This was what has been called the 'justice-oriented' 
culture of Italian administration'. In reality, the habitual practice of 
the bureaucracy depended on a notable extent upon the exercise 
of discretionary power on the part of the functionary (emphasis in 
the original). 
Crucially, in the quote above, the reference to discretionary powers used 
(and more often than not abused) by civil servants in Italy does not allude 
to the acceptable autonomy of action and decision-making that might be 
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desirable in civil servants working within a framework of clear and 
accepted norms and regulations. Ginsborg rather refers to the civil 
servant's "performance of favours in response to particularistic 
pressures" (Ibid. ). Ginsborg's analysis brings together a number of 
problems that have been traditionally linked with the failure, on the part of 
the Italian people, to internalise their laws and to see them as the guide 
to their personal behaviour. This has been interpreted as a symptom of 
the Italian's lack of loyalty to the state as well as to the wider national 
community. One's family and circle of friends, or alternatively, the 
entourage of an influential individual are the true repositories of the 
Italians' loyalties (Eve 1996,44 ff.; Dickie 1996,19-20). 
This interpretation of this Italian 'anomaly' has been explored and 
researched by a number of American sociologists who, in the 1930s, 
begun to travel to Italy with the aim of researching the cultural 
foundations of the economic and social backwardness that characterised, 
at the time, Italian society. They focused their attention especially on the 
underdeveloped South - which was usually the location where they 
conducted their field research (Filippucci 1996,53)37. Particularly 
influential was the work of the American sociologist Edward Banfield, 
who, in 1958 (reprinted in 1967), published an essay entitled The Moral 
37 Filippucci (1996,53) reports how anthropologists (mainly English-speaking ones) 
studying Mediterranean societies identified some cultural traits they believed to be 
widely diffused in the area. This included: a special centrality of the concept of 'honour'; 
a form of social status based on the fulfilment of sexual roles; particularly strong local 
and regional identities, and the preference for 'personalistic' forms of political action 
which often gave rise to the phenomena of clientelism and corruption. Corruption was 
indeed one of the most crucial issues in Italy in the early 1990s, and, according to 
Michael Eve (1996,38), "[t]here is no real reason to doubt that Italy has been 
exceptional among Western nations in the extent of its public corruption". 
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Basis of a Backward Society. In this book - on the grounds of a research 
conducted on a Southern Italian village - Banfield introduced the concept 
of 'amoral familism' to explain the peculiarities of the Italians' weak civic 
sense38. Banfield's study - which is still often cited today - has influenced 
the hypothesis of Italy's 'weak sense of state' referred to above. At the 
root of the 'amoral familism' thesis lies the assumption that Italians 
(especially in the South), more than other European peoples, tend to 
pursue their personal interests or those of their close family over and 
above the wider interest of the community (Banfield 1958 [1967], 83-84). 
As a consequence of this attitude, many forms of social co-operation 
become unworkable, so as to inhibit an optimal economic and political 
development (Eve 1996,45). Banfield's theory of 'familism', though still 
influential, has been strongly criticised and challenged since the late 
1960s (Filippucci 1996). Ginsborg, for instance, distanced himself from 
the excesses of Banfield's view, while acknowledging the centrality of 
family values in Italian culture and identifying the strength of feelings of 
loyalty towards the family as one of the principal characteristics of Italian 
post-war history. Ginsborg (2003,216-217) indeed maintains that: 
... in the vital process of interiorization of codes of conduct for 
the public sphere, individuals were presented by the state with 
no constant and clear alternative to the long-standing practices 
of clientelism. On the contrary: patron-client relations, the 
38 In the introduction to his book, Benfield (1958[1967], 9-10) writes: "The book is about 
a single village in Southern Italy, the extreme poverty and backwardness of which is to 
be explained largely (but not entirely) by the inability of the villagers to act together for 
their common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate, material 
interest of the nuclear family. This inability to concert activity beyond the immediate 
family arises from an ethos - that of "amoral familism" - which has been produced by 
three factors acting in combination: a high death rate, certain land and tenure conditions 
and the absence of the institution of the extended family". 
-- 98 
exchange of favours, the use of kin and friends, became an 
accepted way for families to negotiate and traverse the 
bureaucracy. The state was not seen as either impartial or 
benevolent, but rather as a container of resources which 
individuals and families, if they found the right keys, could hope 
to unlock. 
Ginsborg (Ibid. ) acknowledges that in many ways this family-centred 
attitude gave birth to a system with an intrinsic logic, and endowed with 
vivacity and even a great deal of human warmth; however, it certainly 
was not a system that could ever be very conducive to the growth of 
citizenship values among the Italian population. 
With regards to these interpretations of the Italian 'weak sense of state' 
based on the intrusion of 'particularistic' values in the public sphere, Eve 
(1996,45) notes how the kind of framework adopted by the 'familism' 
approach promoted by Banfield is based on an implicit comparison of 
Italy with a type of society where the 'sense of state' (or 'stateness' as 
Heidenheimer would have it - see chapter 2) is more firmly rooted in the 
general consciousness, and where the levels of particularism and 
familism are lower. The latter is considered to be a more sophisticated 
society, and to have reached a higher level of social and political 
development. However, Eve (Ibid. ) also points out that - at a closer look - 
this ideal type of mature society is, in fact, based on an idealised picture 
of the differences between Italy and the USA or the states of Northern 
Europe rather than on any empirical observation, and should therefore be 
accepted with a good deal of caution (see also Galli della Loggia 1998, 
213-214). 
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On the other hand, when studying Italian public policy, it is necessary to 
be aware of the extent to which, in fact, issues of clientelism and 
corruption - rather than being mere subjects for the anthropologist to 
study - deeply affect public life in the country. The impacts on public 
administration of the familistic attitudes discussed above has been 
powerfully described by the well-respected scholar Sabino Cassese, who 
in the mid-1990s wrote: 
In the last fifteen years, in spite of the fact that the Constitution 
lays down that entry to the public administration is by 
examination, around 60 per cent of public employees have been 
hired by means of temporary or'precarious' contracts, which are 
then followed by permanent 'titularizations'. In this way, the 
bureaucrats have been able to find jobs for their relatives, 
following a long-standing custom of privileging family interests 
rather than those of the State. The political parties, in their turn, 
have managed to place their'clients' in the public administration, 
thus fortifying their own electoral base' (Cassese quoted in 
Ginsborg 2003,218-219). 
Clientelism and outright corruption are therefore some of the causes of 
the 'weak sense of state' and the consequent 'public administration 
paradox' discussed above. However, Ginsborg (2003,217) also 
attributes the weakness of public administration in Italy to the problems 
of inefficiency, disorganization and low productivity that have consistently 
characterised the Italian public sector. Such inefficiency, coupled with the 
clientelism described by Cassese, have both contributed to accentuate 
the traditional tendency towards 'familism' that has been discussed 
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earlier. According to Ginsborg (Ibid. ) the main causes of such deep- 
rooted inefficiency of the public administration were the dominance of the 
legalistic approach to public administration and an over-developed 
tradition of centralism39. There is no doubt that one of the most striking 
characteristic of the Italian public sector is the coexistence, within the 
one country, of an ensemble of incredibly rigorous and detailed - if 
intricate - laws and regulations meant to limit cases of corruption and 
clientelism, and a particularly high incidence of precisely those 
phenomena. In Italy, as was noted before, very little flexibility is given to 
public officials (at least formally) in the application of norms and 
regulations, so that the practices of flexibility and small-scale 
negotiations that allow the administrative system workability and flexibility 
belong, in Italy, to the sphere of illegal activity`o 
Administrative laws, on the other hand, are incredibly numerous with the 
result that the Italian public administration system is remarkably 
cumbersome and rigid. According to the data presented in a government 
report on the state of the public administration compiled in 1993, the laws 
currently in force in France were 7,325 and in Germany 5,587 (although 
this figure excludes the laws promulgated by the individual Länder). In 
3e The predominance of a legalistic culture over one oriented towards the provision of 
services has been already mentioned in the preceding discussion. However, the 
importance of this notion for the understanding of the processes of public policy-making 
in Italy cannot be stressed enough. Administrative law is indeed at the very heart of the 
paradigm of public management in Italy, and every activity taking place in the public 
realm has to be set within its (inflexible) framework. As a matter of fact, the process of 
juridification' has been identified as a phenomenon developing consistently throughout 
the history of Italian public administration (Capano 2003,785-787). 
40 Paradoxically, it is precisely such inflexibility of the bureaucratic machine that allows 
civil servants working in crucial positions, to abuse the system and establish 
relationships of political patronage and introduce illegal practices. 
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Italy, the numbers of laws and legally enforceable regulations was 
believed to be in the region of 90,000 (Ginsborg 2003,217). Although the 
data proposed by other studies put the estimate at a lower figure, the 
exorbitant number of the laws that are supposed to guide activities that 
happen in the public realm is universally recognised as the most 
remarkable feature of Italian public administration. The aforementioned 
government report explicitly admits this: 
The functions of the state are regulated and distributed among its 
organs by a highly disparate collection of acts, laws, regulations, 
circulars, directives, deliberations of interministerial committees, 
functional orders, etc. Some of these acts are not even published 
(quoted in Ginsborg 2003,424). 
Significantly, many public officials and central as well as local 
government managers have traditionally been recruited principally 
among graduates holding law or political science degrees, that is people 
with a strong legal formation41. The understanding of governance that 
public officials tend to have is therefore of a strongly formal and judicial 
nature. As a result, in the Italian public sector, compliance with the law is 
often interpreted as a standard to assess management performance and 
legalistic forms of control have developed where other countries - the UK 
among them - have preferred accountability-oriented systems of control 
(see chapter 5). In short, the view prevalent in Italy is that the 'neutral' 
enforcement of the law represents the best guarantee of good 
performance of the public administration (Mussari 1994,55). It is hardly 
41 Political science university degrees in Italy have a strong juridical emphasis. 
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surprising then, that - swamped with norms and regulations to be 
followed to the letter - the public administration in Italy has succumbed to 
legalism and has thus not been able to establish working practices 
founded on a culture of services42. 
An alternative interpretation of the development of public administration 
in Italy has been elaborated by Robert Putnam (1993) in Making 
Democracy Work. Putnam, building on the work done by the historians 
Almond and Verba on the notion of civic culture, attempts to account for 
contemporary political attitudes by considering socio-cultural variables in 
their historical evolution. The concept of 'civic region' plays an important 
role in Putnam's analysis of Italy, and tracing the civic roots of different 
parts of the country leads him to the realization that some regions are 
more 'civic' than others, and display lively social networks and diffused 
42 Eve (1996,48) observes that this state of affairs, and in particular the lack of any 
'reasonableness' (intended as common sense shared by both public official and client) 
behind the work of public institutions make the present predicament of Italian public 
administration a somewhat Kafkaesque situation. This is because - and this is yet 
another paradox - all these norms, rather than instilling law-abiding habits in public 
officials, have had pretty much the opposite effect. Since the law is felt to be, more 
often than not, an external and frequently unreasonable force, those who are in charge 
of ensuring its enforcement end up dissociating themselves from any identification with 
the norms themselves and the values they represent. Because of their passive role and 
the denial of any discretion in decision-making, public officials tend not to feel 
personally responsible for the workings of the burdensome machinery of the public 
administration. As a result, they may become eventually more susceptible to favouritism 
towards friends and family, if not to outright corruption (Ibid. ). Against this background, 
it seems hardly surprising that, as Dickie (1996,20) explicitly maintains, the Italians 
should be fundamentally sceptical of the impartiality of the State. The state, on its part, 
displays the same lack of faith in its citizens, as proved by the remarkable complicated 
procedures that for decades were involved in the simplest document requests: 
signatures had to be verified by notaries or public officials, a simple job application 
needed to be accompanied by dozens of certificati, official documents attesting the 
circumstances of the applicant (Ginsborg 200,218). Things have slightly improved with 
the introduction of the autocertificazione -a process on the basis of which an Italian 
citizen can provide information about himself or herself to the public authorities without 
having to support every declaration with the relevant official document. However, just 
how little the Italian state trusts its citizens is further demonstrated by the internal 
resistances encountered by the institution of the autocertificazione: introduced by the 
law no. 15 of 1968, it only became widely operational in the mid 1990s (Idem. ). 
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norms of civic engagement. Other regions, on the other hand display a 
prevalence of what Putnam (Ibid., 15) calls 'vertically structured politics' 
and a diffused culture of distrust in public institutions. Putnam shows that 
there is a clear link between different levels of modernity and institutional 
performance 43 
The arguments presented so far have attempted to show how the issue 
of the deformed relationship between state and citizen in Italy is indeed 
complex and multifaceted. It seems opportune, thus, to conclude this 
necessarily brief review of the 'weak sense of state' that seems to affect 
the Italian people and have spread into public administration, with 
Michael Eve's invitation to caution (1996,49): 
None of these features - the perverse effects of heavy legal and 
administrative regulation, long chains of accountability, the 
attempt to extend state authority in the face of powerful interests 
- fit in with any simple version of the 'weak state' or lack of civic 
consciousness thesis (emphasis in the original). 
Together with the inflation of laws, another characteristic that, according 
to Ginsborg (2003,217), contributed to the inefficiency of Italian public 
43 Putnam also maintains that the search for an explanation for such an uneven spread 
of civic values across the country, "leads us back to a momentous period nearly a 
millennium ago, when two contrasting and innovative regimes where established. In 
different parts of Italy -a powerful monarchy in the south and a remarkable set of 
communal republics in the center and north. From this early medieval epoch through the 
unification of Italy in the nineteenth century, we trace systematic regional differences in 
patterns of civic involvement and social solidarity. These traditions have decisive 
consequences for the quality of life, public and private, in Italy's regions today. Indeed, 
Putnam (1993,133) manages to build a convincing argument for a clear parallel 
between the prevalence in a certain area of either of the two political forms and different 
levels of civic spirit. So, 'the southern territories once ruled by the Norman kings 
constitute exactly the seven least civic regions in the 1970s. [... ] At the other end of the 
scale, the heartland of republicanism in 1300 corresponds uncannily to the most civic 
regions of today". 
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administration was the over-developed traditions of centralism. By the 
early-1990s, various types of public institutions that in many other 
countries managed themselves with a certain degree of autonomy 
(museums and galleries, just to make an example), in Italy, were still 
managed centrally (and not very efficiently) by the state. As will be 
shown in chapter 6, things are slowly changing, although there is little 
doubt that, compared to the UK, Italy is still managed according to a 
much stronger centralised paradigm. Despite the reform introduced by 
the article 54 of law no. 142 of 1990, following which local authorities 
have acquired a certain financial autonomy, public finance in Italy is still 
highly centralised (Mussari 1994,55 and 60). Almost fifteen years after 
the law was promulgated, the reform has not yet been fully implemented. 
Before the reform introduced the possibility for local authorities to 
increase the revenue generated from the local community (by levying 
taxes and applying differential pricing for the services provided) local 
authorities received, on average, two thirds of their resources directly 
from the central government. Funds are transferred to local government 
according to decisions made annually and ratified in the national budget. 
Although the distribution of resources happens on the grounds of 
quantitative parameters (such as regional population, size, etc. ) other 
factors, such as the actual costs of the services provided and the 
efficiency levels of local governments are not always taken into 
consideration (Mussari 1994,55). 
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It is clear that the Italian bureaucratic machine is still far from working 
efficiently. The problems discussed so far, coupled with the obdurate 
resistance encountered by any attempt at reform paint a very grim 
picture indeed. The inefficiency and unresolved organisational problems 
of the Italian public administration are reflected in the incredibly high 
number of court cases originating from appeals against alleged errors or 
illegalities attributed to public offices or civil servants44. Despite the 
obvious problems (only a few of which have been discussed here), 
however, administrative reform was never a very high political priority, 
and it did not become one even after an especially devoted ministry was 
established in the mid-1990s. Timid reforms have taken place at some 
point in post-war history, but they usually amounted to little more than 
modifications to the economic and juridical status of civil servants 
(Ginsborg 2003,211-222). 
CENTRALISED BUT DISPERSED: THE ORIGINS OF THE ITALIAN CULTURAL 
POLICY MODEL 
As could be expected, the intricacies that characterise policy-making in 
general, are also reflected in the specific area of cultural policy. In 
particular, one of the features of cultural policy-making in Italy which 
contributes to making the picture even more complicated is the fact that 
44 In a strongly legalist system, where administrative law is accepted to be the very 
foundation of public administration, it logically follows that the final form of control is 
represented by the law itself. Hence there were 111,000 cases of new appeals to 
administrative or financial tribunals registered for the year 1991 alone on top of the 
800,000 already under-way but still pending (Ginsborg 2003,219). It is legitimate to 
assume that the recourse en masse to the administrative courts is a symptom of the 
ineffectiveness of the routine systems of control in place in the Italian public sector. 
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all levels of government - State, Regions, Provinces and Municipalities - 
are involved in the definition and the implementation of cultural policies 
(Bodo 2002,5). However, the communication and co-ordination between 
the various levels are very poor: very often the observer has the 
impression that what informs their relationship is, in fact, an antagonistic 
attitude. The state has historically displayed a marked resistance towards 
the devolution of powers and responsibilities for cultural planning and 
policy-making to the lower levels of government - the Regions in 
particular45. The problem of the persistent tendency to centralism of the 
Italian public administration paradigm has already been remarked upon, 
but - as will be discussed in more detail later - this phenomenon has 
been even more noteworthy in the sphere of cultural policyas 
Similarly, the inflation of legal norms and regulations that was lamented 
in the context of the preceding review of the Italian public administration 
also represents a grave burden on cultural policy-making. This is how 
Augustin Girard (1996,58) has described the Italian situation: 
45 Significantly, Merusi (2005) reports that recent legislation attempting to clarify the 
relationship between State and regional and local levels has been condemned for 
having achieved only 'an imperfect decentralisation' ('un decentramento imperfetto') on 
the grounds that a number of functions that could have been rightfully be expected to 
have been devolved to the regional government have, in fact, been retained at central 
level. 
46 This complicated relationship between the various governmental levels that share 
responsibilities in the cultural field contributes to the phenomenon that Palma and 
Clemente di San Luca (1987,68) refer to as the "plurality of public administrations". 
This 'plurality' is represented by the large number of public bodies and institutions that 
are active in the cultural policy field. Because of the obvious difficulty of taking into 
consideration the activities of all these agencies and organisations making up the Italian 
public sphere, Palma and Clemente di San Luca (Ibid. ) prefer to use the more specific 
label of 'State intervention' in the arts rather than the more generic one of 'public 
intervention' to qualify the focus of their paper. Similarly, this section of this paper will 
consider issues relating more specifically to 'State intervention' in the cultural field in 
Italy. 
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Italy has an extraordinary array of legislation relating to culture, 
which never ceases to grow at a steady pace both at national 
and regional level. This plethora of rules and regulations, which 
especially affects the cultural heritage, seems to have the effect 
of gradually making the actual implementation of the laws more 
and more difficult. 
As a direct result of its dense legal framework, cultural policy has been, 
in Italy, pretty much an affair for specialists, and rarely has the debate 
over spending decisions or legal reforms affecting the cultural sector 
crossed the thresholds of the professional sphere (the experts and those 
directly and professionally involved in cultural management) to reach the 
general public. This was indeed the feeling expressed by the report 
prepared by Christopher Gordon in 1995 on the basis of the National 
Report on cultural policy submitted by the Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to the Culture Committee of the Council of Europe. Gordon (1995, 
10) writes: 
There is no comprehensive document setting out basic strategies 
and programme objectives for public intervention in the field of 
culture. The laws which guarantee financial resources are the 
only programme documents in the Italian cultural policy system. 
It is hardly surprising therefore, that legal circles, (and especially experts 
of administrative law) have produced most of the available material on 
cultural policy administration. If jurisprudence leads the way with regards 
to the accepted understandings of cultural policy, art historians have 
retained a monopoly of debates and decision-making in the realms of 
conservation and restoration, which are both of paramount importance in 
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the Italian cultural public sphere (Bianchini et al. 1996,291; Di Stefano 
1995,5; see also Bobbio 1992,149). 
From an administrative point of view, the model on which Italian cultural 
policy has always been based is founded on the direct engagement of 
the public administration in funding the conservation, the creation and - 
to a lesser extent - the promotion, valorisation and diffusion of its 
extensive cultural patrimony. Such direct engagement of the state often 
extends to the direct management and running of cultural facilities and 
institutions (such as archaeological sites, museums, theatres, etc, ) which 
are responsibilities of either central ministries or special departments at 
the regional, provincial and municipal levels (Bodo 2002,8). There are a 
number of quasi-independent bodies, whose relationship to the 
government could be assimilated to the one envisaged by the 'arm's 
length principle' discussed with relation to Great Britain. Examples of this 
type of institution are the Venice Biennale and the Ente Teatrale Italiano 
(ETI, the Italian Theatre Institute) and the High Authority for 
Communications. These bodies, however, represent only an exception to 
the rule of direct management described above (Ibid. ). 
In the Italian case, the fact that responsibilities for funding and decision- 
making have been largely retained centrally, did not result in a strong 
central ministry of culture of the sort that can be found in France. On the 
contrary, responsibilities for cultural decision-making were for a very long 
period of time dispersed among a number of central ministries, giving rise 
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to what could be defined as a situation of 'centralised dispersion'. This 
status quo only ended in 1998, with the creation of the new Ministry for 
Heritage and Cultural Activities (Ministero per i Beni e le Attivita' 
Cultural, ) when finally responsibilities for the various cultural activities 
supported by the State were grouped together within the new ministry's 
remit47. Bodo (2002) clearly sees the creation of the new Ministry as an 
important change and as a discrete improvement on the status quo ante. 
It is beyond doubt that before the creation of the new Ministry in 1998, 
the picture of cultural provision and support in Italy was very confused 
and presented wide areas of overlap and lack of communication between 
the many central departments involved in cultural policy-making. The 
historical development of Italian cultural policy will be the object of 
detailed analysis in chapter 6, however, the pervasive popularity of the 
introduction of the Ministry of Heritage and Cultural Activities will be much 
easier to understand after a brief review of the pre-1998 distribution of 
responsibilities for the cultural sector. The pre-1998 distribution of 
responsibility across central ministries appeared as such: 
  The Ministry of Education (Ministero delta Pubblica Istruzione) had 
been in charge of running of the Directorate for Antiquities and 
Fine Arts (Direttorato delle Antichita' e Belle Arti) since the 
establishment of the Republic. In 1975, however, the Directorate 
constituted the core institution of a newly established Ministry of 
47 The administrative structure of the unified Ministry has undergone further legislative 
change following the D. Lgs no. 42 of 22nd January 2004 (the so-called Decreto Urban, ) 
and the presidential decree n. 172 of 2004. The detail of this legal reform cannot be 
discussed here in detail, but extensive analysis of the legal innovations and their 
implications can be found in Cammelli 2003b, Ferretti 2004, Cammelli 2005, Pastori 
2005, D'Auria 2005, Sciullo 2005, Barbati 2005 and Merusi 2005. 
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Cultural and Environmental Assets (Ministero dei Beni Culturali e 
Ambientali). This was, throughout the pre-1998 phase of Italian 
cultural policy, the only minister exclusively engaged with cultural 
matters (its brief included the artistic, archaeological and 
architectural heritage, museums and galleries, the fine arts, 
libraries, publishing and archives). 
  The Ministry for Tourism and the Performing Arts (Ministeno per il 
Turismo e lo Spettacolo) was abolished in 1993, as a result of a 
referendum, so that responsibility for the live performing arts 
returned to the office of the Prime Minister (Ufficio delta 
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministrº) which was initially in charge 
of them. (Bianchini et al. 1996,293). 
  Although the Ministry of Cultural and Environmental Assets 
represented the major player, other government departments were 
- and still are - in charge of other aspects of cultural policy: the 
already mentioned Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione is still in 
charge of arts teaching and training. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Ministero degli Affari Esters) is in charge of looking after 
Italy's foreign cultural relations and the promotion of Italian culture 
abroad (through the work of about eighty Centres for Italian culture 
located in as many different countries). The Ministry for Post and 
Telecommunications (Ministero delle Poste e delle 
Telecomunicazioni) is the main regulator for the broadcasting 
system and supervises the RAI, the Italian public broadcasting 
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company. The Ministry of Public Works (Ministero dei Lavori 
Pubblici) takes care, in collaboration with the Ministry of Heritage 
and Cultural Activities, of restoration works carried out on 
monuments and buildings of historic and artistic importance. 
It is obvious from this brief overview that the institutional framework of 
Italian cultural policy has been characterised by a long period of extreme 
confusion and by a high degree of fragmentation and distribution of 
responsibilities between a number of players and across the various 
administrative levels. This situation has undoubtedly affected the quality 
and the consistency of the actual policies, and probably contributes to the 
lack of strategic planning, the confused objectives and the vagueness of 
the state's action plans with regards to the cultural field that 
commentators lament (Bianchini et al. 1996,294; see also Gordon 1995). 
Why has this state of affairs, which we have referred to as 'centralised 
dispersion', persisted for over fifty years despite the obvious problems it 
involves? Commentators seem to agree that the cultural policy set-up just 
described was in fact intentional on the part of Italian legislators. The 
justification for such apparently bizarre choice of administrative 
framework lies in the attempt to avoid the possibility of abusing cultural 
policy for propaganda purposes as had happened during the Fascist era 
(Bianchini et al. 1996,292; Gordon 1995,9). When, in the aftermath of 
WWII, the Republic was established and the possibility of the 
reconstitution of a Fascist party was banned by the newly implemented 
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Constitution, every effort was put in place to avoid recreating a powerful 
and centralised institution resembling the Fascist Ministero della Cultura 
Popolare (Ministry for Popular Culture, often referred to as Minculpop). 
During the Fascist regime, the nurturing and promotion of culture on the 
part of the state had assumed a centrality that has remained unique in 
Italian history. Indeed, through the promotion of a regime-friendly version 
of 'national culture', the Minculpop became a crucial player in the 
establishment of a broad popular consensus around the Fascist 
dictatorship, as well as a powerful tool to counteract the activities of 
intellectuals and artists hostile to the regime. As Stone (1998,23) 
explains, "Fascist culture originated in a contest for control of the 
structures of representation": hence the pivotal role of the culture ministry 
within Fascist Italy. The Fascist regime begun its cultural project by first 
devoting itself to institutional reforms rather than the promotion or 
celebration of a particular aesthetics or arts forms. At the beginning of the 
century, the country did not have a distinctively Italian cultural policy, and 
the regime took it upon itself to begin the process of institutionalisation of 
public intervention in the arts (Palma and Clemente di San Luca 1987, 
69). These administrative reforms served the purpose of creating a fertile 
ground for the creation of a very powerful and wealthy 'patron state' 
which had access to money as well as all the tools it needed to distribute 
and make visible the artistic expression it promoted (Stone 1998). This 
strong impetus towards administrative reform in the arena of cultural 
administration and support was to have long-lasting impacts which 
outlived the regime itself. Some of the laws that were issued in the late 
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1930s, at the height of the Fascist dictatorship, had a significant influence 
over Italian cultural policy ever since they were first promulgated. In fact, 
even the Testo Unico of 1998 - the legislative act that has re-organised 
all the legislation for the cultural field - is fundamentally consistent to the 
approach to the conservation and protection of the country's 'cultural 
assets' that was established during the Fascist Ventennio (Genovese 
1995,32). 
The report on Italian cultural policy prepared in 1995 by the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Council of Europe openly acknowledges 
the achievements of the dictatorship in this area of public administration: 
it praises the breadth of scope of its intervention and the importance of 
the setting in place of a framework for the systematic preservation of 
Italy's immense cultural heritage (Council of Europe 1995,23-26). 
However, despite its positive contributions to administrative reform, the 
Minculpop was undoubtedly responsible for the unscrupulous use of 
culture and arts for propaganda and for the promotion of one of the most 
illiberal, discriminatory and despotic regimes in modern history. Hence, 
as Gordon (1995,9) points out "[I]t is wholly understandable that, 
following the suppression of the former Ministry of popular Culture in 
1953, fears in Italy led to an outright rejection of the idea that there 
should be a single, unified Ministry of Culture". The price to pay though, 
was the 'centralised dispersion' of responsibilities and competencies for 
the cultural sector that has been discussed above. In 1998, though, the 
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decision was made that this was, in fact, a price too high, and the first 
post-war unified Ministry for Culture was established in Italy. 
THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE CULTURAL POLICY DEBATE 
Another crucial difference between the British and the Italian cultural 
policy model is linked to the fact that, while the United Kingdom does not 
have a written Constitution, Italy does. The preceding section has shown 
how the lack of a written constitution, as well as the possibility, afforded 
by the system, to introduce significant administrative reforms without the 
need for major legislative changes is what allows the British system such 
flexibility and the capacity to swiftly adapt to changed political 
circumstances. In Italy, things are very different: since 1948 the 
Constitution has been providing the guiding principles for the elaboration 
of all subsequent judicial norms. Every single law that is issued has to be 
consistent with the values and principles expressed by the Constitution, 
and failure to meet this requirement imports the highly likelihood of a 
Constitutional Court ruling to invalidate the law itself (Barbati 2003,105). 
Therefore, the interpretation of the text of the Constitution and the 
reconstruction of its meaning in the intentions of the founders of the 
Republic becomes, in the Italian context, an absolutely crucial matter. 
Moreover, it is a matter that has had important repercussions on the 
cultural policy debate. 
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One of the most significant cases has been the long legal dispute over 
the interpretation of the meaning of the letter of Article 9 of the Italian 
Constitution. This question of constitutional doctrine, which is centred on 
the interpretation of the word Repubblica (republic), concerns the 
involvement of the various administrative levels in the promotion of the 
arts, and in particular the legitimacy of the regional and local government 
levels to be fully involved in cultural planning and provision. Article 9 
ratifies and institutionalises the commitment of the Italian Republic to 
promote the arts48. In the course of the decision-making process that 
originated the Italian Constitution, the word Repubblica was chosen over 
the term Stato which appeared in an earlier draft (Barbati 2003,105). 
This has created some confusion, since the word Repubblica occurs a 
number of times in the text of the Constitution, but not always with the 
same meaning. What has been at the centre of the jurisprudential 
debate is whether, in Article 9, by the term Repubblica the authors of the 
Constitution meant to indicate what in legal terms is often referred to as 
Stato-persona or Stato-apparato (that is, the state intended as the central 
national government) or, rather, the Stato-ordinamento (that is the 
general notion of state as embodied by any of the territorial administrative 
levels that belong to it - national and sub-national: regional, municipal, 
etc. ) (Barbati 2003,105; Palma and Clemente di San Luca 1987,70). 
48 Article 9 of the Italian Constitution reads: "La Repubblica promuove lo sviluppo della 
cultura e della ricerca scientifica e tecnica. Tutela il paesaggio e il patrimonio storico e 
artistico della Nazione". The translation offered by Gordon (1995,9) is "The Republic 
shall do all in its power to promote the development of culture and of scientific and 
technical research. It shall also protect and preserve the countryside and the historical 
and artistic monuments which are the inheritance of the nation". 
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The implications of the adoption of one interpretation over the other with 
regards to cultural policy are obvious: in the first case, the Constitution 
would seem to imply that only the central government is rightfully entitled 
to be involved in cultural policy-making. Conversely, the second option 
leaves open the possibility of the regional and local administrative levels 
to participate in cultural-policy making besides the institutions of central 
government. The final prevalence of the latter option however, introduces 
the need to define the competences of the central state and the sub- 
national levels of government respectively. But, as was referred to above, 
this has been not a straightforward process in view of the reluctance of 
the centre to turn the rights of the periphery to involvement in the cultural 
sphere into reality. According to the currently accepted juridical doctrine, 
which has been endorsed by the revised version of the Constitution 
following the reform process that took place in 2001 (l. cost. 18 ottobre 
2001, n. 3, di revisione del Titolo V, parte seconda, delta Costituzione) the 
central institutions of the state retain the full responsibility for the tutela, 
that is the preservation and conservation of Italy's cultural heritage. The 
revised Constitution ratifies the right of sub-national levels of government 
to exercise their authority in the sphere of the valorizzazione, that is the 
presentation, valorisation and 'exploitation' of the artistic patrimony 
(Barbati 2003,106-109). 
According to the scholar of Italian administrative law Marco Cammelli 
(2003,12), far from having resolved the tension between centre and 
periphery in the Italian cultural policy system, the Constitutional reform 
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has in fact potentially jeopardised its unity. Cammelli (Ibid. ) maintains that 
the process of devolution of responsibilities for 'cultural assets' has only 
been partially achieved, and has thus resulted in a chaotic dualism of 
functions (with the separation between the activities of tutela and 
valorizzazione as well as between the central institution of the Ministry for 
Heritage and Cultural Activities and those at the local level). 
The framework for cultural policy-making in Italy will be discussed in 
greater detail in later sections of this thesis; however, the discussion so 
far will have hopefully shed light on some of the essential differences 
between the Italian and British cultural policy models. It is now time to 
draw some conclusions from the comparative observations that have 
been made so far. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In accordance with the methodological conclusions reached in Chapter 1, 
this and the preceding chapter have attempted to present some of the 
principal features of the British and Italian administrative and legal 
systems. This was indeed necessary in order to offer a backdrop against 
which the in-depth discussion of cultural policy in the two countries, which 
will follow, can be better understood. In particular, the present overview 
of the framework of public policy-making in the two countries has focused 
on the very different ways in which policy is talked about and understood 
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in Italy and the UK, and the ways in which different approaches to public 
policy have affected the development of public policy as a field of 
academic enquiry. If, on the one hand, the public policy literature in the 
UK is characterised by a widely interdisciplinary character, on the other 
hand, the Italian policy debate has been the almost exclusive dominion of 
scholars specializing in the legal disciplines, with "administrative law" 
research accounting for a great proportion of the available publications 
on various aspects of Italian cultural policy. 
Furthermore, the comparative analysis of the ways in which the state is 
involved in cultural funding and promotion has highlighted the profound 
differences between the British and Italian cultural policy models. In brief, 
the discussion presented above can be summarised in the contraposition 
of the British model - partly based on the creation on quasi-independent 
bodies (quangos) for the allocation of public resources and the definition 
of specific policy and strategies for the cultural sector - and the Italian 
model, where responsibilities and competences for the arts and culture 
have been retained largely by the central state, although they were for 
about forty years fragmented and scattered among a number of different 
ministries. An attempt was also made to assess the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of both models. The quango paradigm seems to 
maximise the flexibility allowed by the loose legal system in place in the 
UK, which allows bodies such as the Arts Council to adapt their policies 
and strategies to the fast-changing circumstances of the modern world. 
On the other hand, the criticism moved against the British quangocracy 
-- 119 
by a number of commentators was acknowledged, and the allegations 
concerning the increasing 'shortening' of the arm in the so-called 'arm's 
length' relationship between quangos and government have been 
discussed extensively. The flexibility of the British example was 
juxtaposed against the fragmentation of competence for cultural policy in 
Italy. This fragmentation, together with the hindrance represented by a 
dense and cumbersome legal framework within which the policy-making 
process happens, make for a much more rigid system, where change is 
slow to happen and where administrative structures are often obsolete 
and unable to cope with the complex need of the cultural sector in a land 
as culturally rich as Italy. Undoubtedly, the Italian situation is further 
complicated by the high degree of political instability that has consistently 
plagued the political life of the country throughout its Republican history. 
Italian governments rarely succeed in surviving a whole term, and it's 
rather a common occurrence for general elections to be called a matter of 
years before they are due. Although the short life of governments rarely 
means a radically changed political scene following new elections (the 
Christian Democrats were consistently in power for about forty years 
before the corruption-related scandals of the early 1990s), this rather 
unstable situation means that the normal legislative iter that any new law 
has to go through (which is already rather tortuous)49 is often further 
slowed down. Legal changes and reforms, in Italy, can thus take a very 
long time. 
49 Any new law has to be discussed and voted by both the Chambers that make up the 
Italian Legislative: the Camera des Deputats and the Camera del Senato. 
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In the light of the discussion presented so far, it seems evident that the 
main differences between the Italian and the British cultural policy 
systems closely reflect the different cultural context of the two countries, 
especially with regards to the relationship between law and action (Lo 
Schiavo 2000,693). According to Lo Schiavo (ibid. ), when looking 
comparatively at Britain and Italy, it is of paramount importance to 
consider the implications of the fact that the UK is a common law country 
(where changes can be made without large scale law-making exercises 
being required), whereas Italy is a public law country. This is how he 
(Ibid. ) explains the consequences of such different legal profiles of the 
two countries: 
In a few words, in a common law country like the UK, change in a 
law follows change in the public services. In a public law country 
like Italy, it is exactly the opposite: change in law is required in 
advance, but generally is not sufficient to implement real changes 
(emphasis in the original). 
It is significant to remark that, despite such radical differences, both the 
Italian and the British cultural policy models show a crucial similarity. 
Indeed, the adoption of the 'quango approach' in Britain, and the 
fragmentation of competences for the arts and culture across central 
departments in Italy, both originate from the same intention to guarantee 
that the cultural sector can be supported and flourish without being 
submitted to unduly pressures from the government. The two models that 
have been the object of the present analysis are really not much other 
than two different solutions to the same problem. The two countries felt 
equally strongly the need to avoid the danger that is potentially inherent 
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in the notion of a powerful ministry of culture working to promulgate a set 
of 'official' cultural values and artefacts through an 'official cultural policy'. 
As has already been mentioned, the reason for such a recalcitrant 
attitude vis ä vis a unified culture ministry might be more immediately 
evident with regards to Italy, in view of the obvious precedent 
represented by the Fascist regime's instrumentalisation of culture for 
propaganda aims. However, there is a general consensus, among 
commentators and scholars, that the adoption of the 'arm's length 
principle' as the guiding notion of British cultural policy reflects very 
similar concerns to those found in post-Fascist Italy (Williams 1979; Beck 
1992; Taylor 1995). According to Beck (1992,139) the 'arm's length 
principle', despite all its limitations, is the embodiment of the belief that 
art and politics should never meet and fulfils the function of making clear 
what kind of relationship should be established between the two. He 
(Ibid. ) writes that: 
British government has always resisted the establishment of a 
Ministry of Culture. There is a fundamental conviction deep in 
our political culture that art and politics must never mix [... ] 
Thus British government, because it is a liberal and democratic 
government, should never have a cultural policy. 
Beck's quote expresses a set of beliefs that was rather consensual in the 
early days of the British post-war cultural policy debate. However, the 
times have changed dramatically, and the sphere of public policy has 
undergone a dramatic re-shaping. Unsurprisingly, these have had 
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repercussions in the area of cultural policy, and these will be the topic of 
the following sections of this thesis. The argumentation that will follow 
aims to show that, despite the common preoccupation with the perils that 
a more direct involvement of the government in cultural policy would 
entail, recent developments in both countries seem to point towards the 
progressive increase of governmental influence over cultural policy 
priorities and strategies. Furthermore, there is evidence to argue that 
both countries are moving (though at a different pace) towards a 
progressive and steady instrumentalization of cultural policy to broader 
governmental priorities. Significantly, such powerful forces are at work 
that cultural, juridical and administrative differences between the two 
countries seem to have lost importance, indicating the possibility that - 
despite their original roots in national cultural traditions - national cultural 
policies might in fact be one area were globalizing processes are already 
well under way and have been for quite some time. 
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Chapter 4 
The culture of cultural policy: A brief review of the British 
and Italian intellectual and cultural traditions 
The first section of this thesis has presented an overview of the political, 
institutional and bureaucratic background against which cultural policy 
needs to be viewed in both the countries at the centre of the present 
study. This second section opens with a brief history of the intellectual 
and cultural traditions of Britain and Italy, with a view of discussing the 
notion of culture which is at the root of cultural policy-making in the two 
countries. Both countries have a very complex and rich cultural history 
which it would be impossible to analyse and discuss extensively within 
the constraints imposed by this thesis. The present discussion will 
therefore focus on those aspects of the intellectual and cultural history of 
the two nations that is more immediately relevant to the sphere of cultural 
policy. This will provide the necessary theoretical grounding for the 
discussion of British and Italian contemporary cultural policy that will 
follow in chapter 5 and 6. Indeed, this chapter will begin by attempting to 
describe the most crucial stages in the evolution of notions of culture 
within the British intellectual discourse. This is a necessary step in order 
to show how shifts in the definitions of what can be ascribed to the realm 
of 'culture' have affected cultural policies in postwar Britain. The analysis 
will then move on to highlighting the different evolution of the concept of 
culture within Italian cultural theory, seeking to find - in the different 
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shades of meaning that culture has displayed within the cultural debate 
in Italy - an explanation for the different evolution of Italian cultural 
policies over time. 
It is useful at this stage to refer to Oliver Bennett's (2005) warning that 
"the tracing of intellectual influences in institutional and policy matters is 
not always straightforward, as such influences are often not articulated, 
let alone attributed, but, rather, are reflected in unspoken policy 
assumption or institutional rhetoric". Special attention will thus be given 
to the identification of the conceptions of culture that appear to have 
indeed made their way from the critical debates of intellectuals and 
cultural analysts into the arena of cultural policy-making, becoming 
operational within those institutions whose responsibility it is to finance 
and sustain the arts in Britain and Italy. 
CHANGING NOTIONS OF CULTURE IN THE BRITISH CONTEXT 
"Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English 
language. This is so partly because of its intricate historical development, 
in several European languages, but mainly because it has now come to 
be used for important concepts in several distinct and incompatible 
systems of thought" (Williams, 1976,87) 
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As can be evinced by the opening quote above, taken from Williams' 
Keywords (1976), 'culture' is a word employed in a variety of senses in 
everyday use as well as in academic contexts. Indeed, according to the 
cultural anthropologist Robert Borofsky, "[c]ulture has become one of the 
most popular words in our global vocabulary" (Borofsky, 1998,64). 
Despite its common use, though, there is not a tangible or generally 
agreed meaning for it, so that, when talking of culture, it is not always 
clear what the central concept being discussed is. A further example of 
the difficulties of achieving a single, systematic notion of culture might be 
offered by the book entitled Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and 
Definitions by Kroeber, Kluckhohn and Untereiner (1952), which contains 
over 150 definitions of culture! Moreover, to complicate things further, 
"the term culture has a long history of meaning different things to different 
people" (W. Goodenough, quoted in Borofsky, 1998,65). If, on the one 
hand, defining culture is definitely a tantalising task, on the other, it is 
quite remarkable - considering the number of books and articles devoted 
to the theme of 'culture' and to cultural management and policy - how 
often the topic is confidently tackled without the need being felt for a 
proper clarification of the terms under discussion. And yet, one would 
assume it essential, in order to define effective policies for the area of 
culture, that the boundaries of this area should be clearly defined (Quinn, 
1998,72)50 
50 There is one thing on which, however, there seems to be a relative agreement among 
scholars in the humanities and social sciences alike, namely that "culture is a concept, 
not a reality" (Borofsky, 1998,64). In Borofsky's words, "[d]espite the fact that people 
talk of culture as being something 'real', as something that exists 'out there', it is in fact 
an intellectual construct used for describing (and explaining) a complex cluster of 
human behaviours, ideas, emotions and artefacts" (Borofsky, 1998,65). 
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Culture is, in fact, an idea that has developed in European cultural theory 
over the past two centuries paralleling great political, social and 
economic changes, and is substantially linked to notions of political 
solidarity, particularly that of the nation-state, and of national cultural 
identities. Culture is therefore not just a concept, but a concept with a 
history involving a continuous evolution of meaning. Raymond Williams 
has devoted a number of articles and books to the topic of the 
developments of the notion of culture over time. He is, as a matter of fact, 
considered the single most important figure in the original formation of 
what has come to be known, in the English-speaking academic world, as 
'cultural studies' (Gray and McGuigan, 1993, viii). 
In Keywords (1976,87-92), Williams has traced the complex history of 
the word 'culture' starting from the meaning of its Latin predecessor, 
cultura. This derived from the verb colere, which had a wide range of 
meanings, including the cultivation of the soil. And indeed, originally and 
until the early 16th century, culture was a word indicating a process, 
normally the process of the tending of crops or animals. The first 
modification in meaning happened around the mid 16th century, when, by 
metaphor, "the tending of natural growth was extended to a process of 
human development" (Idem, 87). By this time, culture had thus become a 
figurative term to indicate the process of refinement of spirit and 
manners. However, Williams (1953, reprinted in Mclllroy and Westwood, 
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1993,59) insists that the term culture at this stage always implied 
reference to a process rather than to an achieved state. This represents 
one of the three main fields of reference of the word culture that Williams 
describes: culture as 'civilisation', in the sense of a general process of 
intellectual, spiritual and material progress. As Eagleton (2000,9) has 
noted, in this identification with 'civilisation', the term 'culture' inscribed 
itself fully in the spirit of the Enlightenment, with its belief in secular 
values and man's possibilities of progressive self-development. Only in 
the course of the 19th century will the use of the word 'culture' develop as 
a concept and evolve towards the sense of an absolute, an entity: the 
idea of culture. Indeed, until the 19th century, the word culture was rarely 
used on its own, but was usually preceded by an adjective, such as 
`moral', 'intellectual', etc. It was probably not until Matthew Arnold that the 
word dropped all the adjectives that normally accompanied it to be just 
'culture', "an independent noun, an abstract process or the product of 
such a process" (Williams, 1976,88). In short, "in the nineteenth century, 
the word has become the Idea" (Williams, 1953 in Mclllroy and 
Westwood, 1993,60). 
Williams (Ibid., 60-61) has explained this development in the meaning of 
the word `culture' as a response to the changes, unprecedented in 
human experience, in the social structure and in everyday life that were 
occurring around Europe at the time, due to the Industrial Revolution, and 
the consequent phenomenon of urbanisation. Indeed, for Williams, "[t]he 
idea of culture is not to be considered as a process of independent 
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evolution; it is shaped and at times directed by the total environment to 
which it is one kind of response" (Ibid., 61). The era of the industrial 
society dominated by the machine was felt, by many intellectual and 
social as well as cultural commentators of that time, to be devouring and 
corrupting the natural character of humankind. As a result, a number of 
cultural and social theorists started to feel an ever-widening gap between 
the creative and the productive, between certain moral and intellectual 
activities and the values represented by the new kind of society that was 
then affirming itself. This new concept of culture - which was heavily 
indebted to the aesthetic theories elaborated within the German tradition 
(Hammermeister 2002 and Bruford 1962) - in the changed historical 
circumstances, was thus supposed to mediate between 'man' and 
'machine', and to provide an antidote to the alienated, fragmented, 
materialistic and utilitarian values of the new era. In the words of Matthew 
Arnold, the main exponent of this understanding of culture, "Culture looks 
beyond machinery, culture hates hatred, culture has one great passion, 
the passion for sweetness and light" (quoted in Williams 1958,126). 
Indeed, the more actual times were perceived as debased and devoid of 
true values, the more the idea of culture was forced into an ideal of 
perfection and in a critical position with regards to the present (Jenks, 
1993,7; Eagleton, 2000,11). It is interesting to note how this 
interpretation of the development of the concept of culture (now more 
correctly Culture) as a "Romantic, pre-Marxist critique of early industrial 
capitalism" (Eagleton, 2000,10) and the related notion that "if culture was 
once seen as allied with commerce, the two are now increasingly at 
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odds" (Ibid., 11), seems to explain a feature of contemporary notions of 
culture that still has a strong hold. The reference is to the conviction that 
culture represents values intrinsically irreconcilable with the market. This 
notion has been often called upon to justify state intervention in 
supporting the arts that are, in this view, expected to perish if abandoned 
to market forces (McGuigan, 1996,54). 
This new notion of culture as being associated with an ideal of perfection 
has been championed, in the English cultural tradition, by Matthew 
Arnold. Such a concept of culture as 'the best that has been thought and 
said in the world' (Arnold, 1932, reprinted in 1981,6), has been the 
intellectual base for the Liberal humanist tradition that has been most 
influential in determining what was to be included within the boundaries 
of culture and, thus, in shaping postwar cultural polices all over Europe51. 
Indeed, cultural institutions and funding bodies in Britain - though the 
same can be argued about most European countries - were originally 
structured (and they largely still are) according to a dominant Liberal 
Humanist discourse of culture, which, in turn, they helped to reproduce 
(Jordan and Weedon, 1995, chapters 1 and 2). In his history of the Arts 
Council, Andrew Sinclair (1995,76) openly establishes a link between the 
founding of the Arts Council, and the intention to promote a form of 
culture consistent with "Matthew Arnold's Aristotelian conception of 
culture". Indeed, according to John Storey (1993,22) "Arnold established 
a cultural agenda which remained dominant in debate from the 1860s 
51 For an exhaustive discussion of the arnoldian legacy of post-war British cultural 
policy, see Bennett (2005). 
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until the 1950s". Liberal Humanism, taking up some of Romanticism's 
assumptions and developing Schiller's notion of the civilising power of 
art, privileges 'The Individual' over social factors or social determinants. 
Art is thus the product of individual talent and represents the expression 
of the noblest aspects of human nature. The Arnoldian perspective, and, 
more broadly, the Liberal Humanist tradition views culture as "the works 
and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activities" (Williams, 
1976,80), and has therefore tended to limit'Culture' (now rigorously with 
a capital C) to a selective body of literary and artistic texts which were 
said to embody universal truths and values, to express a fixed and 
recognizable 'human nature' and which now constitute the kernel of the 
'great' European cultural tradition52. 
Aesthetically, 20th century culture has been shaped by the hegemony of 
Modernism, which thus came to be considered as the culmination and 
the highest expression of this European cultural tradition. However, 
Modernism's rejection of realism and popular culture has meant that its 
accessibility was often limited to an elite, educated audience (Jordan and 
Weedon, 1995,58-59). This view of culture, deeply reliant on modernist 
aesthetic values, allows to distinguish clearly between what counts as art 
and what does not and its effect can be seen (even now, in the 
'postmodern world') in the constitution of cultural traditions as well as in 
the practice of the arts funding bodies. In this view, Culture transmits the 
best ideas and values of a particular period, ideas and values that 
52 It is precisely to this notion of Culture as the embodiment of the highest achievements 
of a selective European cultural tradition that I will refer to, in the course of the present 
chapter, when using the label of'high culture' (see also De Mauro 1987,13). 
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transcend social and cultural differences. This is the reason why 'access' 
has been the main focus of Liberal Humanist cultural politics, as the 
experiences of British, French and generally European cultural policies 
between the 1950s and 1970s prove 53 
Williams (1953 in Mclllroy and Westwood, 1993,57) also distinguished 
one more use of the word culture, which is especially common in the 
fields of sociology and social anthropology. In these disciplines, the word 
'culture' is used in the sense of 'a whole way of life' of a people. To 
further clarify this definition, Williams quotes a passage form Dewey's 
Freedom and Culture: 
The state of culture is a state of interaction of many factors, the 
chief of which are law and politics, industry and commerce, 
science and technology, the arts of expression and 
communication and of morals, or the values men prize and the 
ways in which they evaluate them; and finally, though indirectly, 
the system of general ideas used by men to justify and to 
criticize the fundamental conditions under which they live, their 
social philosophy (Ibid., 37). 
53 If we look at the experience of France, for instance, the influence of the Liberal 
Humanist paradigm on cultural policy is undeniable. If we consider the convictions held 
by Andre Malraux, the country's first Minister for Culture, they clearly appear as a pure 
distillation of Liberal Humanist values. Bourdieu defined Malraux's beliefs as the "illusion 
of immediate comprehension" (quoted in Looseley 2004,17). The scholar of French 
cultural policy, David Looseley (Ibid. ) defines such illusion thus: "For Malraux, the love 
of art could neither be taught nor bought; great art could nevertheless be relied upon to 
jump social barriers and speak for itself without mediation. This belief has become the 
ministry's default position. As a result, the relationships between the arts and education 
or community arts, between democratising heritage and 'creation' (new works of art) on 
the one hand, and creativity and self expression on the other, have become the defining 
aspects of the policy debate". 
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Williams traces this particular development in the concept of culture back 
to the German idealists, and to Johann Gottfried Herder in particular: "He 
attacked the assumption of the universal stories that 'civilization' or 
'culture' - the historical self-development of humanity - was what we 
would now call a unilinear process, leading to the high and dominant 
point of C18 [eighteenth century] European culture. Indeed he attacked 
what he called European subjugation and domination of the four quarters 
of the globe" (Williams, 1976,89). Thus, Culture for Herder is nothing but 
a diversity of cultural forms, each characterised by its own development. 
To fully understand Herder's claims it is important to realise that, by the 
end of the 18`h century, the term 'civilization' had acquired a distinctive 
imperialist flavour that became the target of the writings of a number of 
liberal Romantic theorists such as Herder himself (Eagleton, 2000,10). 
As Norbert Elias has remarked in his dated yet still influential essay The 
Civilising Process, the concept of 'civilization' "... expresses the self- 
consciousness of the West... By this term Western society seeks to 
describe what constitutes its special character and what it is proud of: the 
level of its technology, the nature of its manners, the development of its 
scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more" (Elias, 1994, 
3). Hence, Herder linked the conflict between the traditional notion of 
Culture and the belief, which he purported, in the existence, in the world, 
of numerous cultures of equal dignity to the conflict between Europe and 
its colonial 'other'. He wrote: "The very thought of a superior European 
culture is a blatant insult to the majesty of Nature" (quoted in Williams, 
1976,89). Indeed, the German concept of Kultur gives a special 
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importance to national differences and the particular identities of groups, 
and Elias (1994,5) maintains that it is actually for this reason that in 
certain fields of research, such as the ethnological and anthropological 
ones, the use of the German notion of Kultur has successfully extended 
widely beyond the boundary of the German linguistic areas, and of the 
discipline in which the notion originated. 
In Britain, the development of a similar concept of culture as a distinctive 
way of life developed from the discipline of literary criticism, and in 
particular from the desire, common among British men of letters, from 
Ruskin and Arnold to Eliot and Leavis, to study and understand works of 
art and literature in tight relation to the society within which they had 
been produced. In fact, according to Williams (1953 in Mclllroy and 
Westwood, 1993,58): 
... this extension of a critic's activities 
in the judgements of works of 
art to the study and thence the judgements of 'a whole way of life', 
has been a marked element of the English tradition. These critics, 
and others like them, have certainly always been concerned with the 
arts, and beyond them with 'the intellectual side of civilization', but 
from Ruskin's ideas of wealth to Eliot's ideas of class there has been 
this distinctive tradition of influential social thinking by men who took 
their experience of the arts as a starting point. 
And this 'distinctive English tradition' is indeed the object of one of 
Williams's most important essays, Culture and Society (1958), in which 
he follows the development of the word 'culture' in relation to social 
change in the works of English writers from Coleridge to Orwell. It has 
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been observed that this broader, anthropological view of culture as a 
whole way of life has had, historically, the very important function of 
establishing a more critical attitude towards the older, more restrictive 
notion that limits culture to the field of the arts and higher forms of 
learning. This has in turn resulted in a relative modification of the 
Arnoldian concept of Culture and in a certain democratisation of the way 
in which, today, we think and talk about culture (McGuigan, 1996,5-6) g4. 
54 However, it would be incorrect to think that an anthropological view of culture is 
necessarily or intrinsically more democratic than the traditional identification of culture 
with the 'sweetness and light' of Western high culture. A clear example of this would be 
T. S. Eliot's position, exposed in his Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, published 
in 1948. Here Eliot proposes a definition of culture that reminds us of Williams's motto 
'culture is ordinary' (1958,5). For Eliot (1948,31), culture "includes all the characteristic 
activities of a people: Derby Day, Henley Regatta, Cowes, the twelfth of August, a cup 
final, the dog races, the pin table, the dart board, Wensleydale cheese, boiled cabbage 
cut into sections, beetroot in vinegar, nineteenth-century Gothic churches and the music 
of Elgar. The reader can make his own list". Moreover, later in his essay, Eliot openly 
claims that "... a 'culture' is conceived as the creation of the society as a whole: being 
from another aspect what makes it a society. It is not the creation of any part of that 
society" (Idem, 37). However, Eliot did not fully develop this anthropological view of 
culture as the production of a whole society (rather than just certain privileged sections 
of it) so as to embrace a notion of culture that includes anything more than the usual 
high arts. In fact, according to Terry Eagleton, "Eliot's writings on culture superbly 
illustrate the constant sliding of the concept" (Eagleton, 2000,112). Eliot (1948,120) 
declares that culture for him means "first of all what the anthropologists mean: the way 
of life of a particular people living together in one place". Elsewhere in his essay, 
though, the narrower sense of culture as a value-term seems to be prevailing: "Culture 
may even be described simply as that which makes life worth living" (Idem, 27). Thus, 
although he recognised that culture can, and does, spread across the whole spectrum 
of society, Eliot was still firmly convinced that the cultural landscape was articulated in 
the traditional pyramidal shape, with examples of high artistic achievement at the top, a 
middle ground of average cultural practice, and the lower level of popular forms of 
cultural consumption, which he mostly identified with tawdry mass entertainment, largely 
composed of imports from America (Hewison, 1995,52-53). In the collection of essays 
here under discussion, Eliot also shows a deep scepticism of what he calls the 'dogma 
of equal opportunity' (1948,103) and the conviction that "... in our headlong rush to 
educating everybody, we are lowering our standards... " (Idem, 108). Rather, for Eliot 
(Ibid., 35), "[w]e have to try to keep in mind, that in a healthy society this maintenance of 
a particular level of culture is to the benefit, not merely of the class which maintains it, 
but of the society as a whole. Awareness of this fact will prevent us from supposing that 
the culture of a 'higher' class is something superfluous to society as a whole, or to the 
majority, and from supposing that it is something which ought to be shared equally by all 
other classes". 
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Nevertheless, with its emphasis on the importance of maintaining 
standards of excellence and increasing access, the understanding of 
culture that underpinned the foundation of the Arts Council of England 
was clearly based on Liberal Humanist cultural values. Indeed the Arts 
Council's Royal Charter that was granted on 9 August 1946, described 
the purpose of the newly founded public body as "developing a greater 
knowledge, understanding and practice of the fine arts exclusively, and in 
particular to increase the accessibility of the fine arts to the public 
throughout Our Realm, and to improve the standard of execution of the 
fine arts... " (Hewison, 1995,43; emphasis mine). The stress on the need 
for broadening access to cultural activities can be explained as a 
consequence of the fact that the setting up of the British system of public 
funding of the arts has to be understood in the context, and as part of, the 
process of post-war reconstruction. In this sense, and in its aims, it 
parallels the development of the Welfare State (Bennett, 1995,203). 
However, the Royal Charter, by limiting the Arts Council's remit to 'the 
fine arts exclusively', in practice purported a very narrow definition of 
culture as identified with the high arts that excluded both amateur and 
popular cultural forms55 
Such a restrictive view of culture has been eventually strongly 
questioned from many directions, to the extent that battles over the 
55 The phrase was, in truth, originally inserted mainly with the intention (eventually 
unsuccessful) to obtain relief from local taxation on Arts Council buildings, and it was 
indeed dropped in 1967, when the Arts council charter was renewed (Hewison, 1995, 
43). However, it cannot be denied that the notion of culture on which the public funding 
system was originally founded in Britain was a very exclusive and limiting one, 
corresponding to the Liberal Humanist principles discussed earlier. 
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definition of the word 'culture' have been a fundamental feature of the 
postwar critical debate (Hewison, 1995,34). In the field of cultural theory, 
we have already seen how the broader anthropological notion of culture 
has contributed to challenge the more exclusive identification of culture 
with the product of intellectual, and more specifically, artistic activity. In 
particular, in the theoretical field, the need was felt for a stress on culture 
seen as a 'lived experience', and for a recovery of the 'popular' from its 
denigration or sentimentalization on the part of the cultural elitism 
prevailing at the time. In this context, the problem was not anymore to 
make Culture more accessible to the people for their own improvement 
(as in the Arnoldian view). Rather, the aim was to offer an alternative 
definition of culture that could be able to explain and appreciate areas of 
experience and creative expressions that had been previously 
disregarded by the traditional identification of culture with the arts (and 
other high cultural forms, and hence overlooked by educational, 
broadcasting and other cultural institutions (Gray and McGuigan 1993, 
viii; Lumley and O'Shaughnessey, 1985,268). From the discussion of 
different possible interpretations of the notion of culture presented so far, 
it will clearly emerge that this was no easy task. If, on the one hand, 
'culture' is a shifting noun (with all the difficulties that this implies), on the 
other hand, 'popular' is also a shifting qualifier. As a consequence, an 
intense debate over the meaning of 'popular culture' developed and 
spread around the mid-twentieth century, mainly within educational 
institutions. The result of such debates was the creation of a new and 
independent interdisciplinary approach to cultural analysis (Lumley and 
-- 137 
O'Shaughnessey, 1985,268-269). This new discipline was 'cultural 
studies', a label which became current in Britain during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s in association with its institutional site in the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, founded in 1964 by Richard Hoggart at 
the University of Birmingham. 
The new discipline of cultural studies derived from a scholarly tradition 
that emerged in Britain in the postwar period in the field of adult 
education. In particular, the birth of British cultural studies can be directly 
linked to the Worker's Educational Association (WEA). Significantly, 
among the tutors who joined WEA after the end of World War II were 
none other than Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson 
and, shortly afterwards, Stuart Hall, that is the very founders of what was 
to become the field of cultural studies. It was indeed adult education that, 
starting from the discipline of English, encouraged a new approach to the 
relations between 'culture' and 'society', and a new understanding of the 
function of culture in society. (Gray and McGuigan, 1993, vii-viii; 
Hewison, 1995,93). This campaign for a broader definition of culture to 
include 'ways of life' was linked to struggles for a more democratic and 
egalitarian organisation of society. The influential 'culturalist' current in 
cultural studies emerged in the postwar years in conjunction with 
socialism or Marxist humanism, and stemmed from a growing interest in 
Marx's early work Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. This work 
seemed to offer the possibility for a conception of culture alternative to 
the 'orthodox' Marxist view of culture as superstructure (a bare reflection 
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of the 'base', that is, of the relation between productive forces), which 
was felt to be insufficient to account for the changed and more complex 
contemporary cultural landscape (Peck, 2001,200-207). Indeed, E. P. 
Thompson insisted that popular culture was not just produced by and for 
the people but was also the result of their struggles against the dominant 
social and cultural order (Lumley O'Shaughnessey, 1985,283). Thus, the 
core concern of cultural studies is, according to Stuart Hall, "the 
relationship of the social and the symbolic, the 'play' between power and 
culture" (quoted in Peck, 2001,204)56. Hall belonged, together with the 
other theorists mentioned above, to that strand of British cultural analysis 
borne out of the early work of Hoggart and Williams and referred to as 
'left-culturalism'. This aimed at overturning the established emphasis on 
high culture intrinsic to the established Arnoldian/Leavisite notion of 
culture, and argued for the recognition of the significance of popular 
culture, and against the prejudice that sees the working classes as a 
'mass' lacking in critical faculties and incapable of artistic appreciation 
(Hughson and Inglis, 2001,475; Peck 2001,203). 
Cultural studies, therefore, can be defined as based on the belief that 
culture must be understood on its own terms and in relation to other 
aspects of social life. Raymond Williams was certainly one of the first to 
56 The interest in relations of power and culture has indeed become the very trademark 
of the Cultural Studies approach to the understanding and the study of cultural 
phenomena and products. The extent to which this is indeed the case is proven by 
Kendall and Wickam (2001,2), who polemically refer to the current dominance (which 
they ascribe mainly to the influence of Foucauldian thought) of what they call Cultural 
Studies' "obsession with power-and-meanings" (emphasis mine). As Miller (2001,1) 
further explains: The "cultural" has become a "master-trope" in the humanities, blending 
and blurring textual analysis of popular culture with social theory, and focusing on the 
margins of power rather than reproducing established lines of force and authority". 
-- 139 
move towards such a notion of culture as 'integral to the social totality' 
(Peck, 2001,201). In 1958, Williams published an essay entitled Culture 
is Ordinary, in which he maintained that "[c]ulture is ordinary: that is the 
first fact. Every human society has its own shape, its own purposes, and 
its own meanings. Every human society expresses these, in institutions, 
arts and learning" (reprinted in Gray and McGuigan, 1993,6). In short, 
for Williams, "there is a distinct working-class way of life" (1958,9). He 
also wrote (Idem): 
There is an English bourgeois culture, with its powerful educational, 
literary and social institutions, in close contact with the actual 
centres of power. To say that most working people are excluded 
from these is self-evident, though the doors, under sustained 
pressure, are slowly opening. But to go on to say that working 
people are excluded from English culture is nonsense; they have 
their own growing institutions, and much of the strictly bourgeois 
culture they would in any case not want. A great part of the English 
way of life, and of its arts and learning is not bourgeois in any 
discoverable sense. 
The Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies developed 
into a significant source of new ideas and innovative theoretical 
elaborations on popular culture, and in the process promoted a distinct 
modification in the notion of culture as it was then received in British 
academia. At the heart of the work of the theorists evolving around the 
Centre was a new notion of culture. In the 1960s, a climate of anxiety 
characterised certain sections of British intelligentsia. According to Helen 
Davis (2004,18) around this time many examples could be found of what 
she calls "a siege mentality with regard to the rising tide of media 
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consumption. To many, commercial culture seemed poised to engulf and 
sweep away the treasured culture of the past"57. The more optimistic view 
held by Hall with respect to popular culture found expression in a book he 
co-wrote with Whannel in 1964, entitled The Popular Arts. Although the 
book does not accept the view that popular culture is always and 
necessarily valuable, it also puts forward the idea (rather revolutionary at 
that time) that the popular arts are a legitimate object of study in their 
own right and on their own terms. In other words, Hall and Whannel 
argued that the legitimacy of the popular arts was not limited to them 
being the conduit for the popularisation and thus the transmission of 
accepted, traditional cultural values, but that they could, instead, be 
bearers of cultural values of their own. Furthermore, as Chris Rojek 
(2003,2) - one of Hall's students - explains, Hall's view of culture and 
knowledge was one in which "identity, history, agency and practice are 
not fixed entities but parts of a system of representation which is 
permanently in process". It is obvious then, that what we have here is an 
understanding of culture that is really far removed from the Arnoldian 
notion of "Culture". Indeed, Hall's view of culture and its role within 
society is a clear exemplification of the evolution that the notion of culture 
has undergone, in the British cultural context since the late 19th century58. 
The deep gap that separates Arnold's and Hall's conceptions of culture is 
57 Davies (2004) refers here to the incensed debate that characterised the National 
Union of Teachers' conference in 1960 where such preoccupations with regards to the 
growing popularity of mass culture among the young were forcefully expressed. The 
events and debates that took place in that occasion are also extensively discussed in 
Hall and Whannel (1964; chapter 1). 
58 Unsurprisingly, these developments in the cultural sphere were paralleled by equally 
significant and radical transformation in the social sphere. Commenting on Hall's 
academic career, Rojek (2003,10) observes that it "coincided with the erosion of the 
traditional white, middle-class, insular establishment in Britain". 
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even clearer if we look at Stuart Hall's own definition, given in the 
Centre's report for 1968-9: 
Culture, then, not as a body of work, or particular media, or 
even as a particular set of ideal standards and rules, but rather 
as a lived experience, the consciousness of a whole society: 
the peculiar order, pattern, configuration of valued experience, 
expressed now in imaginative art of the highest order, now in 
the most popular and proverbial forms, in gesture and 
language, in myth and ideology, in modes of communication 
and in forms of social relationship and organisation (quoted in 
Hewison, 1995,185). 
Despite the radical appearance of this cultural project of re-definition of 
the prevailing notions of culture, Hewison points out that the notion of 
culture professed by Williams, Hoggart, Thompson and Hall was in fact 
still linked to the established tradition that originated from Arnold and had 
been championed by F. R. Leavis, for they had all been trained according 
to a Leavisite methodology. Hewison (1995,113) explains that, as they 
were effectively the 'heirs' of F. R. Leavis, they all made critical 
evaluations on the basis of some nationally absolute cultural standard 
which was that of the 'high culture' - in an Arnoldian sense (which, as we 
have seen, seemed to be threatened by the debasing, yet growing, 
influence of the mass media). The essence of the problem, according to 
Hewison (1995,113), lies in the fact that "[a]ttempts to understand 
'popular art' (a consciously less pejorative term than 'mass 
entertainment') were confused by the difficulty of distinguishing between 
discriminations based on aesthetic grounds and distinctions that had 
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their ultimate justification in issues of power and class. Judgements of 
value were clouded by the social and political differences between the art 
enjoyed by a privileged minority and that by a wider community". 
Hewison then quotes the critic Alan Sinfield, who has drawn attention to 
the fact that "the idea that high culture transcends material conditions, 
such as class, has a good socialist lineage, especially when British 
culture could be seen as a means of resistance to American capitalist 
culture" (ldem; see also Lumley O'Shaughnessey, 1985,286-287). Such 
a perspective shows great affinity to the approach of Matthew Arnold and 
F. R. Leavis, which having become accepted as the working philosophy 
of the British educational system59, had contributed to ratify class mobility 
as directly linked to the attainment of a higher level of 'Culture' (Idem). 
Indeed, if we turn back again to Williams's Culture is Ordinary, we can 
see how such a conservative cultural tradition was still in force in 
Williams position, especially when he seems to defend 'old' concepts of 
cultural value: 
It is plain that what may have started as a feeling about 
hypocrisy, or about pretentiousness (in itself a two-edged word), 
is becoming a guilt-ridden tic at the mention of any serious 
standards whatever (1958,8)60 
59 This is confirmed by the claim that Rojek (2003,64) makes with reference to the 
experience of the academics that established the disciplines of Cultural Studies and that 
therefore contrasted the accepted philosophy of the British educational system; To 
some extent [... ], it is tenable to maintain that Cultural Studies was founded by 
intellectual misfits in the traditional British university system. This sense of being 
outsiders and operating on the edges of knowledge is still central to the self-image of 
Cultural Studies". 
60 For an extensive and polemical discussion of the unpopularity of the notions of 
'excellence' and 'standards' in the contemporary cultural climate, see Furedi (2004). 
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The persisting Arnoldian influence can be further detected as Williams's 
(Ibid., 8 and 9) arguments unfurl: 
Culture is ordinary. An interest in learning or the arts is simple, 
pleasant and natural. [... ] As for the arts and learning, they are 
in a real sense a national inheritance, which is, or should be, 
available to everyone. 
With this position we are effectively back once more to that particular 
view - based on the principle of the democratisation of culture and 
embodied by Matthew Arnold - according to which Culture transmits the 
best ideas and values of a particular period, ideas and values that have a 
universal validity and transcend social and cultural differences. 
We can thus conclude this review of the evolution of the notion of culture 
within British cultural theory with the observation that 'culture', despite 
having been largely written about, and, moreover, despite having 
become the centre of a new academic discipline, still defies a 
straightforward and systematic definition on which universal agreement 
can be reached. This significantly brings us back to the quote from 
Williams's Keywords that opened the chapter with a warning of the 
complexities involved in a discussion of the possible meanings of the 
word 'culture', Furthermore, we can also infer from the discussion 
presented so far that the acceptance of a certain interpretation of the 
meaning of 'culture' over competing alternatives, implies a certain 
approach to the whole issue of the place that the arts and other forms of 
human expression occupy in relation to society, and a very specific 
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hierarchy of cultural values. A shift has occurred, however, on the 
theoretical level, with the development of the critical and questioning 
approach that characterises the discipline of cultural studies. Whilst it 
would be an overstatement to claim that the establishment of the 
academic field of Cultural Studies was single-handedly responsible for 
the subsequent developments in the cultural policy arena, it certainly 
contributed to creating a new language and a more flexible 
understanding of the notion of 'arts' and popular culture. This optimistic 
view of the process of cultural change and the role of the popular and 
mass arts within it was indeed picked up by the media, so that the 
influence of such ideas was by no means limited to the sphere of 
Academia. In addition, the cultural relativism and the consequent crisis of 
authority that invested the traditional institutions of Western culture at the 
hands of postmodern theories in the second half of the 20th century 
(Owens 1990) had significant repercussions in the British cultural policy 
arena61. 
In the 1970s, the tension culminated in the community arts movement. 
The main target of the movement was the sharp division that had 
crystallised within the British cultural sphere between the 'professional' 
arts (which have a recognised place both in the market and in systems of 
61 As Bennett (2005,31-32) explains: "This authority was challenged through various 
forms of critical practice, often linked to postmodernism, which attacked the very 
premises on which the dominant artistic and cultural hierarchies had been established. 
From this perspective, the canonical works of Western high culture owed their privileged 
status not to their intrinsic properties, but to the operation of a highly selective tradition, 
inflected by the unquestioned assumptions of class, race and gender. The upholders of 
this tradition, in the academies, the media and cultural institutions, were represented not 
as guardians of universal cultural standards, but as prisoners of an ideology that they 
did not even see". 
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state patronage, and were accused of being restricted to rigid formulas 
of what was acceptable as art) and the broad-ranging category of the 
'amateur' arts, which included any artistic expression that had no obvious 
place in the cultural arena - commercial or otherwise (Braden 1978,4). 
This is how Su Braden (1978,4), one of the most active exponents of the 
community arts movement, summarises the spirit of the times: 
There is a change of climate, a growing awareness that what is 
termed 'artistic expression' can no longer be withheld from 
those who wish to have some measure by which to view their 
lives and by which to expose that view to others. [... ] A whole 
series of moves from artists, certain funding bodies and 
members of different communities over the past ten years have 
begun to put the arts on a path which will re-establish the 
importance of a vernacular vocabulary of artistic expression 
and perhaps ultimately expose the rigid formulas of many of 
the 'recognised' arts. For, almost as an aside, this movement 
threatens to disrupt the most deep-rooted notions about the 
nature of art itself. 
As a matter of fact, the impact of the community arts movement on 
cultural policy was not as disruptive or radical as Braden's words would 
lead us to think. However, the call for the recognition of the values 
inherent to a notion of cultural democracy (instead of the traditional, 
'Arnoldian' principle of the democratisation of high culture) were at least 
formally accepted by the British institutions in charge of the distribution of 
public resources to the cultural sector. This became obvious during the 
extensive consultation exercise that accompanied the drawing up, in 
1992, of the discussion document prepared by the then Arts Council of 
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Great Britain and entitled Towards a National Arts and Media Strategy. 
The document explicitly accepted that a more diverse and broader notion 
of culture ought to be at the basis of cultural policy-making, and - whilst 
retaining the traditional commitment to fostering excellence in the arts - 
the admission was explicitly made that high-standards of artistic quality 
could be found beyond the boundaries of the traditional high arts62. 
THE ITALIAN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION AND ITS IMPACTS ON CULTURAL 
POLICY 
As was noted in the preceding section of this chapter, the discipline of 
'cultural studies', as it has been theorized in Britain and the United 
States, embraces a broadly anthropological notion of culture, and argues 
for the necessity to understand all cultural products and practices in 
relation to society, history and power-related issues. However, the 
traditional understanding of culture as it has been developed within the 
Italian context, was firmly rooted in its Liberal Humanist origin, and 
appears to have remained largely unchallenged by the questioning 
attitude that has characterised the discipline of cultural studies in the 
Anglo-Saxon world. Interestingly, English-speaking researchers working 
within the academic area of study that is usually referred to as 'Italian 
Studies' display a universal agreement that anything like the 'cultural 
studies revolution' simply did not take place in the Italian Academe, a 
point that is raised time and time again in their writings on Italy (Barar ski 
62 For more on the 1992 national strategy and its position vis 6 vis issues of artistic 
quality, see chapter 5. 
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and Lumley 1990; Forgacs and Lumley 1996; Dombroski 1998; Barar ski 
2001)63. The very expression "cultural studies" has no exact counterpart 
in the Italian language. According to Forgacs and Lumley (1996,2), "this 
lack of terminological equivalence indicates that there is not an exact 
mapping of the field from one country onto the other. This in turn is 
indicative of the fact that the intellectual traditions in the two countries 
[Italy and Britain] and the ways in which institutions of learning and 
publisher's lists have divided up knowledge are different". Interestingly, 
the Cambridge Companion to Modern Italian Culture, published in 2001, 
as one of its author claimed, filled a significant gap in the literature on 
post-unification Italian culture, in that it represented an exercise never 
previously attempted: 
As far as we are aware, there is no single-volume study in 
English - and we suspect that the same is true as regards to 
the Italian book market - that attempts to provide a general 
introduction to the cultural life of the peninsula since 186064 
63 Although, as this chapter will show, the consequences of the lack of a corresponding 
approach to the study of culture as that elaborated within the Cultural Studies field will 
have important impacts in the development of the Italian model of cultural policy, it 
would be a mistake to assume that Italy is ultimately exceptional in its resistances to 
embrace the study of culture the Anglo-Saxon way. For instance, Roman Horak (1999), 
in an article poignantly entitled "Cultural studies in Germany (and Austria) and why there 
is no such thing", has showed how Germany and Austria have also expressed very little 
interest, until very recently, for the cultural studies debate. More interestingly, Horak 
explicitly links this lack of interest in cultural studies' mode of analysis to the German 
intellectual tradition, and especially to the dominance of the Frankfurt School over 
German academic thinking. Particularly influential was the negative view of the culture 
industry, and the notion of the passive consumer of the cheap and nasty products of the 
entertainment industry popularised by Adorno and Horkeimer's Dialectic of the 
Enlightenment. This negative perception of the cultural industries and their products 
contributed to create hostile grounds for the reception of the sympathetic view to 
popular culture that characterises the cultural studies approach. 
4 This is indeed a perception that the authors of the Companion share with many others 
English researchers of Italian culture. Forgacs and Lumley (1996,8), for instance, 
conclude their discussion of the present state of the study of cultural matters in Italy, by 
stating that "[t]he fact remains, however, that there is simply much less being done in 
these areas in Italy than in some other countries" (see also Bara6ski and Lumley 1990, 
3). This impression is further confirmed by a quick glance to the 2001 edition of the full 
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This should not to be taken as a declaration that cultural matters are of 
no interests to Italian academics, as that would be highly misleading65. 
However, it is undeniable that the emphasis, research topics and 
methodologies prevalent among Italian scholars seem to set them apart 
from the ways in which culture has been investigated in the international 
(and effectively predominantly Anglo-Saxon) context. Dombroski (1998, 
2), writing from an American perspective, has synthetically yet forcefully 
summarised the main consequence of this state of things thus: 
It is no small paradox that the intellectual left in Italy, a country 
in which Marxism has played a concrete role in the 
development of contemporary institutions, has retained 
throughout the century a humanist-intellectualist concept of 
culture and has made little effort to question the institution of 
culture and the class privileges of intellectual groups; while in 
the United States, where Marxism has been excluded from all 
list of books presently in print in the Italian book market and published by the 
Associazione Italiana Editori (The Association of Italian Publishers). According to the 
catalogue's listing by subject, only 56 titles appeared under the heading "Cultura", of 
which 9 (that is about 16% of the total) are translation of foreign texts. Furthermore, a 
mere 6 titles are in the category of "Cultura underground", and here the proportion of 
translations rises to 4 out of 6. Finally, under the heading of "Politica culturale" ("cultural 
policy"), only 12 books can be found, one of which a translation. While the very few 
books on cultural policy can be explained with the fact that volumes discussing the laws 
that apply to the cultural sector would be classified under other subject categories (of a 
legal character), it is certainly beyond doubt that the volume of publications on the more 
general 
topic of culture seems somewhat limited. 
5 The aim of the present discussion is indeed to outline the ways in which the study of 
culture is different in the two countries (not necessarily one better than the other), and to 
establish a connection between the prevalent academic approaches in the two countries 
with regards to studying culture, and their own cultural and intellectual traditions and 
history. In fairness, it must also be pointed out that Barar ski (2001,10) himself explicitly 
states a similar position in a very insightful passage that is worth quoting at length: "... I 
should not like to create the impression that Italian scholarship is incapable of 
appreciating the implications of looking at culture from a mobile and interdisciplinary 
perspective. If anything, my impression is that the Italian emphasis on context, history 
and respect for the literal meaning of texts offers the best means to understanding the 
complexity of any cultural expression. In particular, given Italy's millennial regional, 
political and linguistic fragmentation, questions relating to culture, albeit with 'high 
culture' very much to the fore, have long been posed by Italian scholars in a manner 
receptive to geographical, historical, social and textual difference". 
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meaningful political practice, left leaning intellectuals and 
academics are more sensitive to disciplinary investments and 
exclusions66. 
Italian academics and intellectuals, then, rather than positioning 
themselves as critical voices and questioning the system have, in fact, 
often contributed (whether willingly or not) to reinforcing its ideological 
bases. If the Humanities department in the UK increasingly became 
aware of the potential contribution of critical theory to a critique of 
contemporary society, Roberto Moscati (2001) in his fascinating account 
of the Italian academic world, explains how Italian universities were 
geared toward the formation of a social elite67. In his own words, the 
"Italian cultural tradition saw the university as being devoted more to 
social class organisation (reproduction of the elites) and to the 
organization of the state (training of the civil service) than to economic 
development and the related need for professional skills" (Moscati 2001, 
112). Unsurprisingly then, an academic career has been traditionally 
considered appropriate for the social elites of the country, and the data 
that Moscati (Ibid. ) produces, on the social background of academic staff 
in Italian academic institutions, further confirm his claims. David Ward 
(2001,81) reinforces Moscati's observations by declaring, possibly a 
66 Interestingly, Gordon (2000,199) suggests that it is precisely its alliance with the Left 
during the period of centre-right government during the Cold War period that gave 
intellectuals, and therefore, traditional high culture, its privileged position in Italian 
society. According to Gordon's argument, the Italian cultural elite actually "derived much 
authority and vitality from its status as a culture of opposition or critique". However, 
Gordon (Ibid. ) also acknowledges that this situation also gave rise to complications and 
contradictions: "The conservatism of 'high' culture - its hostility to modernization and 
'progress' and its dedication to preserving its own aura and traditions - sat uneasily with 
an ideology of radical, even revolutionary change". 
67 As a matter of fact, Scotto di Luzio (1999,32-33) argues that the same can be said for 
the post-unitary educational system in general. 
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touch regretfully, that "contemporary Italian intellectuals have a more 
prestigious existence than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts"68 By 
identifying a trend that can already be seen in operation at the times of 
Dante and his call for a supra-regional language as a unifying element in 
an Italy politically and culturally divided, Ward concludes (Ibid. ) that 
"Italian society has consistently relied on its intellectuals, rather than its 
political class, to supply the nation's agents for social change". The 
central role of the intellectual in Italian culture, and its implications for the 
evolution of the notion of culture as it was developed within the academic 
and political field, is indeed a crucial point in the present discussion, and 
one to which we will come back to later. For the moment, it is important to 
point out a significant by-product of the situation outlined so far. In view of 
the importance that concerns for culture held in cultural life, and the 
68 The theme of the 'crisis of intellectuals' is indeed a recurrent one in writings on 
contemporary culture (especially in the Anglo-Saxon context) and as such, has given 
rise a remarkable body of literature which it is not possible to examine here at length 
(see for instance Green 2000 and Posner's (2001) aptly titled Public Intellectuals: A 
study of decline). However, the latest example of this type of literature is a book recently 
published by the British sociologist Frank Furedi (2004) and meaningfully entitled Where 
have all the intellectuals gone? Furedi (Ibid., 8) summarises the present situation thus: 
"During the past two centuries, the authority of intellectuals was underwritten by the 
belief that the pursuit of knowledge and truth merited the affirmation of society. This 
belief endowed intellectual work with a unique significance and provided intellectuals 
with a unique sense of purpose towards their mission. Indeed within the humanist 
tradition, intellectual and contemplative activity was represented as the highest form of 
human endeavour, and it was often claimed that it was this endeavour that distinguished 
the human from the animal. Today, this lofty image of the intellectual appears 
inconsistent with the way that society regards the pursuit of knowledge". Interestingly, 
Furedi identifies as the causes of this degeneration of the role and status of intellectuals 
a number of phenomena, some of which will be shown in the present thesis to have had 
important impacts on cultural policy too. They are "the growing impact of the market 
upon intellectual life, the institutionalisation and the professionalization of intellectual life, 
the growing power of the media and the erosion of public space for the exercise of 
autonomy" (Furedi 2004,38). These phenomena, and academic careerism, are indeed 
the targets of Furedi's incensed if somewhat repetitive polemic. What is beyond doubt, 
however, is that Furedi's view of the present situation is very, very bleak: "One of the 
most striking manifestations of the banalization of cultural life is the transformation of the 
intellectual into a uniquely insignificant figure. Even in France, the supposed home of 
intellectuals, they appear to lead a life of cultural irrelevance" (Furedi 2004,25). As the 
rest of the chapter will demonstrate, in this respect at least, Italy seems to have bucked 
the trend. 
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importance of culture as a marker of Italian identity (as suggested by the 
reference to Dante69), the eyes of both Italian and foreign researchers 
alike, have remained focused principally on the manifestations of Italy's 
'high culture' (Grew 2000,206; Bianchini et al. 1996,291-2)70. Forgacs 
and Lumley (1996,3) argue that "if one traces the usage of the term 
cultura in Italian over the last century and a half, one finds that one of its 
most durable features is its strong association with education and 
literacy, and more generally, with 'print culture"'. They (Ibid. ) further argue 
that a corollary of this view of culture, is the fact that, in many ways, 
"Culture" has come to be seen as a value in itself, and thus as something 
which one either already possesses or should aspire to acquire. The 
linguist Tullio De Mauro (2004,3) has indeed recently observed that the 
restrictive way in which cultura has been accepted in the Italian 
intellectual context ought to require that, to be fully understood, the term 
be accompanied by the adjective 'intellectual', and even further qualified 
as 'literary culture'. 
69 On Dante's crucial role in the construction of a national culture long before Italy 
became a unified national state, and on the persistence of the identification of the Italian 
identity and national spirit with its past cultural - and predominantly literary - tradition, 
see this passage by Jens Petersen: "Italy is only a 'young nation' in terms of its 
construction as a state. As a people, as a culture, as a form of self-awareness, it begins 
in the fourteenth century at the latest. Dante's works remain the foundation of the 
collective consciousness. As the father of the Italian language he is also the father of 
the nation and the symbol of national greatness through the centuries. Metternich's 
notorious expression about Italy being merely a geographical concept was already 
wrong at the very moment he pronounced it" (quoted in Dickie 2001,23). 
70 Gundle (2000,124-5) observes that this is indeed a tendency that could already be 
detected from the eighteenth century onwards, when a trip to Italy, to admire its artistic 
and architectural heritage, begun to be considered a necessary element of a 'proper 
education. The popularity of Italy as a prime destination for such formative trips was 
founded not just on the objective artistic wealth and naturalistic beauty of the country, 
but also on the "idea of Italy's special relationship with the aesthetic, as the bel paese 
par excellence". Gundle (Ibid., 139), goes as far as maintaining that "the tradition of 
beauty informed Italian national identity in a variety of ways", and provided the country 
with "an aesthetic self-awareness and a sense of cultural mission which rested on 
impeccable, if not always clearly defined, antecedents". 
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What is even more significant is that this traditional connection between 
culture, intellectuals and a book-based notion of cultural refinement has 
proved to be remarkably resilient, to the point of having survived largely 
unscathed not only by the political upheavals that accompanied the fall of 
Fascism, but even the counter-cultural movement of 1968, which in Italy 
was particularly intense and vital (Forgacs and Lumley 1996,4)71 The 
counter-cultural and political movement of the late 1960s, as well as 
student revolt that accompanied it, surely had some beneficial impacts 
over Italian culture, which Umberto Eco summarises thus: 
Even though all visible traces of 1968 are gone, it profoundly 
changed the way all of us, at least in Europe, behave and relate to 
one another. Relations between bosses and workers, students and 
teachers, even children and parents, have opened up. They'll never 
be the same (quoted in Lumley 1990,2) 
Robert Lumley (1990,2) indeed refers to the years 1968-9 as a 
"watershed" when the very foundations, political and cultural, of the 
Italian republic were deeply shaken. However, it is important not to 
overestimate the long-term impact of the student revolt and the industrial 
71 Chambers and Curti (1984,108) write: "Connected to this movement [that of the 'hot 
autumn' of 1969], the hierarchical structures of academic power within the universities 
were also heavily contested. But the hermetic world of letters and high culture emerged 
remarkably unscathed from the fray". For an interesting discussion of the cultural 
dimension of the counter-cultural movement in Italy between the late 1960s and 1970s, 
see Nanni Balestrini's L'Orda D'Oro (1997) and Robert Lumley's States of Emergency: 
Cultures of revolt in Italy from 1968 to 1978 (1990). For a detailed reconstruction of the 
dense political battles of the "Sessantotto" see Giuseppe Carlo Marino's Biografia del 
Sessantotto (2004). 
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disputes of the late '60s and following years72. Many commentators, as 
we have seen, are a lot more cautious in their assessment of the 
changes that occurred around that time in the cultural sphere, observing 
how deep seated notions of culture and authority, though shaken, 
generally remained fundamentally unscarred (Dombroski 1998; 
Chambers and Curti 1984,108). A clear example of the extent to which 
the beliefs of the cultural establishment in Italy have remained largely 
unchanged is the publication, in 1975, of an essay entitled La cultura for 
the 15-volume work Storia d'Italia ("History of Italy"). It was written by 
Alberto Asor Rosa, one of the most respected and influential Marxist 
Italian literary critics, and former political activist. The essay in question 
strived to provide a panoramic view of culture in post-unification Italy. 
However, it soon becomes evident that, in Asor Rosa's view, a 
discussion of the history of Italian culture coincided with a history of 
intellectuals and ideas that are reconstructed through texts belonging to 
Italy's high-cultural tradition (in particular those of social theory, politics 
and literature) (Forgacs and Lumley 1996,4). As De Mauro (2004,4) 
observes, in Asor Rosa's view, culture is equivalent to a conoscenza 
delle belle lettere (knowledge of the literary arts). Consequently, any 
discussion at all of the role of mass cultural forms such as television, 
radio or cinema in shaping the cultural scene in Italy is absent. 
Romagnoli (1977,28) has pointed out, in his discussion of Asor Rosa's 
72 In his utterly compelling analysis of the problems currently faced by the world of 
Italian academia, Moscati (2001) observes how reforms launched in the wake of the 
student protest movement with the intent of widening access to higher education have, 
in fact, resulted in the compounding of the chronic problem of low efficiency and 
productivity of Italian universities. This has ultimately resulted in the fact that fewer 
students successfully complete their course of studies and graduate in the present 
(post-1968) system than they used to in the early 1960s. 
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essay, that popular and mass cultural forms also contribute to create the 
complete picture of a certain historical era, yet they seem to be 
consistently disregarded by Italian historical writers and literary critics, 
including learned and experienced ones such as Asor Rosa himself. Nor, 
he also laments, does the Italian academic tradition display any sign of 
interest for going beyond the study of the classic literary texts of the 
national tradition to look at the ways in which those text were involved in 
power struggles, or the use that dominant classes made of the Italian 
classics via their exploitation through the educational system and the 
publishing industry (Romagnoli, 1977,27). 
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that in the post-1968 phase, and 
increasingly so in the times leading up to the present, "Italian culture has 
become less bookish and print-dominated", especially as a result of the 
growing popularity of radio and television over the years (Ward 2001,92). 
Consequently to the rapid growth of the mass media and their audiences, 
indeed, Italian 'high' culture went through a phase characterised by a 
substantial degree of cross-fertilization with 'lower' and popular forms of 
art, which ultimately produced a succession of interesting transformations 
of tastes, styles and cultural practices, and audiences (Gordon 2000, 
197). As Gordon (Ibid., 198) is quick to point out, however, these 
developments do not mean that, in this period, 'high' culture disappeared 
from the Italian cultural scene. In fact, quite the opposite: as the wave of 
successful film d'essai in the 1960s prove, Italian high culture "retained 
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many aspects of its traditional autonomy and prestige and indeed 
flourished, even if increasingly as a 'niche' within a wider culture market". 
However, and this might be one of the most original and fascinating traits 
of Italian modern culture, in Italy the process of cross-fertilization 
between 'higher' and 'lower' cultural forms seems to have been a 
genuinely two-way process. So that, not only were traditional forms of 
culture affected by popular culture and the media, but high cultural 
products often find themselves linking arms with cultural products of a 
'popular' or even 'mass' nature73. This peculiar state of affairs has been 
clearly captured by the British educationalist John Haycraft (1985,53-54), 
who, recalling his time in Italy, wrote: 
Italians seem to make none of the distinction between poetry, 
theatre, music and everyday living that we do in Britain or 
America. "Culture" is not regarded as something pretentious or 
"sissy", an attitude which probably starts at school when an 
artificial division is often established between the "intellectual" 
and the games player. I was amazed to find in Stop, one of the 
popular Italian weekly magazines74, which was full of articles 
about a Roman prince, John Travolta, astrology and television 
73 A detailed discussion of the difference, in the Italian cultural context, between the 
notions of cultura popolare (popular culture) and cultura di massa (mass culture) is 
beyond the scope of the present analysis. However, very briefly, Bara6ski and Lumley 
(1990,8-10) explain that whereas scholars writing in English generally see the two 
terms as broadly equivalent and choose between using one or the other (the British 
displaying a preference for 'popular culture', and the Americans consistently adopting 
the alternative 'mass culture'), in the Italian framework the two labels are used to refer to 
two clearly distinguished - if not even opposing - types of cultural products. They 
succinctly summarise the difference between the two thus: "The term cultura di massa 
often assumes some kind of manipulation of those who consume it- the production of a 
minority or an elite for the use of the majority. Cultura popolare, on the other hand, 
points to activities which spring from the people themselves and are fashioned for their 
own utilization (Baradski and Lumley 1990,10; see also Lumley 1988; Bara6ski 1988 
and Chambers and Curti 1984; Caughie 1986) 
" Haycraft is referring here to the Italian counterpart of light-hearted publications such 
as Hello! And OK. 
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stars, that there was also a piece about Leopardi, the nineteenth- 
century poet, and one of his poems was printed. It was illustrated 
with sad portraits by Vespignani, a contemporary painter. 
There is further evidence of the central role held in Italy by what could be 
defined as an "Arnoldian" conception of culture that identifies it with the 
highest and noblest artistic and cultural expressions according to the 
traditional liberal humanist canon. A typical example is, for instance, the 
collection of 26 essays edited by Corrado Stajano (1996) and entitled La 
cultura italiana del Novecento ("Nineteenth Century Italian Culture"). In 
Barar ski's opinion, "the focus of Stajano's book is crucially restricted by 
an elite sense of what is important about a national culture" (Bara6ski 
2001,7). Indeed, a quotation from Stajano's introduction to the collection 
seems to fully justify Bara6ski's statement: 
What is [... ] the condition of Italian culture within the framework of 
a world undergoing a great transformation? What is the condition 
of the arts, of the sciences, of the legal and economic disciplines 
[... ] culture as history and as national life? [... ] [The] 26 essays 
recount the past and present of the fundamental disciplines which 
constitute the framework of twentieth-century culture [... ]. Each 
essay [... ] aims to offer a kaleidoscope of the ideas, opinions and 
figures that have characterised the century in its various 
moments (Quoted and translated by Barar ski 2001,7)75. 
75 These are the title of the 26 chapters that make up Stajano's collection and 
correspond to as many disciplinary areas that make up, in his view, Italian culture: 
Anthropology; Archaeology; Architecture; Figurative Arts; Biology; Chemistry; Film 
(limited to the Italian post-war film d'essai); Demography; Economics; Philosophy; 
Physics and Mathematics; Geography; Journalism; Literature; The Question of 
Language; Medicine; Music (though the chapter deals with classical music only); Politics 
and Ideology; Psychology and Psychoanalysis; Juridical Sciences; Political and Social 
Sciences; Education; History and Historiography; Theatre; Television; Theology and the 
Church. 
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In other words, Barar ski (Ibid., 8) suggests that, as is typical of the Italian 
usage of the term, "Stajano uses cultura to refer specifically to 'high' 
culture, namely, to the intellectual and artistic achievements of a 
sophisticated elite". In Baranski's assessment of Stajano's approach to 
the study of culture, such an emphasis on 'ideas' and intellectuals, so 
prevalent in the Italian debate, ultimately risks to provide a somewhat 
simplistic picture of the phenomena under examination. This ultimately 
gives an impression of Italian culture as a much less complex and varied 
entity than it would appear from the broader 'cultural studies' perspective 
that Barar ski himself and the other authors of the Companion adopt 
(Barar ski 2001,7-8). 
If we accept Forgacs and Lumley's (1996,1) list of the 'common 
concerns' that are shared, in the Anglo-Saxon context, by those scholars 
working in the research field broadly referred to by the label of 'cultural 
studies' - that is "to deal with culture as a set of signifying practices and 
symbolic social forms; to look at a wide variety of cultural materials and 
avoid prior evaluative rankings of high and low; to bring new theoretical 
considerations to bear on the study of culture" - then we would have to 
conclude that the understanding and the study of culture in Italy shares 
very little common grounds with it. Furthermore, it is evident from 
Stajano's collection of essays, that the notion of culture that underlies it is 
a very optimistic one. As Barar ski (2001,8-9) further explains: 
[C]ultura is intrinsically valuable; it can help improve life; it can offer 
a safe haven during times of trouble. Stajano's faith in the benefits 
158 
of 'high' culture is not unusual; it is deeply embedded in Italian 
society, even among non-intellectuals. Indeed, the idea has often 
been canvassed that many of Italy's problems could be alleviated if 
more of its citizens could be made to share in this cultura. Given 
the fairly restricted remit of what is deemed worthy to be described 
as culture, this means that, in general, Italian cultura is not as 
volatile a term as English 'culture' (see for instance, Raymond 
Williams' quote at the beginning of this chapter). 
It is precisely the persistence of such an elitist conception of culture that, 
according to Baranski (Ibid. ) is imputable for the fact that'cultural studies' 
as a distinct discipline has not found acceptance within Italian academia. 
This should however, not be taken to mean that popular culture is not 
studied at all in Italian universities. Quite the opposite, but usually 
popular cultural forms are considered independently of each other and, 
more significantly, independently from 'high' cultural products (Barar ski 
2001,9). Personalities such as Umberto Eco, then, would seem to 
represent the exception that confirms the general trend of Italian 
universities in their approach to the study of the country's culture 76 
THE ITALIAN'STATUS QUO': POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
76 This is indeed confirmed by Lumley (1994,2) who explains how, at the time of the 
publication of Eco's Apocalittici e Integrati in the 1960s, Eco "felt himself to be 
somewhat isolated, occupying a narrow strip between the great 'churches' of Italian 
postwar culture", that is, the neo-Crocean, the Marxist and the Catholic ones. (Lumley 
1994,2). Whether Eco effectively ever lived on the margins of Italy's intellectual life, is 
however, debatable and indeed Lumley (Ibid., 3) seems rather doubtful about it. Eco, as 
a matter of fact, actually even dedicated his influential book to the apocalyptics and their 
apostasies of popular and commercial culture, "without whose unjust, unbiased, 
neurotic, desperate censure I could never have elaborated three-quarters of the ideas I 
want to share here" (quoted in Lumley 1994,3). The integrati, on the other hand, 
represent those in favour of a more relaxed acceptance of contemporary 'low' cultural 
forms. 
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The picture of Italian culture painted above, although necessarily terse, 
has however, identified as its crucial aspects the identification of culture 
with education and print, the persistent centrality of 'high culture' in spite 
of the late 1960s counter-cultural movement and the diffusion of the 
mass media, and the resulting privileged role that intellectuals and 
academics still hold in Italian society. The present section will now 
attempt to present some plausible explanations for such distinctive 
features of the Italian cultural situation. Forgacs and Lumley (1996,3) 
identify three possible reasons for the Italian cultural status quo. First of 
all, they feel that the combination (which lasted until the 1960s) of limited 
access to higher education and low national rates of literacy and post- 
primary school attendance levels, has had important effects on the 
country's cultural life, and was particularly influential in rural areas". In 
order to understand the educational system's reinforcing function of 
traditional views of culture, it is important to remember that the Italian 
educational model has always been based on the central role of 'the 
classics', and on the 'exclusive cult of the ancient' (Scotto di Luzio 1999, 
15)78. 
77 The reasons for such limited access to education amongst the Italian population is a 
very complex phenomenon that cannot be discussed at length here. De Mauro (2004, 
122-124) for instance, suggests that the Catholic Church for centuries tried to oppose 
the alphabetisation of the Italian people (with the exception of the city of Rome, where 
acceptable standards of literacy were necessary to the recruitment of the lower to 
medium levels of the clerical administration) as it was feared that higher levels of 
education would result in the increased secularisation of Italian society. As late as 1874, 
one of the speakers at the first Italian Catholic Congress, maintained, with regards to 
the notion of compulsory education, that it was up to the family to decide about the 
education of its younger members. Consequently, the State had no right to make 
education a duty, especially in view of the fact that the obvious ultimate goal of 
compulsory education was atheism ("sc(stianeggiare il mondo") and thus, a step 
backwards towards pagan barbarism ("a ricacciarlo nella paganica barbarie") (Ibid. ). 
78 This is indeed a point that Scotto di Luzio (1999) makes repeatedly in his study of the 
Italian equivalent of the grammar school, the liceo classico. See for instance, on page 
36 his explanation of how the learning of classical culture came to be seen, in Italy, as 
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Secondly, the enduring centrality of 'high' culture and the status of 
intellectuals are undoubtedly linked to the prestige and resilience of a 
humanist intellectual tradition which "identified culture with intellectuals, 
cultural history with intellectual history" (Forgacs and Lumely 1996,3). 
This tradition, in Italy, found its principal vehicle of expression in the neo- 
idealist school of thought, whose main representatives are Benedetto 
Croce and Giovanni Gentile. As Umberto Eco (1983,225) puts it, "our 
educated society has not yet freed itself from the taboos in which 
neoidealist philosophy has enveloped the word 'cultura'"79. The last 
section of this chapter will indeed linger over the influential role that 
Croce in particular had over Italian culture, and the impacts that his 
legacy has had on the constitution of the Italian cultural policy model. 
Closely related to the long-lasting influence of Croce, is also the final 
explanation that Forgacs and Lumley put forward to explain the 
peculiarities of the Italian cultural context. Since the humanistic tradition 
championed by Croce, and its reverence for intellectuals remained 
the assimilation of a national culture: "La cultura classica impartita dalla scuola assume 
per questa via il valore specifico di cultura nazionale. Nel quadro fissato dalla 
costruzione dello Stato unitario essa 8 chiamata a fornire il bagaglio etico, estetico e 
intellettuale del ceto the nel progetto liberale 6 individuato come la chiave di volta 
dell'architettura sociale della nazione, I'elemento connettivo the ne tiene insieme la 
fragile trama" (The classical culture transmitted by schools thus assumes the specific 
value of a national culture. In the framework established by the creation of the unitary 
State, culture is called upon to provide the ethical, aesthetic and intellectual formation of 
the class that, in the liberal project, is identified as the crucial element in the social 
structure of the nation, and the element that keeps connected its fragile structure). 
Further indications of the all-pervasive influence of the classical tradition in Italian 
educational institutions, are offered by Pulcini (1997,82), who, in her discussion of the 
teaching of English as a foreign language in Italian schools, observes that "the 
humanistic tradition of Italian education has only recently abandoned models of 
language teaching based on those traditionally used for classical languages (translation 
of written literary works, little use of the spoken language)". Unsurprisingly, then, Pulcini 
(Ibid. ) goes on to quote research showing that "Italians have a poor knowledge of 
foreign languages". 
's "la nostra society colta non si 6 ancora liberata dai tabu di cui la filosofia idealistica 
aveva munito la parola 'cultura'". 
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dominant in Italy until the mid-1960s, affecting the publishing industry as 
well as education and the universities, the reception in Italy of the Anglo- 
American developments in the disciplines of political science and 
sociology (all of which tended to adopt a broader, anthropological notion 
of culture) was very slow and unenthusiastic (for a more detailed 
discussion of such reception delays, see chapter 3). 
Sergio Romano (1984,12) suggests one further reason for the persistent 
fascination of the Italian establishment for its traditional cultural tradition 
and the past, and for the wealth of cultural assets that he calls the 'Italian 
particularity': 
The reasons for this Italian peculiarity are not, contrary to what is 
usually said, the extraordinary richness and variety of Italian 
history, but the poverty and decay of Italian society between the 
second half of the 16th and the first half of the 19th centuries. 
As Romano's argument goes, if Italy had had a mercantile revolution in 
the 17th century, and an industrial revolution between the second half of 
the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries, as other countries in 
Europe did, then things would have been very different indeed. For the 
Italian bourgeois, enriched by trade and industry, would have demolished 
older buildings in order to build more comfortable and 'modern' homes, 
while also modernising roads and infrastructures, regardless of whether 
they required the destruction of Roman or Middle-Ages structures. Such 
development, in turn, would have hastened the process of secularisation, 
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which would have likely have resulted in the loss of much of the cultural 
heritage belonging to the Church. However, as Romano (Ibid. ) 
concludes, "[b]ecause nothing of the sort happened in Italy in the three 
centuries between the sack of Rome of 1527 and the Napoleonic 
despoliation, Italy has become a gigantic cultural warehouse, a historical 
depository to which the laws of profit and economy do not apply"80. This 
is, indeed, an aspect of Italian history that, as chapter 6 will show, will 
have dramatic impacts on Italian cultural policy. At this stage it suffices to 
point out that the notions of culture that prevail in Italy discussed above, 
have resulted in the fact that, according to Bianchini et al. (1996,291), 
"Italian cultural policy, especially at national level, has been decidedly 
oriented towards a narrow definition of 'culture', one which encompasses 
"81 mainly three elements: the arts, heritage, and the media. 
80 Romano's diagnosis of this 'Italian peculiarity' is consistent with the judgement 
advanced by Barar ski (2001,13), according to whom, "[d]espite its position as one of 
the leading industrialized nations, modern Italy plays a secondary role in the world. Its 
greatness lies squarely in its past [... ] Modern Italy suffers under the yoke of this history. 
Indeed, many of those who bemoan the country's present condition do so by comparing 
it unfavourably to idealized versions of this illustrious past". It is interesting to point out 
that, according to Gundle (2000,124), Italians already exhibited signs of an 'inferiority 
complex' in relation to what they perceived as more advanced industrial powers in the 
18`h and 19th centuries, when Italy became the ideal centre of the Grand Tour. "Most 
Italian took pride in their country's extraordinary heritage. They welcomed visitors and 
basked in the reputation Italy enjoyed as the birthplace of genius, civilization and the 
arts. But there was a recurrent dissatisfaction with the idea of Italy purely as a museum, 
or of it as a civilization that was once great but which had decayed and declined". 
81 It is important to point out again, that, although the present discussion has attempted 
to show how accepted boundaries of the notion of culture which is at the heart of Italian 
cultural policy are narrower than it is the case in the other country at the centre of this 
comparative study, the Italian situation is however not 'abnormal' or 'atypical' (though, 
for obvious reasons that will be explored in chapter 6, certain more conservative traits in 
cultural policy making are central in the Italian context). It is useful to quote here the 
Canadian academic Alan Stanbridge (2004,1), who, speaking at the 3rd International 
Conference on Cultural Policy Research (ICCPR) in 2004, painted a general picture of 
the current status of cultural policy debates as such: "Although the rhetoric of cultural 
policy has been strongly influenced by broader conceptualisations of 'culture', the 
influence of the 'lofty approach' to art and culture remains apparently unshakeable. The 
programs and funding patterns of many cultural institutions and arts funding agencies 
serve to illustrate this tension, bespeaking a faith in the traditional 'arts', and often 
betraying little or no real involvement - or, indeed, cognizance, - of the full range of 
cultural activities implied by the cultural and creative industries". 
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One of the most significant elements in the Italian intellectual tradition, 
and one that has proved highly influential in shaping the model for 
national cultural policy in Italy is, however, the legacy of the neo-idealist 
school of thought that developed in Italy in the early 20th century and that 
found in Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) a most representative and 
charismatic personality. It is therefore to Croce's influence on Italian 
cultural and political life that the last section of this chapter is devoted. 
BENEDETTO CROCE. THE ITALIAN NEO-IDEALIST TRADITION AND ITS IMPACTS 
ON CULTURE 
There is not space here to do full justice to the complexities of Croce's 
intellectual theory and its legacy, nor to his academic career and political 
engagement. This final section of the chapter, thus, will attempt to draw a 
necessarily terse, yet hopefully convincing picture of the vast influence 
that the so-called neo-idealist school of thought and its main 
representatives - Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944) and, above all, Croce - 
have had on Italian educational and cultural institutions, as well as on the 
general cultural climate of Italy in the first half of the 20th century 82. 
82 Croce and Gentile were initially very close, both in their philosophical elaborations 
and in their personal friendship. Gentile was indeed Croce's chief collaborator and 
supporter in the common battle against positivist thought, which was the prevalent 
school of thought in Italy at that time (Moss 1987,11; Bellamy 2000,854). They 
however grew increasingly apart, in the course of the 1920s. As Roberts (2002,117) 
explains, the first theoretical discrepancies between the two friends' philosophical 
thought started to emerge in 1923, when Gentile began the process of definition of his 
own distinctive version of idealism, which is usually labelled 'actual idealism' or 
'actualism'. One of the events that precipitated the conflict between the two old friends, 
was the different reaction to the Fascist regime that was around that time gathering 
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Indeed, as the discussion of the history of Italian cultural policy that will 
be presented in chapter 6 will confirm, the legal and institutional 
infrastructure of the Italian model of cultural policy that was established in 
the late 1930s, displays clear signs of the influence of Crocean views of 
culture and art. The present discussion - though, out of necessity, by no 
means exhaustive of the complexities of Crocean thought and its 
evolution over time - therefore represents an important premise for the 
later discussion of cultural policy-making in Italy. 
Another important observation to be made at this stage, is that Crocean 
philosophy is obviously not the only factor that affected the 
institutionalisation of culture and cultural administration in Italy. Other 
aspects of Italian culture and society were also significant in influencing 
developments in the cultural and political spheres. I refer here for 
instance to the influence of the Catholic Church and the Communist 
Party on the cultural and political debates of post-war Italy. These 
strength and progressively organising itself as a totalitarian government. Gentile, not 
only officially joined the Fascist movement in 1923, but was then nominated Minister of 
Education in Mussolini's government, thus exerting a long-lasting influence on the Italian 
educational system (Scotto di Luzio 1999, ch. 9). The friendship definitely broke up in 
1925, when, following the infamous murder of the socialist MP Matteotti, and the crisis 
that ensued, no doubt could any longer be had on the totalitarian direction that Mussolini 
had taken. Croce, who many claim had 'guiltily' waited until the very last moment to take 
position on the country's delicate historical and political conjuncture, finally expressed 
his unequivocal opposition to the regime. Since then, he remained one of the most 
coherent Italian intellectuals in this unpopular, and dangerous, stance (d'Orsi 2001,23 
refers to "una scelta colpevolmente tardiva', that is, to a 'choice that came guiltily late' 
when speaking about Croce's opposition to Fascism; see also Capati 2000,129). 
Commentators agree, however, that after that first indecisiveness, "Croce became 
perhaps the world's best-known anti-Fascist as he sought to offer a modem recasting of 
liberalism in response to the Fascist challenge" (Roberts 2002,117; see also Simoni 
1952, d'Orsi 2002, Roberts 1987, ch. 1). Moss (1987,15-19) succinctly, yet clearly, 
traces the progression from Croce's initial hopes that Mussolini "might extend civil 
liberties along with social order in Italy" to his disillusionment with the regime, and open 
opposition to it. For an extensive discussion of the relationship between Croce and 
Fascism, see Rizi (2003). 
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phenomena, however, have been widely written about (Pratt 1996; 
Kertzer 2000; Allum 1990 and 2000; Chambers and Curti 1984; Forgacs 
1990; Bedani 2000; McCarthy 2000; Ward 1996). On the other hand, the 
influence of Benedetto Croce on cultural politics and policy seems to 
have been researched to a lesser degree (probably due also to the 
overshadowing popularity of Gramscian theories of culture in the field of 
cultural theory 83). The present discussion, thus, represents a first attempt 
at filling this gap. Furthermore, it is my belief, that, as the discussion of 
the Italian model of cultural policy unfolds in later chapters, it will become 
clearer how numerous of its most influential aspects, such as the 
'ideology of the masterpiece', the importance of the cultural past, the 
notion of the autonomy of art and, hence, the value of the preservation of 
the national cultural heritage can be all traced back to Croce's thought 
and the influence of the neoidealist school on Italian culture and society. 
As for the actual content of Crocean aesthetics, Benedetto Croce's 
understanding of art and literature is based on what we might call 'a cult 
of the masterpiece'. Croce's main work on aesthetics is Estetica Come 
Scienza dell'Espressione e Linguistica Generale (Aesthetics as Science 
of Expression and General Linguistics), published in 1902. According to 
Trafton and Verdicchio (1999,5) the book defined "the aesthetic as 
intuition, as identical with expression, and differentiated it from pseudo- 
83 Gramscian thought itself is however, profoundly interrelated with Crocean ideas. 
Barlera (1998,19) argues that "Gramsci built his cultural case against a Crocean 
background" and that he recognised Croce "as the true and most alarming antagonist 
[... ] because he knew that Croce shared some of the same agenda, some of the same 
background and preoccupations". Barlera's paper (Ibid. ) offers indeed a good 
discussion of the 'debt' of Gramscian thought to Croce and the interrelations between 
the two philosophical perspectives (see also Ward 1996,45ff. ). 
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aesthetic forms that are often erroneously taken to be art". The 'aesthetic 
moment' also represents the first moment in the process of evolution of 
the spirit discussed in Croce's ambitious three-volume work Filosofia 
dello Spirito (Philosophy of the Spirit). This imposing work represents 
Croce's attempt to develop a philosophical system that can provide a 
solid understanding of history, human knowledge and activity. This Croce 
tried to achieve by a personal reworking of Kantian and Hegelian 
concepts (Ibid. ). Although there is much more to Croce's aesthetic 
philosophy than what can be discussed here, there is a point that needs 
to be made. One of the most original and important features of Crocean 
aesthetics is the rejection of any theory that aims to distinguish or judge 
art on the basis of technical principles. Issues concerning technical 
problems in art are of no importance to Croce, since, in his view, 
technical devices only have a merely communicative function. In other 
words, the technical dimension is fundamentally extraneous to the true 
and original artistic creation (Paolozzi 2002,69)84. 
Art is for Croce 'pure intuition', that is a form of knowledge that is non- 
rational. Art, rather, is a 'pre-logic and universal' knowledge of reality; 
and this peculiar form of knowledge is intimately linked, 'fused' in fact, 
with its expression; it is therefore pointless to expect to understand 
84Paolozzi (2002,69-70) clarifies this aspect of Croce's thought by arguing that, for 
instance, the division between various art forms (sculpture, painting, music, etc. ) on the 
grounds of principles that are purely empirical and technical does not in fact help 
towards the understanding of the essential nature of art. This is in fact represented by 
the aesthetic dimension of the work of art, not its technical one: one could be perfectly 
versatile in the more complex musical techniques and yet not be able to create 
significant or artistic musical creations. Nevertheless, technical aspects still have a 
function, in that they provide true art with a mezzo espressivo (a means of expression). 
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poetry and art in rational terms, nor can they be described scientifically 
(Paladini Musitelli 1992,68). Zink (1950,268) explains Croce's position 
on the nature and autonomy of art thus: 
Croce holds that art is non-scientific, noninstructive in any sense, 
and, though he does not (to my knowledge) condemn the use of art 
for other purposes, one gathers from him that such a use does 
some violence to art. [... ] [According to Croce] art incorporates into 
itself materials from the rest of life, it incorporates them completely, 
in such a way that these materials acquire a new nature and 
meaning, independent of their actual sources and potential 
references. 
Whenever these 'external' elements, whose nature can be of an 
intellectual, political, religious character, etc., are not successfully 
incorporated in the work of art, their representation appears incoherent 
and they are classified as 'non-art'. The principal task of the literary critic 
is therefore precisely to distinguish between pure art and non-art (Moss 
1990,5-7). The legitimacy of this operation rests on the fact that, as 
Crocean aesthetic postulates, one of the most important attributes of art 
is its aesthetic universality and, consequently, its eternality (Ibid., 8; see 
also Moss 1987 and Paolozzi 2002,56-57)85. That notion of Culture with 
a capital C that was referred to above, is therefore represented by the 
highest examples of pure art as they are carefully identified by Crocean 
literary criticism and crystallized into a canon of artistic (and especially 
literary) perfection. This brings us back to that book-based notion of 
85 Croce himself famously attempted to identify the fragments of pure art and distinguish 
them from non-art in Dante's Divine Comedy and Shakespeare's poetry (see the 
English translation of Croce's literary criticism in Moss 1990 and Contini 1967,41). 
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culture as knowledge of the 'high' literary tradition still predominant in 
Italy (and still, often at the expense of technical and scientific spheres of 
knowledge), that was referred to in earlier sections of this chapter, and 
that we saw particularly evident in the work of the literary critic Alberto 
Asor Rosa. The long-lasting consequences, for Italian culture, of the 
influence of this notion of culture is forcefully explained by De Mauro 
(2004,4): 
This is the common opinion: he who knows by heart a poem by 
Montale is a learned person, he who doesn't is not. He might be 
an eminent mathematician or biologist, but he doesn't know 
Montale: he therefore is not learned. All other forms of culture, 
intellectual culture included, are persistently in the shade86. 
The quote above clearly shows that it can be rightfully argued (as indeed 
it has been done on the part of numerous commentators - see, for 
instance, Simoni 1952 and De Mauro 2004) that Benedetto Croce 
constituted the single weightiest influence over Italian culture in the 
course of the 20th century. According to David Ward (1996,45), it is 
precisely because Croce lived in a country where "education was 
synonymous with literary culture" that the enormous influence of his 
aesthetics could successfully extend to all age groups and sectors of the 
political spectrum. Indeed, if we look again at Stajano's collection of 
essays on Italian culture, the index reveals that Croce is mentioned and 
discussed in just about all the chapters, whether they present an 
86 In De Mauro's own words: "Questa e I'opinione commune: chi conosce a memoria 
una poesia di Montale 6 colto, chi non la conosce non lo 6. Pub essere un grande 
matematico o biologo, ma non conosce Montale: non e colto. Tutto il resto della cultura, 
anche della cultura intellettuale, e in ombra". Eugenio Montale (1896-1981) was a poet, 
prose writer, editor and translator, who won the Nobel prize for literature in 1975. He is 
particularly known for his highly subjective, introspective and sometimes obscure 
poems. 
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overview of the discipline of philosophy, architecture, medicine, 
theology, social sciences, and so on and so forth. In other words, Croce's 
influence, though admittedly strongest in the fields of literary criticism, 
political writing and historiography (even more so than in the 
philosophical milieu itself, according to some - see Galasso 2002,310- 
312) was anyway felt in the broader cultural and intellectual sphere 
throughout the first half of the 20th century. Moreover, in the reversed role 
of principal target of criticism, Croce's influence continued to be felt for a 
long time afterwards. 
This sense of absolute predominance of Croce's personality on the 
culture of his time is apparent in the literature, which is littered with 
references to the 'aesthetic dictatorship of Croce' and the 'dogmas' of his 
thought (Dorfles 1953,184). Angelo d'Orsi (2001,337) even speaks of 
crocianesimo as a culto laico (a 'lay cult') and his discussion of Italian 
intellectuals in the 20th century appears pretty much as a catalogue of the 
followers of that cult (and, for many, the story of their gradual 
emancipation from the Crocean teachings). Galasso (2002), echoing De 
Castris (1981,133), speaks of conclamata egemonia idealistica (self- 
evident idealist hegemony). Others, referred to Croce as a 'spiritual 
guide', an 'undiscussed authority' and the 'voice of his time' (Ward 1996, 
43). This is an occurrence that Roberts (2002,116) explains as a result 
of the crucial formative role that both Croce and Gentile had on the 
Italian intelligentsia throughout the first quarter of the 20th century: 
"[t]hose who passed within their orbit constitute a virtual who's who 
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among Italian intellectuals of the period"87. According to Simoni (1952, 
12), there is no doubt that "Croce has been the educator of the Italians 
since the turn of the century"88, and Isaiah Berlin once openly expressed 
his bafflement at the apparent compulsion that Italian intellectuals seem 
to have at some point in their careers, to confront Croce and his 
philosophy. Massimiliano Capati (2000,7) who reports this incident in his 
book on Croce (significantly entitled 11 Maestro Abnorme, which literally 
means 'the abnormal teacher') answers Berlin's question with a 
reference to Goethe, who once said that he who was once extremely 
influential, cannot be easily forgotten89. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to point out that, despite being very 
influential until the mid-20th century, and widely read not just in Italy, but 
also internationally, Croce's popularity (and even, more so, Gentile's) 
soon declined in the post-war years (Roberts 2002,118; Roberts 1987, 
13 ff. ). This discussion, however, aims to show that his influence on 
Italian culture and institutions, though admittedly less direct, remained 
87 The validity of Roberts' assertion is further confirmed by the anecdote he provides 
(Ibid., 116-117) about the decision taken by Eugenio Garin - whose Cronache di 
Filosofia Italiana 1900-1943, though dated is still one of the best account of Italian 
culture in the first half of the 20th century - to delete both Croce and Gentile from the 
index of his volume. The two philosophers' names were cited so regularly in almost 
every page of Guerin's survey of the era, as to making the whole indexing exercise for 
them rather pointless! See also Barlera 1998,18 if. 
88 Not only did Croce contribute, through his collaboration with the publishing house 
Laterza to introducing many foreign works to the Italian public, including those of 
thinkers whose ideas he did not share nor approve of - such as Dewey (De Mauro 
2004,84; Barlera 1998,23). He also taught and influenced entire generations of 
students and literary critics. As a result, in 1952, the picture appeared to Simoni (1952, 
12) thus: "If his intellectual influence during Fascism was considerable, in liberated Italy 
it has multiplied and become pervasive. Nearly all the leading art and literary critics are 
Crociani" (see also d'Orsi 2001,335 ff.; Torriglia 2002,156). 
89 According to Capati (2000,23 ff. ) one of the main reasons for the hold that Croce 
established over Italian culture is due to the originality and the often 'subversive' 
character of his writings, which were bound to make a strong impression in the stale 
cultural climate of the time. 
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however remarkable in postwar Italy. The reasons for the decline of his 
popularity are to be found in the numerous and serious (even virulent, at 
times) accusations moved against Croce in the postwars years. His 
detractors felt that his thinking vas "vacuous" or "prejudicially 
conservative" (Roberts 2002,118). Others felt uncomfortable about the 
label of 'idealism' under which Crocian thought was usually classified. As 
Roberts (1987,17) explains, "[b]ecause he relied on idealist categories, 
Croce has been easily typed - and dismissed - as a late, rather quaint 
Hegelian by those viewing him from a distance". Simoni (1952,7) further 
suggests that this imprecise (and possibly partly malicious) labelling of 
Hegelianism contributed to cause the interpretative mistakes that have 
blighted the reception of Crocean ideas in America (See also Roberts 
1987,8-21)90. Another common accusation made against the Neapolitan 
philosopher is that, by posing historical and literary concerns at the heart 
of his philosophy, he placed the sciences in a secondary position with 
nefarious consequences for a country such as Italy, who was forever 
trying to overcome her industrial and technical backwardness (Galasso 
2002,304 ff. ). In many cases, moral responsibility for the enduring 
disinterest for scientific concerns prevalent in Italy was placed at Croce's 
doorstep91. A significant confirmation of this common view is proffered by 
the renowned political scientists Norberto Bobbio's declaration, in the 
90 Simoni (1952) also draws attention to the paradoxical character of the label of 
Hegelian for a thinker like Croce, who effectively sought to "liquidate the Hegelian 
system" and consistently criticized the confused and transcendent elements in Hegel's 
thought, as well as his subservience to the politics of the Prussian State. 
91 Galasso (2002,309) quotes Gemelli declaring (as early as the 1930s) that "Italian 
neoidealism succeeded in demolishing positivist thought, but ended up having a harmful 
effect over the development of Italian science, and it still does' ("I'idealismo italiano 
giovö alla demolizione del positivismo, ma riuscl ed 8 deleterio alto sviluppo della 
scienza") 
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1950s, that Croce was primarily responsible for Italy's cultural 
backwardness (De Mauro 2004,82). Similar accusations also came from 
the humanistic front, as the harsh opinions of eminent linguists of the 
calibre of Luigi Rosiello and Giulio Lepschy prove (Ibid. ). This is hardly 
surprising, however, since after Croce's death, his positions were 
consistently attacked with vehemence in particular by Marxist critics and 
those scholars who were becoming increasingly interested in theoretical 
developments elaborated in the Anglo-Saxon context (neopositivists and 
linguists in particular) (De Mauro 2004,84 and Capati 2000,125-145). 
Besides the criticisms elaborated within an academic context, Croce was 
consistently a target of fierce criticism in the national press throughout 
the Second World War and beyond (Capati 2000,131)92. Antonio 
Gramsci himself, elaborated his thought as a reaction to Crocian 
philosophy (Bellamy 2001a, 209)93. Barlera (1998,19) explains that 
Croce, as well as Gramsci, was well aware of the connections between 
culture and politics (as a matter of fact, any intellectual had to be in 
92 It is impossible, in the present discussion, to look in detail at the content and 
rightfulness of the accusations moved against Croce, many of which do seem indeed 
unfairly virulent. For instance, as De Mauro (2004,122-124) argues, the Catholic 
Church, and its hostility for public education, is more realistically 'culpable' for the 
country's persistent cultural underdevelopment. The 'attack on Croce' must indeed be 
seen in the complex cultural and political background of the time. It seems, however, 
that Tullio de Mauro (2004,82-83) puts forward a more balanced and fair assessment of 
the contestation of Croce when he says that it is hard to believe that the development of 
a whole national culture could be affected so dramatically and directly by a single 
personality, theoretical position, or by a book. He suggests instead that usually books 
give voice to cultural elements, tendencies and ideas that are already at work in a 
national culture. According to De Mauro, it is a characteristic of the Italian cultural 
tradition (rather than Croce's responsibility) to have refrained from the development of 
an analytic and scientific attitude to the search for knowledge and understanding. In this 
perspective, Croce would rather appear to be the quintessential Italian intellectual, 
rather than the creator of an approach sceptical of scientific research. 
93 Bellamy (2001b, 154-5) explains that "Gramsci saw Croce as a typically aloof 
'traditional' intellectual. Despite his protestations to the contrary, he adopted 
'transcendent' rather than 'immanent' criteria of truth which he implicitly identified with 
the prevailing liberal 'hegemony'". 
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Fascist Italyl) and suggested that Italian politics ought to be guided by 
'men of culture' who would act not as a party or parliamentary force, but 
rather as an elite that would use its influence to affect and shape public 
policy. Croce saw Culture (ä la Arnold, that is, rigorously with a capital C) 
as the redeeming force that would keep the emerging mass society at 
bay94. Gramsci, on the other hand, endeavoured precisely to counter 
such position, by re-establishing a firm bridge between the practical 
world and intellectual and cultural activity, and by valuing cultural forms 
of a popular nature95. Unsurprisingly, some commentators have 
suggested that Croce's idealism represented a conservative and 'philo- 
bourgeois' reaction to the crisis of 1 gth century values and beliefs, which 
in Italy was particularly acute at the time of Croce's most creative phase. 
According to Marina Paladini Musitelli (1992,69), Croce's philosophical 
system constituted the "direct cultural instruments of bourgeoisie 
hegemony" in Italy. 
Whatever interpretation of Croce's role (whether progressive or 
conservative) in the cultural life of Italy at the turn of the century one 
wishes to adopt, the centrality of his personality remains unquestionable. 
94 As Barlera (1998,23) himself admits, there is a discrepancy between Croce's 
theoretical positions and his already mentioned activity as editorial adviser for the 
publisher Laterza (as well as his work for his journal La critica). While his aesthetic 
views were clearly opposed to 'mass culture' and were In favour of an elitist vision and 
the establishment of a rigid canon", he displayed a very open attitude in his editorial 
work, contributing to the rediscovery of popular forms of literature, which also become 
object of some of his historical writings (see D'Amico 1999 for Croce's work on the 
Commedia dell'Arte of Naples, and Willette 1999 on Croce's contribution to the journal 
Napoli Nobilissima). 
95 As Barlera (1998,20) puts it: "Symptomatically, the opposition Croce-Gramsci 
reflects a wider point of division between idealist and materialist philosophies: whereas 
the former perceives culture ethically as an 'ideal of human perfection', the later sees 
culture as a 'body of intellectual work'"(including both 'high' and 'low' manifestations). 
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Indeed, the full weight of the legacy of Crocean thought on Italian cultural 
policy will become clearer once the focus of the discussion will move on 
the notions of culture and the values that were at the root of the 
establishment of the legislative and institutional framework for modern 
Italian cultural policy in the late 1930s. 
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Chapter 5 
Auditing Culture: the subsidized cultural sector in the New 
Public Management 
This chapter presents a discussion of 'instrumental cultural policy' in the 
attempt to understand the phenomenon in its relation to changes that 
have taken place in the last two decades within the British public sector. 
In particular, the chapter will argue that changes in the style of public 
policy-making and administration that can be ascribed to the 
phenomenon of the New Public Management (NPM) seem to provide a 
useful framework for making sense of the increasingly instrumental 
inspiration of British public policies for culture since the 1980s. Although 
the discussion will focus on the case study of Britain, similar 
developments have also occurred beyond the boundaries of the UK. So, 
the general conclusions that the chapter proposes with regards to the 
British experience might be extended - with due adjustments - to other 
European countries, and in fact, arguably, to wide sections of the 
Western world. 
The expression 'instrumental cultural policy', whose usage within the 
academic field of cultural policy research can be traced back to the early 
1990s, was first introduced in the attempt to make sense of the trends 
-- 176 
shown by public policies for the cultural sector since the 1980s96. Geir 
Vestheim (1994,65) has defined instrumental cultural policy as the 
tendency "to use cultural ventures and cultural investments as a means 
or instrument to attain goals in other than cultural areas". The goals might 
refer to job and wealth creation, urban regeneration or - as the current 
trend goes - social inclusion, community development and social 
cohesion. In fact, what defines a cultural policy as 'instrumental' is not 
particularly the nature of the aims that the arts can allegedly help to 
pursue; rather, "the instrumental aspect lies in emphasizing culture and 
cultural venture as a means, not an end in itself" (Vestheim 1994,65). 
In Britain, it is now a well-established practice to define cultural policy 
rationales on the grounds of the alleged economic and - since New 
Labour's election to government - the social benefits, that 'investment' in 
the cultural sector can yield. Current instrumental notions of the role of 
the arts in society build upon the economic arguments for public arts 
funding that began to circulate in the eighties. These were founded on 
the belief that public subsidy for the arts represented a sensible way for 
the state to 'invest' public resources, in view of the arts' potential for job 
creation, tourism promotion, invisible earnings, and its contribution to 
urban regeneration both in its economic and social aspects. Despite 
severe criticism against the methodology and hence the conclusions of 
this type of studies, the instrumental rationale in UK cultural policy seems 
to be rather resilient. Indeed, the most recent development - which 
96 The expression can be found in: Vestheim 1994; Clancy et al 1994; Bennett 1997, Belfiore 
2002. 
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coincided with the New Labour's victory in the 1997 general election - is 
that the previous emphasis on the need to subsidise the arts for their 
positive contributions to the national and local economy has now been 
placed side by side with notions of the positive role that the arts can have 
in bringing about social inclusion and cohesion (Belfiore 2002). As a 
result, in the last decade, arts organizations in the UK have been 
reinvented as 'centres of social change' (DCMS 2000), and have been 
expected to contribute actively to urban regeneration and to the 
government's fight against the plight of social exclusion. The new focus 
of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport's policy and funding on 
the promotion of social inclusion originated from the Government's 
commitment to the regeneration of socio-economically deprived 
neighbourhoods and was an integral part of the development of a social 
inclusion policy in the context of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood 
Renewal (DCMS 1999,3). In New Labour's view, young people and the 
socially excluded seem to have become - at least in the rhetoric of the 
Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) - the funding system's 
top priority: 
Following the Government's Comprehensive Spending Review, 
DCMS will be reaching new funding agreements governing its grants 
to its sponsored bodies. These will set out clearly what outcomes we 
expect public investment to deliver and some of these outcomes will 
relate to social inclusion (Smith, 1999). 
This quote clearly shows how the subsidised cultural sector has come to 
be officially expected to contribute to social inclusion and the 
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neighbourhood renewal agenda, in view of its alleged potential of 
improving communities' 'performance' in the four key indicators identified 
by the government: health, crime, employment, education (DCMS 1999, 
21-22). Such contribution to tackling social problems was explicitly 
identified as a crucial justification for public 'investment' in the arts. 
Things have not changed much since 1999, and the belief in the positive 
social impacts of the arts still holds strong within the British arts funding 
system. This is a quote from the latest Arts Council of England manifesto, 
Ambitions for the Arts, published in February 2003. It reads: 
We will argue that being involved with the arts can have a lasting 
and transforming effect on many aspects of people's lives. This is 
true not just for individuals, but also for neighbourhoods, 
communities, regions and entire generations, whose sense of 
identity and purpose can be changed through art. 
Leaving aside for the moment the worrying idea of a publicly funded body 
that explicitly sets out to manipulate and change people's sense of 
identity and purpose, one can undoubtedly conclude that the official 
rhetoric of public arts funding - in the UK - has taken on board an 
explicitly instrumental justification for arts funding. This strong formal 
commitment towards social inclusion on the Government's part has a 
direct impact on arts funding provision. Indeed, in Britain, the 
Government sets overarching goals for the arts, which are reflected in the 
strategic policy that the DCMS draws for the arts sector. The 
implementation of this policy is then carried out by DCMS in partnership 
with the Arts Council of England (ACE) and its Regional Councils, the 
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Department for Education and Employment, and a number of other 
bodies and directly funded clients, following the "arm's length principle" 
(already discussed in chapter 3). It seems thus evident that the major 
funding bodies and policy makers in Britain have all had to subscribe 
(whether willingly or not) to a clearly instrumental view of the subsidized 
arts and their role in society. 
This chapter will thus attempt to explore the concept and history of 
instrumental cultural policy in the United Kingdom by putting current 
policy debates into the broader context of events that have taken place in 
the historical and political realms since WWII. The assumption on which 
the chapter is based is that in order to understand the phenomenon of 
instrumental cultural policy, this has to be observed in conjunction with - 
and as part of - structural changes that have occurred in the British 
welfare state in the last quarter of the twentieth century. These, in turn, 
can be seen, ultimately, as a result of fundamental social and cultural 
shifts that have marked the advent of the post-modern society in the 
Western world (Vestheim 1994,57). In particular, the analysis will be 
centred on the subsidised cultural sector, where the adoption of 
instrumental notions of the arts has been felt to be a major departure 
from the pre-existing tradition of cultural policy - rooted in the 
establishment of the welfare state in the aftermath of WWII. In fact, 
broader changes in the welfare state system and, consequently, in the 
philosophy and management of public service provision, will provide a 
crucial key to the understanding of the new, instrumental approach to 
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cultural policy-making in Britain. As the title of this chapter alludes to, the 
concept of the 'audit explosion' and the consequent inauguration of an 
'audit society' expounded by the accountancy theorist Michael Power 
(1994 and 1997), will prove particularly useful in providing a framework of 
analysis capable to account for developments in British cultural policy 
since the 1980s. 
A detailed reconstruction of the origins of state support for the arts in 
Britain is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, a review of some of 
the most heated public debates over whether the state should get 
involved in arts funding - dating as back as the 19th century - reveals that 
instrumental justifications - and in particular arguments related to the 
belief that the arts can exert beneficial effects on the economy and 
society - were behind the very first instances of state involvement with 
the arts in Britain. The original stimulus for the state to get involved in the 
acquisition of works of arts was the perceived poor design of British 
manufacture products and the consequent weak position of British-made 
goods in the international markets. It was therefore with the improvement 
of British industrial export in mind that, during the first half of the 19th 
century, the government became involved in the establishment of arts 
and design schools and the opening of the first museums of fine arts. It is 
hardly surprising then, that when in 1816, the Parliament discussed the 
purchase of the Elgin marbles, the positive effect that the beautiful 
sculptures would undoubtedly have on the refinement of national taste, 
and hence on the standard of national manufactures, was cited as a good 
enough reason for the state to finance the acquisition of the marbles. The 
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connection between arts and manufacture was strongly felt throughout 
the 19th century, and was an argument often used whenever the case for 
public subsidy of the arts was presented to an often-reluctant Parliament 
(Minihan 1977). 
Moreover, there is no doubt that the notion that the arts can provide an 
effective means to preserve social order, improve community cohesion 
and aid crime-prevention is hardly a New Labour discovery. Yet again, 
the Victorians had set an important precedent. They were adamant about 
the civilizing potential of the high arts. It was generally believed that an 
improvement in taste and appreciation of the arts would directly result in 
moral progress. Hence the utility, for the state, to support the arts and 
make them available to the masses (Minihan 1977; Pearson 1982). Not 
much room is left, thus, for doubts about the instrumental nature of the 
intention to introduce the working classes to the fine arts. Sir Martin 
Archer Shee, when asked to testify in front of a Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Fine Arts in 1841, declared: 
that the object of the Committee is, not so much, to forward the arts 
themselves, as through their influence to advance their great end, 
towards which the promotion of the fine arts can be considered but 
as means, the civilization of our people; to give to their minds a 
direction which may tend to withdraw them from habits of gross and 
sensual indulgence; to secure and sustain the intellectual supremacy 
of our country, not only with respect to the present age, but with 
reference to posterity... (Quoted in Minihan 1977,68). 
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Therefore, it is possible to conclude that in many ways, cultural policy in 
Britain has been strongly instrumental - both in its practical aims as well 
as in the rhetoric accompanying it - since its very dawn. In light of the 
discussion presented so far, it is difficult to consider the developments 
that have taken place since the late 1970s as a radical break from past 
traditions. In fact, what seems to characterize British cultural policy is a 
rather remarkable consistency in the use of explicitly instrumental 
justifications for government's involvement in arts funding. What was 
once referred to as 'social order' is now preferably spoken of in terms of 
'social inclusion' and 'social cohesion', but this does not alter the identical 
substance of the various claims. If we turn again to Vestheim's definition 
of instrumental cultural policy, we cannot but conclude that there is a very 
long and consistent tradition of instrumental cultural policy in Britain, 
whereby culture was supported in so far as it represented the means to 
an end rather than an end in itself (Vestheim 1994,65). 
To declare instrumentality as an almost 'traditional' feature of British 
cultural policy, however, does not explain the common view among 
commentators (both academic and professional) that major changes did 
occur in the period beginning in the late 1970s and culminating in the 
1980s (of which more recent developments are seen as a derivation). 
Oliver Bennett (1996,7), comments: "The reality of the 1980s was the 
emergence of a very different set of policy concerns to the pre- 
occupations of welfare, access and democratisation which had 
characterised the 1970s". The language in which arts matters were being 
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discussed also changed radically, as exemplified by a glossy brochure 
published in 1985 by the Arts Council: A Great British Success Story. It 
was designed to look like a company report, as it befits a "prospectus": it 
represented an "invitation to the nation to invest in the arts" expressed in 
the language of the "enterprise culture". Cultural activities were referred 
to as "the product", the audiences as "consumers", and the language of 
subsidy turned into the language of "investment" (Hewison 1995,258). 
The term 'subsidy' itself became rather unpopular. In fact, as Selwood 
explains "it did effectively disappear from the language of cultural 
bureaucracies in the 1980s, when the notion of 'subsidy' as welfare was 
no longer regarded as politically correct and the semantics of business 
and managerialism were introduced" (Selwood 2001, xlvii). 
In order to be fully understood, these changes need to be considered in 
the broader context of the political turmoil that characterized the 
beginning of the 1980s and the advent of Thatcherism. This period has 
been indeed referred to as a "turning point for the arts", since "it is during 
this time that the basis of funding to the arts changed significantly and 
governmental relationship with, and interest in, the arts would change 
accordingly" (Quinn 1998,165). Bennett (1995,200), writing about that 
very period, concludes that "the experience of crisis has been widely and 
genuinely felt". As a result, "the debate about cultural policy in the United 
Kingdom appears as a 'discourse of beleaguerment'" (Bennett 1995, 
200). The next section of this chapter will try to offer a possible 
explanation for this diffuse feeling among commentators that a great, 
-- 184 
epochal change took place in the 1980s. A useful approach to this task is 
to consider the post-1980s developments in the broader framework of 
changes that occurred in the British political arena and, consequently, in 
public management style. If instrumental notions of culture cannot be 
considered alien to the pre-1980s British cultural policy discourse - and 
therefore do not represent a dramatic break to its tradition - how can we 
account for the diffused perception that the 1980s represent somewhat of 
a watershed between radically different approaches to state involvement 
in cultural funding? In other words, what differentiates the old-fashioned 
model of instrumental cultural policy that can be seen in action in the 
nineteenth century, from its most recent forms embodied by the 
economic argument in the Thatcherite 1980s and, later, by New Labour's 
rhetoric of social inclusion? 
THE SHIFT TOWARDS EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY 
In so far as cultural policies are public policies with specific relevance to 
art and culture, their evolution over time and their rationales needs to be 
interpreted against the background of developments in the larger arena 
of the relations between government and public policy, and the ways in 
which political motivations shape policy interventions. This is precisely 
the approach that this chapter will follow in trying to make sense of what 
has been felt as an 'instrumental turn' in British policies for culture 
between the early '80s and the present day. In light of the considerations 
presented so far, we can argue that there are two major aspects in the 
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present circumstances that differentiate current instrumental cultural 
policy from the policy rationales in place before the 1980s. Discussing 
them can help to account for the diffuse perception of the 1980s as a 
time of radical change, which turned the arts world (but not that alone) 
upside down. 
Firstly, what characterizes the discourse over cultural policy since the 
1980s is the fact that the instrumental element in the rhetoric of public 
arts funding has become more explicit than it had ever been before. 
Consequently, it is now a major policy rationale, having overshadowed 
arguments which defended subsidy on the basis of what is usually 
referred to as the 'art for art's sake' principle. The latter, although never 
prevalent, had been a constant element in the British cultural policy 
debate. Such positions are much harder to defend today than in Victorian 
times, or during the years of post-war cultural policy. This is partly due to 
changes in public administration modes and the government's emphasis 
on evidence-based policy that have taken place in the last two decades, 
and which will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter. 
However, they are also the result of certain developments within 
postmodern cultural theory. By questioning traditional, accepted 
definitions of culture, postmodern notions of relativism have undermined 
the legitimacy of old cultural policy rationales, leading to what Craig 
Owens has defined as 'a crisis of cultural authority, specifically of the 
authority vested in Western European culture and its institutions' (Owens 
1990,57). The concept of cultural relativism thus entered the cultural 
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discourse, undermining - at the theoretical level - the possibility to justify 
any longer cultural policy decisions grounded on uncontroversial 
principles of 'excellence', 'quality' and 'artistic value'. 
It is important to remember that whilst the effects of this loss of legitimacy 
were being felt - shaking, and drastically redefining the very notion of 
culture on which the whole system of public arts funding had been 
constructed - Britain was also experiencing Thatcherism. This was an 
altogether traumatizing experience for the British arts world. The newly 
appointed Conservative government had always been very clear about 
its ambition to 'roll back the frontiers of the state' with a view to reducing 
public expenditure and increasing efficiency. Unsurprisingly, the level of 
public support for the arts remained unchanged for a number of years 
(and that corresponded, in real terms, to a reduction in funding). In this 
new climate of great uncertainty about future levels of public expenditure, 
it became obvious that, in order to survive, the cultural sector needed to 
be able to put forward a strong case in order to avoid further reductions 
in funding. The economic argument in favour of public support of the arts 
seemed to provide a most precious lifeline for the public arts sector 
(Myerscough 1988,2). In this sense, the instrumental cultural policies of 
the 1980s could be plausibly labelled as 'policies of survival' to which the 
British cultural sector had to turn to in the face of reduced government 
spending and the erosion of the legitimacy of its traditional theoretical 
grounds (Belfiore 2003). 
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In the light of the arguments presented so far, the developments within 
British cultural policy discussed above can be described as an example 
of the phenomenon of policy 'attachment', whereby policy development in 
certain policy areas takes place through the attachment of that area to 
other (more influential) policy concerns (Gray 2002,80). Gray explains 
that policy attachment "goes beyond simply fitting in with the policy 
choices made by other actors operating within the same policy sector: it 
also includes the linkage of one sector with others as a mechanism for 
achieving policy ends" (Gray 2002,81). Strategies of this type have 
allowed the arts, a traditionally 'weak' policy sector to 'attach' themselves 
to a number of different political agendas that were seen as more 
politically important, with the result that the subsidised arts have often 
found their way into mainstream public policy-making. The principal sets 
of public policy objectives to which the arts have successfully 'attached' 
themselves are economic development, urban regeneration and social 
inclusion. 
In particular, the positive impacts of the arts in society are today one of 
the most crucial sources for justification of public arts subsidy. As 
Francois Matarasso has recently reiterated, 'Reducing the incidence of 
social exclusion is currently at the heart of British public policy. If cultural 
organizations hope to have the importance of their work recognized... 
they need to take account of these concerns' (quoted in Selwood 2002a, 
68). The extent to which the recourse to instrumental policy rationales is 
a matter of livelihood for the subsidised arts is clear from this extract from 
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a report published, in 2000, by the Quality, Efficiency and Standards 
Team (QUEST) and entitled Modernising the Relationship: A New 
Approach to Funding Agreements: 
The [cultural] sector cannot continue to compete with other 
increasing demands for expenditure on education, health, law, etc. 
without the essential ammunition that performance measurement 
offers. The greater the impact, the greater the chance that the role 
and fundamental potential of the sector will be fully recognised 
across government and by the public (QUEST 2000,19)97. 
This passage confirms that the second and most important distinguishing 
characteristic of what we could define as a later, post-1980s, phase of 
instrumental cultural policies is precisely the fact that the positive impacts 
of the arts in society are not discussed any longer in merely general and 
vague terms. Public 'investment' in the arts is advocated on the basis of 
what are expected to be concrete and measurable economic and social 
impacts. Moreover, this shift has been accompanied by growing 
expectations that such beneficial impacts ought to be assessed and 
measured before demands on the public purse can be fully legitimate. 
In recent years - and this is hardly a phenomenon limited to cultural 
policy - the UK has witnessed a clear movement towards evidence- 
based policies for the public sector. According to the Cabinet Office, 
policy-making grounded in hard evidence (and thus constant monitoring) 
87 The very existence of a body like QUEST -a watchdog body with the task to improve 
standards of efficiency and financial management across the cultural sector - is a rather 
significant fact in itself. According to the DCMS' web site: "QUEST was established by Secretary 
of State Chris Smith in 1999 following the first Comprehensive Spending Review. Independent of 
DCMS, QUEST reports directly to the Secretary of State on ways in which the cultural and 
sporting sectors can best achieve the government's social and economic objectives, and the 
means by which they demonstrate their performance' (http: //www. dcros. gov. uk/roleAndex. html) 
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is the best guarantee towards the achievement of a more rational and 
modernised government. Modernisation, together with a growing 
emphasis on increased managerialism in the delivery of public services, 
is perceived as resulting in improved efficiency, effectiveness and value 
for money (Selwood 2002a, 65). Hence the origin of the New Labour's 
public policy 'buzz words': the public sector must be guided by clear 
'strategies', where 'aims' and 'objectives' are clearly stated. 
Consequently, the 'performance' of the service providers must undergo 
regular 'monitoring', and provide 'quality assurances' so that the 
government can be reassured - on the basis of the 'evidence' gathered 
and of comparisons between policy 'inputs', 'outputs' and 'outcomes' - 
that the 'targets' are met, and that the 'customers' (formerly known as 
citizens) receive 'value for money'. 
The preoccupation of the present government with evidence-based 
policy-making, however, is hardly a New Labour innovation. In fact, the 
concern that, after 1979, successive Conservative governments showed 
for issues of accountability, and their attempts to introduce a new style of 
public management modelled on the private sector's, were all clear 
harbingers of the developments to come (Selwood 2002b, 4). 
Unsurprisingly, then, from the beginning of the 1990s, data collection 
(especially in the form of time-series) has assumed a central role in 
cultural policy-making and evaluation. Data were collected in a number of 
different ways: through audits, performance measurements, time series, 
impact studies, and studies on audiences (as well as non-audiences). 
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Most of it was based on the quantitative analysis of policy inputs and 
outputs, and the results of such number crunching tended to be 
presented as neat statistics. These seemed to perfectly lend themselves 
to the comparison between targets and achievements that had become 
so central to the practice of policy evaluation (Selwood, 2002b, 8). 
How can we explain this new stress on the measurement of the arts' 
impacts in clear and quantifiable ways? What effects has this new 
managerial style had on the arts? In order to be able to understand and 
elucidate the implications of the new emphasis on the achievement of 
measurable social or economic impacts through the arts, we must first 
put this phenomenon into the broader context of radical changes that 
have occurred in the sphere of public management. 
BRITAIN AND THE'AUDIT EXPLOSION' 
Some help in understanding the complex new circumstances in which 
the public cultural sector now operates comes from the work of Michael 
Power, professor of Accounting at the London School of Economics. In 
1994 he published a pamphlet for the think tank 'Demos' entitled The 
Audit Explosion. In this publication, he points out how "the word 'audit' is 
being used in the UK with growing frequency". He argues that: 
the spread of audits and other quality assurance initiatives means 
that many individuals and organisations now find themselves subject 
to audit for the first time and, notwithstanding protest and complaint, 
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have come to think of themselves as auditees. Indeed there is a real 
sense in which 1990s Britain has become an 'audit society' (Power 
1994,1). 
Power explores in greater detail his theory of the 'audit society' and the 
legitimising role of monitoring and evidence collection within it, in a later 
book: The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, published in 1997. In this 
essay, he discusses the growing popularity of audits and other systems 
of control within British public policy discourse. His conclusion is that 
auditing has presently reached such a remarkable popularity as to have 
acquired 'a degree of institutional stability and acceptance' (Power 1997, 
3). As an institutionalised practice, audit risks becoming 'an 
organizational ritual, a dramaturgical performance' (idem., 141), because 
within organisations, 'pressures exists for audit and inspection systems 
to produce comfort and reassurance, rather than critique' (idem., xvii). 
Auditing, thus, is mainly about reaffirming order and providing a source of 
validation for organizations and their activities, especially when the 
influence of other sources of legitimacy (such as community and state) 
seems to be declining (idem., 147). The validating role of audit often 
entails that the very fact that an organization undergoes a process of 
auditing becomes in itself a guarantee of legitimacy and transparency, 
regardless of the audit's actual findings - which are often simply ignored. 
In this regard, the audit explosion, despite having been originally driven 
by a programmatic commitment to increase accountability in the name of 
transparency and democracy, might have had, in fact, the opposite effect 
(Power, 1997,13-14). 
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Power (1997,10) further explains that "the audit explosion has its 
conditions of emergence in transformations in conceptions of 
administration and organization which straddle, or, better, dismantle the 
public-private divide". To put it simply, Power sees the growing popularity 
of audit as directly linked to systematic attempts to make the state more 
entrepreneurial: the 'audit explosion' is the outcome of these changes in 
the style of public administration. In order to justify this interpretation of 
the 'audit explosion', Powers inscribes the phenomenon within the 
context of the changes that have taken place in society at large, and in 
public administration in particular, in the mid 1980s. Such dramatic 
changes in public management can be associated with the necessity for 
much tighter financial discipline brought about by the fiscal crisis faced 
by many Western governments in the 1980s. Public expenditure in 
countries with generous welfare states - Britain among them - was 
perceived to be getting closer to dangerous levels. It was feared that, 
unless public spending was firmly curbed, the public sector might get so 
big that it might become impossible for the national economy to further 
sustain it (Jenkins 1995,11). Hence the break down in the consensus 
behind the welfare state that had been in place until the 1980s. This 
resulted in increased pressures to reduce public expenditure whilst 
introducing a more managerial approach to public administration, in order 
to make it more efficient and limit waste - thus making the most of 
shrinking public resources. These developments are behind the immense 
popularity that the notions of 'quality' and 'efficiency' have gained in our 
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contemporary rhetoric where the organization of public services is 
concerned (Pollitt and Bouckaert 1995,7). The new stress on quality 
improvement complemented, without substituting it, the drive for 
economy. This contributed to the rise of expectations - among 
beneficiaries of the public services - of more transparency in 
government's activities. Hence the growing importance of systems of 
verification, and the flourishing of the 'audit explosion' described by 
Michael Power. 
These new circumstances have resulted in radical transformations in the 
public sector, and have brought about the establishment of what 
Protherough and Pick (2002, vii) call the 'sinister new orthodoxy' of 
'modern managerialism'. The most remarkable of these transformations 
is without doubt represented by the New Public Management (NPM), and 
the related spread of Value For Money (VFM) auditing. Power (1997,42) 
defines NPM as "a label which has been used to characterize observable 
changes in the style of public administration. Auditing institutions have 
assumed an increasingly important role in the implementation of these 
changes and 'value for money' (VFM) auditing has become a prominent 
and constantly evolving instrument of financial control". Extant literature 
seems rather vague in pinning down the exact origin of the term 'new 
public management' to a precise point in time or a specific publication. 
However, there seems to be a wide agreement that the first systematic 
attempt to discuss both the doctrinal group of ideas identified by the label 
of NPM and their intellectual provenance was an influential paper 
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published by Christopher Hood in 1991 and entitled A public 
management for all seasons? According to Hood's analysis, NPM 
consists of a cluster of managerial principles and ideas that have been 
transferred from the administrative practice of the private sector into 
public management. Its key beliefs are cost control, financial 
transparency, the introduction of market mechanisms into the provision 
of public services, the reliance on a 'contract culture' and - more 
importantly - "the enhancement of accountability to customers for the 
quality of service via the creation of performance indicators" (Power 
1997,43; Hood 1991 and Kettl 2000). 
Such radical transformations of the role of government in public services 
provision and in conceptions of governance (which ultimately caused the 
audit explosion) are common - to varying degrees - to most Western 
societies. Britain has certainly been no exception. In 1982, the UK 
witnessed the introduction of the Financial Management Initiative (FMI), a 
clear indication of the direction in which the Thatcher government wanted 
public administration to head for. FMI required each spending department 
- as well as their subordinate agencies - to clearly identify their objectives 
and set targets against which their performance could be measured. 
Significantly, this practice was also extended to those spheres of activity 
where performance was not easily quantifiable (and the cultural sector 
undoubtedly belongs to this group). Each administrative body had to 
nonetheless declare its aims and assess the extent to which policies had 
been successful in achieving them, as a condition for its claims on public 
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resources to be considered legitimate (Jenkins 1995,232). Unlike 
previous attempts to restructure and modernise the public administrative 
system, the innovations introduced by FMI seemed to take root. The 
tendency towards managerialism in the public sphere was thus first 
encouraged, in the 1980s, by a Conservative government, and has been 
supported by New Labour after 1997 without apparent solution of 
continuity. 
The popularity of NPM principles with governments of both right- and 
centre-left leaning would seem to confirm (at least in principle) its claims 
to political neutrality, which upholders of NPM consider as one if its main 
advantages. With its reliance on the logic of cost calculation as a 
principle for decision-making in public, political and governmental 
choices, NPM is based on the notion of the universality and superiority of 
the market as the ultimate decision-making mechanism (Clarke 2001,5). 
NPM's claims to political neutrality are thus based on the postulate that 
different political priorities and circumstances can be accommodated by 
introducing minimal alternations to NPM principles. These are indeed 
seen as a "neutral and all-purpose instrument for realizing whatever 
goals elected representative might set" (Hood 1991,8). The political 
significance of such claims, though, is evident. In his discussion of New 
Labour's financial policies, Alan Finlayson (2003,114) observes that 
"[t]he advantage of all this (New Public Management plus a hands-off 
economic strategy) is that it appears to remove political calculation from 
the process of economic management. This is deemed an advantage to 
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the markets but also an advantage to the state, in that it cannot be so 
easily accused of screwing things up since it was only following pre-set 
rules. [ ... ] De-politicisation is thus a highly political strategy, with the effect 
of shifting regimes of accountability and influence away from the elected 
and thus away from the electors". Interestingly, Clarke (2001,5) 
maintains that there are clear linkages between the political movement of 
the New Right and systematic attempts to de-politicise the public realm: 
"New Right governments have endeavoured to de-politicise critical public 
issues through installing economic discourse and managerialism as the 
dominant frameworks for decision-making". In the light of these 
considerations, it is interesting to note that the countries where NPM has 
penetrated furthest are the Anglophone states, the USA, UK, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, that is countries where the influence of neo- 
liberalism has been historically particularly significant (Clarke 2001,8). It 
could thus be argued that strong allegiances to neo-liberalism and neo- 
conservatism betray the strong political and ideological nature of the 
sweep of public administration reforms that go under the umbrella term of 
NPM. As Michael Barzelay (1997,3) explains "NPM is not just a 
cognitive device for identifying problems and inventing solutions in public 
management. NPM plays a role in cultivating support for particular 
formulations of problems and their recommended solutions". Rather than 
representing a politically neutral solution to the problems posed by 
contemporary public administration, NPM and the rhetoric of 
managerialism seem to go along very nicely with strategies of neo-liberal 
globalisation, to the extent that Clarke (2001,3) speculates on whether 
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we might be witnessing a systematic attempt, on the part of the New 
Right movement, to dissolve the public realm98. 
NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
Unsurprisingly, the effects of the so-called "modernization imperative" 
(Charlton and Andras 2003) - and the growing managerialism in public 
service delivery that seems to accompany it - has not limited its influence 
to public policy-making at the national level. In fact, the long arm of NPM 
has stretched as far as to encompass local government and its modes of 
service provision. The efforts towards shaping a more entrepreneurial 
and efficient local government also date back to pre-New Labour times, 
as proved by the establishment, in the mid-1980s, of schemes such as 
the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tender (CCT) for a number 
of service previously provided by the local authorities themselves. The 
adoption of CCT has entailed a fundamental revision of the role of local 
authorities, which now find themselves in the position of often having to 
contract out the provision of services to private companies (Byrne 2000, 
76). No longer would local authorities necessarily be the providers of the 
service; they might only be the enablers; that is, local authorities would 
invite private firms to bid (in competition with themselves) for the 
opportunity to provide services. For example, many leisure and cultural 
facilities today are no longer managed by the local authority itself, but by 
98 Clarke (2001,3) writes: "The neo-liberal strategy has been consistently hostile to the 
public realm. It has challenged conceptions of the public interest, striving to replace 
them by the rule of private interests, aggregated by markets (and forms of corporate 
collusion and combination). It has insisted that the 'monopoly providers' of public 
services be replaced by efficient suppliers, disciplined by the competitive realities of the 
market (or, in some of its neo-conservatives combinations, by philanthropy). It has 
disintegrated conceptions of the public as a collective identity, attempting to substitute 
individualised and economised identities as taxpayers and consumers". 
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a private firm contracted by the local authority. The government believed 
that this procedure would encourage a higher standard of service at a 
more competitive price. As local authority departments were allowed to 
bid for the contracts against private competitors, the government hoped 
that this would provide sufficient incentive for them to keep costs down 
and standards of service high. 
In a development that parallels closely what happened at the national 
level, the change of fortunes of the Conservatives did not result in a 
change of direction for local government. Indeed, the 1999 Local 
Government Act decreed that CCT would be abolished by the year 2000 
to be replaced by New Labour's own scheme aiming at the modernization 
of local government: Best Value. Best value, just as CCT before it, is a 
scheme aiming at the achievement of effectiveness and economic 
efficiency within local government. Local authorities now have the duty to 
provide "best value" in the provision of a wide range of services (a wider 
range of services, in fact, than that previously covered by CCT, now 
including cultural provision). According to the policy document 
Modernising Local Government: Improving Local Services Through Best 
Value, local authorities are required "to meet the aspirations of local 
people for the highest quality and most efficient services that are possible 
at a price that people are willing to pay" (DETR 1998,5). In practice, this 
entails the setting of both national and local objectives, performance 
measurements, standards and targets. Most of these are devised by the 
local authority themselves, although, in setting their own standards, local 
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authorities have to take into account those that have been set at the 
national level. In particular, central government establishes a set of 
performance indicators for the assessment of effectiveness and quality 
with regards to major services. On the basis of these, local authorities set 
their own targets, and are under obligation to publish these - as well as 
an assessment of their performance in achieving them - in an annual 
Local Performance Plan (Byrne 2000,593-594). This is not all, for local 
authorities - as Byrne explains - "are also required, as a minimum, to set 
quality targets over a five-year period which are consistent with the 
performance of the top 25 per cent of all councils and cost and efficiency 
targets consistent with the performance of the top 25 per cent of councils 
in the region" (Byrne 2000,594). However, as one would expect from an 
'audit society', there are further systems of control in place in order to 
ensure that 'best value' is indeed provided to public service users. All 
councils are expected to undertake, every five years, a general 
performance review encompassing all the services they provide. The aim 
of such performance reviews is - in what is an enlightening example of 
the current language of public administration - to establish the extent of 
the local authority' s success in the pursuit of the ultimate goal 
represented by the '3 Es', that is, economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
in local service provision (Byrne 2000,317)99. 
99 The '3 Es' - and with them the guarantee that value-for-money has been obtained by 
the effective use of council resources - are to be achieved via the assessment of 
services against four criteria: the '4 Cs': 
a Challenge - why and how a service is being provided; 
" Comparison - with the service and the performance achieved by other local 
authorities and the private sector, 
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The implications of this process for discretionary areas of local authority 
spending such as museum, galleries and local cultural provision in 
general (with the significant exception of the Public Library Service which 
is, in fact, a statutory local government responsibility) are quite 
significant. Museums, for instance "will be placed under much greater 
scrutiny than has been customary and they will have to justify themselves 
in the context of wider local government priorities and strategies" (Lawley 
2003,79). Moreover, since no local authority is actually required to 
operate museums (nor in fact any other cultural facility - cultural provision 
is a statutory duty of local authorities only in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland) there are some fears within the museum community that Best 
Value Reviews might be used an as excuse to put in place damaging 
cost-saving exercises (Lawley 2003,79). This is a concrete possibility, 
especially in view of the fact that, in Ian Lawley's words "[t]he arrival of 
Best Value has exposed the general lack of consistent and meaningful 
data collection and analysis within the sector" (Lawley 2003,80). The 
lack of data on the effectiveness of cultural organisations in achieving the 
targets that have been set for them is indeed a serious issue, and it will 
be discussed in more detail in the following section of this chapter. 
  Consultation - with local tax payers, service users, and the wider business 
community on how the service can be improved; 
" Competitiveness - ensuring that the service's performance is competitive if 
compared to other methods of delivery including those of the private sectors; 
this involves tendering and market testing and might lead to the contracting out 
of services (Byrne 2000,594). 
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The impacts of such developments in modes of local public 
administration upon the nature of local authority provision for the arts, 
however, extend well beyond the museum and gallery sector. Indeed, 
local authorities are a crucial element in the British arts funding system, 
providing essential resources for a range of cultural activities and 
services as diverse as the provision and licensing of venues for the 
production of artistic events, funding theatres, orchestras and individual 
performers, commissioning works of art and providing background 
support and encouragement for arts organisations10°. Local government, 
therefore, has a crucial role in the public support for the arts sector in the 
UK. As a matter of fact, local authorities' spending on the arts exceeded 
that of central government for the first time in 1988/89; and the spending 
on the arts by local government is currently larger than that made by the 
ACE and its Regional Offices, and is only slightly less than that made by 
the DCMS. According to the most recent Arts Council's review of data on 
local authority expenditure on the arts, in England alone, this amounted 
to around £218 million (Jermyn and Joy 2002). Although the distribution 
of its resources is far from homogenous across the country (spending on 
the arts varies dramatically from one local authority to another), local 
government is undoubtedly a key player in public arts funding in the UK, 
albeit its role seems to be sometimes overlooked in cultural policy 
research. 
100 In the year 2000/01,63% of local authority net spending was on local authority run and 
contracted out venues and 21% was on grants to arts organisations or individual artists (Jermyn 
and Joy 2002). 
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THE SUBSIDIZED ARTS IN THE'AUDIT SOCIETY' 
How have the subsidised arts fared in this changed political and 
administrative climate? In view of the arguments presented in the 
preceding sections of this chapter, it seems possible to conclude 
correctly that the subsidised arts sector is currently regulated by policies 
that emphasise the instrumental role of the arts in society. Moreover, 
publicly funded arts organizations have also been involved in the data- 
collection duties that evidence-based policy making entails. As a 
consequence, the subsidized arts too - in so far as they constitute an 
area of public expenditure - have found themselves forced to turn to the 
'rationalized rituals of inspection' described above. One might even be 
tempted to suggest that, even more than other areas of public policy, the 
arts have found in the justifying practices of audit and performance 
measurement a precious form of official validation. This - it could be 
argued - might represent for the arts a means to filling the legitimacy void 
caused by the erosion of cultural authority which followed the diffusion of 
theories of cultural relativism within the postmodern theoretical 
discourse. What we are suggesting is that, to a certain extent, rituals of 
verification (e. g. the obsession for policy targets and outcomes 
evaluation) might be seen as a surrogate for the arts' lost authority and 
legitimacy. 
Whether or not this explanation is accepted as satisfactory, it is 
undeniable that the subsidized arts sector, in the UK, is today under 
increasing pressure to gather data on its impacts on society and on the 
-- 203 
national economy. This is a necessary process in order to produce 'hard 
evidence', to try and demonstrate that the sector can live up to the 
government's expectations (a crucial requirement in the control- 
obsessed audit society). This is indeed the conclusion reached by Sara 
Selwood (2002b), who has researched extensively the uses and abuses 
of cultural statistics within the British cultural sector. She maintains that 
DCMS's emphasis on economic impact, social inclusion and 
regeneration, access (and the whole rhetoric of the 'arts for the many, 
not for the few') is firmly rooted in Labour's commitment to deliver on its 
programmes, and to make public services more efficient. In order to 
achieve its aims, the government has committed itself to base the 
formulation of policy on evidence and, consequently, expects publicly 
funded bodies to regularly collect and analyse data (Selwood 2002b, 11). 
This passage from DCMS' 1998 Annual Report is very explicit on the 
topic: 
This is not something for nothing. We want to see measurable 
outcomes for the investment which is being made. From now on 
there will be real partnership with obligations and responsibilities. 
Such obligations and responsibilities are clearly set out in the Funding 
Agreements that regulate the relationship between DCMS and its 
sponsored bodies (and set the targets they are expected to meet), and in 
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the Local Cultural Strategies that the local authorities are invited to 
produce1°'. 
Unsurprisingly, since 1997, the DCMS has substantially developed its 
bureaucratic systems of control, in order to ensure the delivery of 
government objectives and to be able to advocate for increased funding 
more convincingly, often resorting to explicitly earmarking sums of 
money for the delivery of specified objectives (Selwood 2002b, 20). 
These observations seem to point towards the conclusion that - as Clive 
Gray puts it (1996,218) - "cultural policy does not operate in splendid 
isolation from the broader pressures within society". Consequently, the 
extent to which cultural policies develop independently or are dominated 
by other spheres of public policy and by changes in public management 
style is an important indication of what is actually happening within the 
field. It is now time to consider the implications and the impacts of the 
developments described so far on the arts themselves. 
In the context of the audit explosion and the shift towards evidence- 
based cultural policies, what are the main implications for the British 
subsidized cultural sector? The concluding section of this chapter will 
look at some of the fundamental issues entailed in the adoption of 
101 Selwood's comments on this passage seem to reinforce the argument presented so 
far: This framework, which was ultimately driven by the advent of resource accounting 
across government, meant 'that DCMS ties its expenditure to its objectives' and that it 
needs 'to be assured that public money is being used appropriately to meet public 
objectives'. Moreover, 'investing for reform', as the rhetoric has it, means that the 'more 
money invested, [the] more results are required'. For DCMS, this implies closure on any 
possibility of 'grants for grants' sake' (DCMS quoted in Selwood 2002b 12). 
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instrumental rationales for state involvement in the cultural sector: policy 
evaluation and issues of quality. 
INSTRUMENTAL CULTURAL POLICY: PROBLEMATIC IMPLICATIONS 
One of the most compelling repercussions of instrumental cultural 
policies - especially against the background of the increasing reliance on 
evidence as the basis for public policy-making - is that issues of 
performance measurement and policy evaluation become of crucial 
importance. If we refer, once again, to Vestheim's definition of an 
instrumental cultural policy as an emphasis of arts as a means towards 
the achievement of a non-specifically artistic or aesthetic objective, then 
it will be clear that establishing the extent to which the arts are a 
successful means to an end is essential. 
The main implication of this instrumental view of cultural policy is, 
therefore, that the claim that investment in the arts actually does produce 
positive economic or social impacts has to be convincingly proved. 
Moreover, for the argument to hold - in the context of the current 'audit 
explosion' and of the importance of evidence to inform policy - it 
becomes necessary to demonstrate that the arts can, in fact, make a 
significant contribution to the cause of social inclusion or economic 
development. In fact, the arts must show that they represent the best 
option for the profitable investment of increasingly limited public 
resources; they must convince government and citizens/consumers that 
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they can provide the ultimate goal: value for money. Hence the central 
role - within instrumental cultural policies - of the evaluation of arts 
programmes and policies. In particular, the issues of evaluation throws 
light upon the vexed question of collecting reliable data in order to 
substantiate the claims that are being made for the arts and the ever 
growing expectations of their impacts. 
Unfortunately, despite the governments' and the funding bodies' claims, 
such positive beneficial impacts of the British cultural sector over social 
disadvantage and the economy are far from being proved (Belfiore 2002; 
Merli 2002). A major problem is represented by the quality of the extant 
cultural statistics on which cultural policy-making has become growingly 
reliant. Such statistics are not harmonised (they have been collected at 
different times and with different methods) and cannot therefore be 
neither compared nor aggregated (Selwood 2002,68). In fact, DCMS 
itself has recently concluded that, with regards to the positive impacts of 
the arts, "we do not have enough information to judge whether such 
gains are enough or are efficiently and effectively gained" (DCMS 2002, 
Evidence on CulturallCreative/Sporting Effects. Unpublished document 
quoted by Selwood 2002b, 19). Moreover, a report commissioned in 
2001 by the Local Government Association reached a similar conclusion: 
"[t]he absence of certain types of basic information indicates a 
widespread lack of systematic monitoring and evaluation, which limits the 
ability of cultural services to define precisely the nature of their 
contribution to the new policy agendas and to manage for the 
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achievement of claimed outcomes. It is increasingly important to define 
precisely the desired outcomes of cultural services and assess the extent 
to which they have been achieved" (Coalter 2001,1). 
Extant evidence is simply not sufficient to justify public expenditure in the 
arts solely - or mainly - on the grounds of their impacts in the social and 
economic sphere, and methodologies on which the evidence collection is 
based are rather dubious. Criticism has been moved against methods for 
evaluating the social impacts of arts programmes, and the quality of the 
'evidence' produced has been criticized for being anecdotal and 
unsupported by adequate systems of data collection (with the result of 
making comparisons over time impossible) (Belfiore 2002; Merli 2002, 
Selwood 2002a). Similar arguments have been made against the alleged 
economic impacts of the creative sector (Hansen 1995; van Puffelen 
1996, Belfiore 2003)102. Arguably then - skimmed of the rhetoric that 
hides vested interests - the instrumental notion of arts and culture seem 
to provide a rather weak justification for public support of the arts. 
102 Similar arguments have also been made with regards to the creative industries. 
James Heartfield, for instance, in a pamphlet meaningfully entitled Great Expectations: 
The Creative Industries in the New Economy, argues that the creative industries are far 
from being the amazingly productive sector that they are claimed to be in the 
government's official rhetoric. Indeed, he cites an EU survey, carried out in 1999, 
according to which Britain performs above average in manufacturing innovation but lags 
behind with regards to innovation in the service sector (a bizarre result for what claims 
to be a 'creative economy'). He therefore explains the strong emphasis placed by the 
government on the cultural industries with its intention to re-brand the UK as 'cool 
Britannia', in an attempt to cover up, with a clever design solution, the political problems 
that it was unable (or unwilling) to solve. Ultimately, he believes that "the great 
expectations that individuals, companies and governments invest in the creative 
industries cannot be met. These expectations are not related to the real potentialities of 
creative work, but to the fantasies of those who hold them" (Heartfield 2000,27). This 
last consideration is very important in so far as it throws light on the crucial problem of 
the politicisation undergone by the process of data collection. This has resulted in a 
blurring of the boundary between research and advocacy on the part of both 
government and cultural organizations recipient of public funding. 
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DEFINITIONS OF QUALITY 
The last section of this chapter aims to tackle problems of 'quality'. How 
can we define quality in the cultural sector in the context of instrumental 
cultural policies? 
There are two possible alternative ways of defining quality relatively to 
the subsidized cultural sector. Firstly, aesthetic quality can be defined 
according to criteria of aesthetic value, a position exemplified, in Britain, 
by the Arts Council's belief in the promotion of "excellence" in the arts. 103 
Notions of quality and artistic excellence have in fact never been explicitly 
codified by the Arts Council, although those working within it seem to 
base their activities and decisions concerning fund allocations on some 
understood and shared notion of excellence and quality within the arts, 
and share the belief that judgement of artistic quality are central to the 
Council's work. In Clive Gray's words, "there is no doubt that the ACs 
[Arts Councils] and DCMS are the dominant organisational forms within 
the network for the arts and, as such, -must serve as the focus for 
discerning which values are dominant within the system" (Gray 2000,98). 
Although a discussion of the evolution of conceptions of culture and 
aesthetic values promoted by the Arts Council is beyond the scope of the 
present chapter, it seems legitimate to maintain that notions of aesthetic 
values and quality beheld by decision-makers within the Arts Council 
103 'Excellence' together with 'access' has been the guiding principles of the Arts Council of 
England since its very inception in the aftermath of WWII (see Belfiore 2002; Hewison 1995). 
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have historically tended to coincide with traditional cultural values. This 
might be explained by the very social composition and cultural 
background of key people within the organisation. In the words of Hugh 
Jenkins, "[t]he Council is a group assembled by a series of chances, a 
collection of random choices made by a very tiny and ingrown electorate 
advised by the Council's own bureaucracy and finally approved by a 
Secretary of State or Prime Minister who knows little about the people 
concerned and naturally opts for what he is told is safe, which means the 
arts establishments" (Jenkins quoted in Hewison 1995,176; see also 
Williams 1979). Indeed, over time, accusations have regularly been made 
against the Arts Council, its recruitment practices, and its criteria for grant 
allocations of representing something of a patronage system instrumental 
to a self-indulging cultural elite (see for instance Hewison 1995; Jenkins 
1979). According to Clive Gray (2002,78), the adoption of the 'arm's 
length principle' with regards to public arts funding "has generated the 
creation of a set of policy oligarchies within the state-supported arts 
sector in Britain that have considerable power to influence the manner in 
which policy is both created and implemented". Jenkins himself, 
recounting his experience of working within the Arts Council, explains 
how he became increasingly frustrated as he attempted to "loosen the 
grip of the snobocracy on the arts scene" (Jenkins quoted in Hewison 
1995,177). Things seems to have slightly changed, at least at the level 
of rhetoric, as shown by this passage from the 1992 Arts Council's 
discussion paper Towards a National Arts & Media Strategy "One of our 
key responsibilities is to make judgements about the allocation of scarce 
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resources. The concept of quality is central to the making of such 
judgements, and we believe that it should be central to all those who 
work in the arts. But the concept is not associated solely with particular 
art forms, and we entirely repudiate the idea that some forms are of 
themselves superior or inferior to others" (ACGB 1992). Notions of what 
constitute the arts might have changed over time, but there is no doubt 
that the conception of artistic quality as a primary criteria for grant 
allocation has been a consistent feature of the Arts Council's code of 
practice throughout its existence. 
Secondly, quality can also be defined according to principles of quality in 
public service provision as they have been elaborated in the rhetoric of 
the New Public Management. In this framework, the meaning of quality in 
the public sector relates directly to concepts of effectiveness, 
performance measurement and, ultimately, the provision of 'value for 
money'. 
It is evident that there is a tension between these two competitive notions 
of quality, and the friction this causes can be clearly seen at work within 
the Arts Council England (ACE). When ACE defines as one of its aims 
the financing of arts projects characterized by high quality, does it refer to 
projects and programmes that are successful in reaching the expected 
standards of quality artistically, socially, or economically? It is clear that it 
could easily happen that such notions of quality and success might 
ultimately be incompatible and therefore might not successfully co-exist. 
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In case of conflict, which one of the two notions of quality should prevail? 
A typical example of this kind of difficulty might be provided by the case 
of those cultural projects that are targeted at disadvantaged and 'socially 
excluded' communities, where often the participants have little or no 
previous experience of the arts. Despite the formal recognition, on the 
part of the arts 'establishment', of the intrinsic value of participatory arts 
in the community, quality is still a bone of contention between the 
national funding bodies (such as ACE) and community arts groups. The 
former, as discussed above, base their criteria for subsidy on principles 
of artistic quality and excellence in the arts. On the other hand, 
community arts groups place more emphasis and value on participation 
in the artistic process (because of its alleged empowering effects) rather 
than on the artistic product itself (Webster 1997,1-2). Should community 
arts projects with a social aim be evaluated on the grounds of the same 
criteria of 'excellence' and 'quality' that inform ACE's relationship with its 
traditional client organizations or should they rather be assessed merely 
on the grounds of their positive effects on the participants, with little 
concern for their artistic merit? 
Things are further complicated by a clear ambiguity (or, possibly, 
hypocrisy? ) in ACE's position: on the one hand its policy documents are 
imbued with the rhetoric of social inclusion that is so dear to the 
government. On the other hand, a quick glance at actual funding 
statistics reveal that the share of available funds devoted to community 
or specifically inclusive arts is in no way proportionate to the rhetorical 
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emphasis they receive. It would seem that while preaching in favour of 
socially inclusive arts and on the importance of participation, ACE still 
holds on to aesthetic criteria that can sometimes be incompatible with 
those values (Belfiore 2002,100-101). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Following the arguments presented by this chapter, it seems possible to 
conclude that there are many possible ways to provide explanations for 
the clear tendency displayed by the British government to justify public 
involvement and support of the arts in instrumental terms. Public arts 
funding and encouragement of the arts have been justified on the basis 
of economic arguments and references to their contribution to preserving 
social order since Victorian times - that is, since they were first officially 
admitted into the sphere of public policy. Instrumental cultural policy is, 
therefore, not a novel phenomenon. Its most recent evolution - from the 
1980s to present - might be accounted for by the erosion of the 
legitimacy of traditional notions of culture (largely founded on the 
Eurocentric, white, male and fundamentally exclusionary aesthetic 
canons of Western civilization) at the hand of postmodern cultural 
relativism. However, the recent evolution of cultural policy can also be 
seen as one specific area where broader changes in public management 
style and policy-making are reflected. Whatever the point of perspective 
one decides to choose, it is obvious that instrumental cultural policies 
force the arts sector to face a number of troublesome questions, some of 
which we have just looked at. These problematical issues can be 
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reduced to the difficulty, in the contemporary world, to justify public arts 
spending (and consequently the need for a body like the Arts Council to 
even exist) independently of instrumental arguments. Justin Lewis (1990, 
1) has described these circumstances very well: 
[w]e live in an era of priorities, not ideals. Under any form of 
government, there is not enough public money available to fund 
everything worthy of support. Money spent on art and culture needs, 
like everything else, to be justified against other areas of public 
subsidy... Without a substantial increase in all forms of public 
spending, it is socially irresponsible to spend money on arts and 
culture if it cannot be rigorously justified. 
Since the chances of a 'substantial increase' in public spending across all 
sectors seem today rather slim, the arts world is left with the need to 
make its own case in favour of public arts funding convincingly. 
Regrettably, the way out of the justification impasse that the arts have 
chosen, or have been forced to follow, has been to 'attach' themselves to 
other policy spheres that carry a heftier political weight. As a result, arts 
organisations have increasingly endeavoured to highlight the contribution 
they can make to the national and. local economy and to a more harmonic 
and integrated society as a sensible reason for the state to support the 
arts. This has put the arts in a very awkward position indeed. On the one 
hand if - as it seems the case - the arts cannot provide convincing 
evidence of their impacts, the argument automatically breaks down. If, on 
the other hand, the arts should become able to substantiate the public 
utility argument, the consequence of this on the future of the arts might 
not be necessarily positive. Indeed, if we took the instrumental argument 
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to its most extreme, yet intrinsically logical, consequences, then there 
would be no point in having a cultural policy at all, for its functions might 
be carried out just as well by economic and social services departments. 
In this perspective, arts provision could be easily absorbed within existing 
economic and social policies. 
Significantly, government itself has recently come to acknowledge the 
tension between 'instrumental' and 'intrinsic' values that dominates the 
public debate over arts funding in Britain. So, in 2003, Estelle Morris, 
then Minister for the Arts, speaking at the Cheltenham Festival of 
Literature, confessed: 
I know that Arts and Culture make a contribution to health, to 
education, to crime reduction, to strong communities, to the economy 
and to the nation's well-being but I don't always know how to evaluate 
it or describe it. We have to find a language and a way of describing 
its worth. It's the only way we'll secure the greater support we need. 
A year later, Tessa Jowell, caused a general stir when she published a 
personal essay entitled Government and the Value of Culture, where she 
made what many felt to be a startling indictment of the politicians' 
reliance on instrumental arguments to justify public spending on the 
arts' 04 
104 In Jowell's (2004,8) own words: "Too often politicians have been forced to debate 
culture in terms only of its instrumental benefits to other agendas - education, the 
reduction of crime, improvements in wellbeing - explaining - or in some instances almost 
apologising for - our investment in culture only in terms of something else. In political 
and public discourse in this country we have avoided the more difficult approach of 
investigating, questioning and celebrating what culture actually does in and of Itself. 
There is another story to tell on culture and it's up to politicians in my position to give a 
lead in changing the atmosphere, and changing the terms of debate". 
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The paper was hailed in the media as a sign of support for 'art for art's 
sake' (Fenton 2004). And yet, Jowell's essay is far from being a coherent 
call for the adoption of the so-called 'art for art's sake' principle as the 
guiding rationale for British cultural policy. As a matter of fact, Jowell's 
essay, with its inconsistencies and contradictions, is a typical 
representation of the stumbling block the cultural policy debate is 
presently facing. For, together with the emphasis on the need for 
'improved access to culture for what it does in itself (page 8; emphasis in 
the original) and for an understanding of culture 'on its own terms' (page 
13), a number or residual instrumentalist concepts still find their way into 
Jowell's argument105, and her language is still very much inscribed into 
the post-1980s rhetoric of the public 'investment' on the arts (as opposed 
to the old-fashioned and now supplanted notion of 'subsidy'): "By 
accepting culture is an important investment in personal social capital we 
begin to justify that investment on culture's own terms" (Ibid., 16)106. 
105 David Edgar's (2004) comments that "Jowell edges uncomfortably close to a new 
social mission for the arts when she argues that culture has an additional part to play 'in 
defining and preserving our cultural identity - of the Individual, of communities, and of 
the nation as a whole'". 
106 Jowell's essay Is also fraught with Internal contradictions, and it Is ultimately far from 
being a repudiation of instrumentalism in cultural funding and policy. One the one and, 
as we have seen, Jowell argues for a change of language amongst all parties Involved 
in cultural policy-making and arts administration, In order to find ways to express the 
'intrinsic' value of the arts. On the other, Jowell herself cannot seem to avoid the 
reliance on many of the usual 'instrumental' arguments for arts advocacy. Jowell (2004, 
8) openly admits: We lack convincing language and political arguments for how culture 
lies at the heart of a healthy society" and, as was noted above, she seems to condemn 
the excesses of the prevailing Instrumentalism in current cultural policy-making. 
However, Jowell (lbld., 3) also claims that one of the main tasks of government in 
today's society is to eliminate the poverty of aspiration which compromises all our 
attempts to lift people out of physical poverty. Engagement with culture can help 
alleviate this poverty of aspiration". On page 15 she adds: 'Addressing poverty of 
aspiration is also necessary to build a society of fairness and opportunities". I would 
suggest that this final statement brings us back full circle, for, if the arts can and should 
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In her essay, however, Tessa Jowell does indeed put forward an 
important observation. She fundamentally agrees with the view of Estelle 
Morris cited above when she says: 
We lack convincing language and political arguments for how 
culture lies at the heart of a healthy society. This might be a 
peculiarly British thing, and it might be part of a reaction on the 
one hand against the totalitarian regimes of the past who have 
tried to enrol culture as a tool of political oppression. On the other 
hand it might stem from a national distrust of intellectuals. 
In other words, Jowell here raises the question of how to develop a case 
for the arts that is able to sidestep the sterile dichotomy between 
'instrumental' and 'intrinsic' values that seem to prevail at the moment. 
She also makes it clear (as Morris also did) that facing up to this 
challenge requires the construction of a new language that can articulate 
what the arts do 'for themselves' - in other words, how they affect people 
and societies and, thus, their place and role in today's society. However, 
it is interesting to observe that the notion of 'complex culture' - which 
Jowell herself puts forward as an antidote to simplistic and instrumental 
views of the arts prevalent today - though often referred to in the essay 
(nine times in eighteen pages, to be precise) is in fact never defined. This 
makes one wonder to what extent a simple change in language (or, 
rather, jargon) can really effect a significant shift in the cultural policy 
discourse - and ultimately policy - if it is not substantiated by a critical 
address poverty of aspiration (as ostensibly Jewell is arguing), and addressing poverty 
of aspiration can bring about a just society, then the arts are entrusted with the task of 
bringing about the conditions for such a "society of fairness ad opportunities" to exist. In 
other words, we are back to valuing the arts for the benefits they accrue to society and, 
in effect, to an instrumental rationale for cultural policy-making. 
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exploration and understanding of what lies behind formulas and 
buzzwords. 
In conclusion, there seems to be a fairly good chance that instrumental 
cultural policies, which started off as 'policies of survival' attempting to 
put forward a stronger case in favour of arts subsidy, might in fact turn 
out to be 'politics of extinction', and further undermine the legitimacy of 
the arts sectors' claims over the public purse. An altogether healthier 
exercise for the arts sector would probably have been the attempt to 
elaborate a definition of what makes the arts intrinsically valuable to 
society - the definition of their 'unique selling point', as marketing would 
have it. So far, all the arts have achieved is to generate ever-growing 
expectations which they are, quite simply, unable to meet. 
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